The Critical Rationalist Vol. 01 No. 02 ISSN: 1393-3809 26-Nov-1996
3 A Summary of Simon's Argument for the
Infinite Extent of Resources
2 Respectable Metaphysics
Versus Partial Operationalism
(23) I think that there is another more profound problem with the assessment of past price data. I think that the relevance of past price data is to be understood through a separation of the notions of justification and explanation. I would suggest that all the really interesting so-called "justifications" of a scientific theory (those that are obtained by trying to test the theory) should be looked at as cases of explanation. It is, after all, the intellectual revelation and economic usefulness of an explanation that we want, and not its justification. One can act no better than in the light of the truth, so adding justification is both intellectually and economically superfluous. This puts past price-data in another light. It is not something that completely determines the theory (and projections), but something that can only test alternative theories (along with their projections).
(24) Those who wish to argue that raw material resources are infinite should aim for the best empirically testable theory that both explains past data and how resources might be indefinitely expanded in the future. One need not "justify" future predictions on the basis of past data. On the contrary, the question should be: how do we explain both the past price data and explain the hypothetical projection? Ever since Hume undermined both simple and probabilistic induction, we have known that an infinite number of future projections are logically compatible with any series of past data taken alone.[7] (For a recent refutation of inductivist thinking see Miller 1994) In order to exclude at least some projections one needs a universal theory. Notice I am talking about explaining declining scarcity, not justifying such a prediction. Ideally, in a scientific prediction one needs a universal theory plus initial conditions to logically derive (but note, not demonstrate) a definite testable description of some future state of affairs. But short of this, one can settle for a more or less schematic explanation, which is often the case in the social sciences. An extreme example is our everyday schematic explanations of human actions: even though we do not scientifically predict in detail a piece of behaviour we can understand it afterwards in the context of the person's knowledge, aims and problems.[8] If someone shivers on a cold day, this alone will be insufficient to allow us to scientifically predict that he will put his coat on; but if he does put his coat on, we have no hesitation in explaining this as his attempt to get warm, because we have a general theory that sees humans as goal-directed, rational agents etc.
(25) The sort of thing that can be done is for the resource-finitist and resource-infinitist to put some time limit on the predictions:
(26) Are there any general theoretical ways of explaining why resources and resource-augmenting inventions do not simply dry up? I do not think it possible to develop a theory from which one can scientifically derive the prediction of continued growth in economically useful inventions. I do not think that this is possible because, as Popper has argued, technical developments are strongly influenced by the emergence of new ideas, but there are logical reasons why one cannot predict (scientifically) any radically new idea (Popper 1982a). The argument is involved, but briefly and crudely put it is that if one succeeded in predicting now the emergence in the future of some new idea, this would be paradoxical since how can an idea that is only new in the future be predicted now. The idea would, after all, have to be stated now as part of the prediction, but it's newness would evaporate as soon it was stated. This argument leaves open shrewd conjectures about future technical development that are not strictly derived from theory plus initial conditions, and also the possibility of predicting types of new ideas rather than definite descriptions of future inventions. It also allows for carefully stated conditional predictions. One must also bear in mind that a single new unpredictable idea may lead to the destruction of society as such.
(27) Nevertheless, I do believe it possible to offer a very general argument that suggests the sort of considerations that are necessary (though not sufficient) to explain schematically:
(28) Natural resources are infinite because of the following two fundamental facts:
3 A Summary of Simon's Argument for the
Infinite Extent of Resources
2 Respectable Metaphysics
Versus Partial Operationalism
The Critical Rationalist Vol. 01 No. 02 ISSN: 1393-3809 26-Nov-1996
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TCR Issue Timestamp: Tue Nov 26 17:14:18 GMT 1996