% This file was created by the WP2X program, using an l2h % descriptor file originally written by % Barry McMullin . % Do not expect everything to be converted perfectly. % \documentstyle[html]{article} \newcommand{\WPindent}[1]{\begin{quote}#1\end{quote}} \begin{document} % % [Wid] \title{The Popper Newsletter: Volume 4 Numbers 1 \& 2} \date{March 1992 (HTML Translation: August 1995)} \author{Editor: \htmladdnormallink{Fred Eidlin} {http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/\%7Etkpw/people/eidlin.html}} \maketitle \tableofcontents \section{(COVER MATTER)} \subsection{Banner} \begin{rawhtml}
\end{rawhtml} {\huge\bf NEWSLETTER {\LARGE\it For those interested in the philosophy of Karl Popper Pour ceux qui s'int\'{e}ressent \`{a} la philosophie de Karl Popper F\"{u}r an der Philosophie Karl Poppers interessierte }} \begin{rawhtml} 
Editor, Fred Eidlin
Associate Editor, Andreas Pickel       Associate Editor, Ray Percival
Department of Political Studies                     70 Hillview Court
University of Guelph                                    Astley Bridge
Guelph, Ontario, Canada  N1G 2W1              Bolton BL1 8NU, England

Telephone: (519) 824-4120 (ext. 3469)          Telephone: 0204-593114
FAX (519) 837-9561                                   Fax: 0204-668618
E-Mail: feidlin@polnet.css.uoguelph.ca

Volume 4, Numbers 1 & 2 (March 1992)                   ISSN 0824-1708
\end{rawhtml} \subsection{About the newsletter} The purpose of this NEWSLETTER is to facilitate personal contacts and exchange of information among people interested in criticism, development, and application of Popper's ideas. This includes those who would not want to be considered "Popperians." Frequency of publication and the size of the NEWSLETTER will depend upon the amount of material received and funds available. Correspondence and information for publication submitted for publication in the NEWSLETTER may be in English, French, or German. If possible, please write your submissions to the NEWSLETTER in the form in which you would like them to appear, and try to make clear what is intended for publication, and what is intended for the information of the Editor only (if it makes any difference). Contributions should not exceed 10 typed pages (double-spaced) (1800 words) in length. \subsection{What to submit to the Newsletter? What should be published in the Newsletter?} This NEWSLETTER would be of little interest to most of its subscribers (including its Editor) if it contained nothing by news about debates and publications of professional philosophers. Many non-philosophers are interested in Popper's ideas because they find them useful in their own work and their own lives. Many people are intrigued by Popper's ideas because of their relevance to so many different professions, scholarly disciplines, and other areas of life, and because these ideas cut across the traditional disciplinary boundaries of scholarly and professional communities. The NEWSLETTER seeks to provide the focal point and meeting place that has not previously existed for people in the many fields of human endeavor throughout the world who have been influenced, challenged, and annoyed by the works of Popper and others who have extended and criticized his work. Non-philosophers are especially encouraged to submit news, discussion items, and information about their publications for inclusion in the NEWSLETTER, without worrying much about whether or not there is enough of a direct link to Popper's philosophy to warrant inclusion. Readers' criticisms of the NEWSLETTER and suggestions for editorial guidelines are welcome. \subsection{\bf HOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE NEWSLETTER } % [Center] {\bf COST 2 issues - ABONNEMENT 2 num\'{e}ros}{\bf - 2 Hefte} % [center] \$7.00 Canadian/canadien (cheques payable to the/\`{a} la NEWSLETTER) \$7.00 United States funds (checks payable to the NEWSLETTER) 4.50 British Pounds (cheques payable to the NEWSLETTER) 11.00 Deutsche Mark (Schecks zahlbar an Volker Gadenne oder Erika Eck) 40 French Francs 8000 Italian Lire (checks payable to Raimondo Cubeddu) 10 New Israeli Sheqel (checks payable to Joseph Agassi) 3500 Yugoslav Dinars Other currencies: equivalent of US \$6.00 autres monnaies: l'\'{e}quivalent de \$US\$ 6.00 andere W\"{a}hrungen: Gegenwert von US\$6.00 {\bf 1. Bank transfers/virements/\"{U}berweisungen } {\em {\bf Canada \& U.S.A.}:} Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 23 % \WPindent{% College Ave. West, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Account/Compte No. 95-02661 (NEWSLETTER) for payments in Canadian funds/pour les versements en monnaie canadienne; Account No. 9000038 (F. Eidlin) for payments in U.S. Dollars.% }% {\em {\bf }}{\em {\bf France}:} Cr\'{e}dit Lyonnais, 7 Brigade Alsace-Lorraine, 67000 Strasbourg: Code Banque 30002, Code Guichet 8534, Num\'{e}ro de compte 42084U (F. Eidlin) {\em {\bf Great Britain}:} National Westminster Bank PLC, Edinburgh Branch, 80 George Street, Edinburgh EH2 3DZ, U.K. Bank Sorting Code Number: 60 30 20; Account Title: Fred Eidlin Popper News Letter Account; Account No. 32152299 {\em {\bf Italia}:} conto corrente postale 10438562 intestato a Cubeddu dr. Raimondo, v. Pungilupo, 27 - 56100 PISA. {\bf 2. Cheques or cash may be sent directly to the Editor Des cheques ou des esp\`{e}ces peuvent \^{e}tre envoy\'{e}s a l'\'{e}diteur Schecks und Bargeld k\"{o}nnen an den Herausgeber geschickt werden} \section{NOTES FROM THE EDITORS} {\it It has been over four years since the last issue of the {\em Newsletter}. There are reasons for this long delay. We won't trouble you with them here, but would be pleased to explain to anyone interested. Suffice it to say that we are willing to continue to publish the {\em Newsletter} as long as there is a readership and enough worthwhile material to publish. Please send contributions, including information about your publications, interests and activities. % [Center] * * * % [center] {\bf We are pleased to announce that Dr. Ray Percival, who for the past serveral years has been the organizer of an annual one-day conference on Popper's philosophy, has agreed to serve as an Associate Editor of the {\em NEWSLETTER. Contributions, queries and subscriptions can be addressed to him, as well as to Andres Pickel or Fred Eidlin. } We would like to publish a range of comments in memorium of Bill Bartley. If you have written something (published or not) or know of interesting comments by others, please send them in. } - the editors } \section{NEWS \& DISCUSSION} \subsection{HANS ALBERT ON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY} % \WPindent{% [{\bf {\em Editor's Note:}} The following is a translation of a conversation between Prof. Hans Albert (Mannheim) and {\em Newsletter} Editor, Fred Eidlin. We would like to encourage our readers to submit transcripts of interviews or discussions as well as excerpts from written correspondence that might be of interest to the {\em Newsletter} readership, provided of course all parties have given their agreement.]% }% There are really very different kinds of people working in the Rational Choice paradigm. For example, [Siegwart] Lindenberg has learned modern political economy. In any case, he uses that kind of procedure in an interesting way. He is working on a book explaining revolution. He doesn't always stress general laws and wants to make a linkage to experiments and social research. He is very balanced in this respect. He wants to use psychological research only in order to improve the behavioral assumptions of the economic approach. He also shows why, to some extent, these assumptions have to be simplifications. He thinks there has to be an interplay. I think so too. You can't just ask the psychologists what the laws of behavior are. They will look at you astonished. Maybe not the learning theorists. They have laws of learning. All the others say "No." We investigate personality profiles and this and that, and everything imaginable. We can't find the laws we would need in the social sciences anywhere - the behavioral assumptions. You have to search the social science tradition and improve them. You can use insights from other disciplines for purposes of criticism and improvement, but you can't just say "Here are the assumptions about behavior. The psychologists have found them. Now apply them." It won't work. Psychology has its own problems. They are often different from those we have in the social sciences. They can make sense, but this doesn't mean you can simply take over a problem solution from psychology, since the problem formulation was different, even if it made a lot of sense. They want to know the circumstances under which people go crazy. Some things you can take over. You have to look at it closely. The achievement-motivation people are very interesting for the social sciences. Why? If, for example, you read Schumpeter's theory of economic development. It has an entrepreneurial model - how entrepreneurs search for new {\em Pro\-duk\-tions\-kom\-bi\-na\-tion\-en}, and to explain the development. And the comments that Schumpeter makes about entrepreneurial behavior - e.g. entrepreneurs don't necessarily have a profit motive. The entrepreneurs regard profit as a kind of achievement standard by which they measure their success. Profit itself is often not so interesting for them, it's just a success-standard. The market gives them a standard. So it isn't self-evident that someone who strives for profit has a profit motive. He can have very different motives, but this is the standard of success that he accepts. And the achievement-motivation people have developed a research program, where they show that achievement-motivated people strive for distinction, i.e. they strive for problem-solutions that contain some kind of excellence. What really matters to them is to achieve results. The standard can be very different. They choose their tasks accordingly. E.g. this has been tested on achievement-motivated children. They always choose tasks of medium risk. When you win on low-risk tasks, you can't be proud of it. Tasks with very high risk are crazy. With tasks of medium risk you can act strategically and succeed on the basis of your own capabilities. That is why they choose such tasks. And they have read Schumpeter - these people. The author of {\em The Achieving Society}, McClelland read Schumpeter. He was inspired by what Schumpeter said about entrepreneurs. And this is most interesting. The entrepreneurs are often too optimistic in their expectations, and it is only because of this that they can become active. If they were to calculate correctly, they wouldn't take risks. Such things are in it. The Max Weber thing - how achievement motivation arises is explained. Weber said the spirit of capitalism is as important as the other conditions. How did the spirit of capitalism arise? Through an ascetic Protestantism. The entrepreneurs didn't strive for profit for reasons of money, rather they wanted to be sure that they would be saved. You could only do this through success in the present. Now these people say that conversion to such a {\em Weltanschauung} is only one of the possibilities of creating achievement motivation. But it doesn't always have to be Christianity. In Japan it was by the ethics of the lower Samurai class. It doesn't always have to be conversion to a {\em Weltanschauung}. How does this come to pass. If you take a closer look, it is the educational practices of Puritanism. They placed great value on self-reliance. If you make use of these educational practices, even independently of religion, you can also create achievement motivation. This means that they produced a generalized theory of achievement motivation of which the theory about the influence of Protestant ethics on motivation is a special case. As a result, they had a more general theory which can be used to explain economic development where there is no Protestantism, since there is a completely different culture. If you read Robert N. Bella {\em Tokugawa Religion} you see that the Samurai class played the same role as the entrepreneurs in England. They have a completely different religion, but they stressed similar values. There you have a more general theory of behavior. Perhaps it isn't yet universal, but this is a development which can also be interesting. And this is part of psychology which can be interesting here. But not all kinds of psychology. Only those that focus on problems that play a role here, e.g. on the problem-solving behavior of the entrepreneurial personality. If you take normal economics, something like this doesn't arise at all with the utility function. Economics has often failed in developing countries. Why? Because there are completely different institutions, different personality types, and the assumptions that are usually made don't work at all. If, instead of these universal utility functions, you have theories of motivation in which such things occur, under what conditions, with what educational measures achievement motivation arises, it might be otherwise. McClelland went to developing countries and did training in achievement motivation, with modern methods. I think he was successful. Then he said, good, let's see, achievement motivation is not the only thing. There is also power motivation, affiliation motivation. Motivation is always mixed. There is a combination of achievement and power motivation with American entrepreneurs, or something like that. Maybe there is a bias in it. Nevertheless, despite this, he tried to develop a theory of motivation, that is applied to interesting situations in social science and makes explanation possible. He somewhat neglected the social-structural aspects of the situation, as his critics (for example Eisenstadt) have observed. But someone else can bring them in. Psychologists never have much understanding for structures. One problem is: How do achievement-motivated people get into the situations in which they can become entrepreneurs? This isn't self-evident. It is the problem of the recruitment of entrepreneurs. There might be social barriers there. There are many achievement-motivated boys who will never be entrepreneurs if there are social barriers in place. This is the question of social mobility. And the question of social mobility is partly a question of structures. In a caste society like India, the talented and achievement-motivated can't rise because there are social barriers. So, on the one hand there is education for achievement motivation; on the other hand, there is social mobility and recruitment to roles. There is a social-structural component and a motivational one. You can imagine what a meaningful kind of research this is. By the way, I wrote a paper, "Erwerbsprinzip und Sozialstruktur" where I criticized economics because it doesn't do things like this. (FE) Have you sent AB (a rational choice theorist) these papers? (HA) I send him my papers. He probably hasn't read them. Those people always cite Americans. They don't read me. They are very friendly to me, but they don't read me. (FE) But he regards you as a great expert. (HA) Maybe, but why should he read it? He has so much to read. I don't know and it's all the same to me. I have also brought people together from the most diverse areas in order to apply this. But this is also practically a sketch. (FE) I think you are too optimistic. The social sciences consist almost entirely of research programs, and people talk past each other. (HA) Yes, of course. I'm not optimistic at all. Most of what is done in social science is junk. Most people read only literature from their own orientation. There is so much literature for every orientation that you can't even keep up with the literature from your own orientation. They hardly read the others. (FE) But even when they read them, they have an ideology through which they interpret the others. For example, there are two quantitative orientations in American political science. When you look at their articles, e.g. in {\em The American Political Science Review}, they look identical. Both use mathematical formulae and lots of mathematics. There are first the Michigan survey research people. (HA) Oh yes, survey, Ann Arbor. That's where our people go. That's where they learn everything. (FE) These are the empiricists. They gather data. (HA) Yes, that's right. Our people are always sent to Michigan to learn their methods. (FE) The other school is Rochester. Riker and ... (HA) Oh, he's in Rochester. They must be theorists. Rochester, Karl Brunner also comes from there, the economist. (FE) I've talked with people from both schools, and what I find really interesting is that both sides, both schools have, first of all, rationalizations for their own weaknesses. (HA) That's normal. (FE) But they have a whole system of rationalizations that explain why they accept such weak assumptions, and so on, but they attack the other side for their weak assumptions. And they have contempt for each other. (HA) It's like that here too. The systems people don't bother with the others, have contempt for the empiricists; the empiricists have contempt for the systems people, and ... (FE) Like you, I would like to learn from all of them, but I am trying to understand and solve the intellectual problems that have to be solved if you want to bring them together. (HA) That has always been my problem in economics. I wrote a Habilitation thesis dissertation - {\em National\"{o}konomie }{\em als Soziologie} (Political Economy as Sociology). I wrote in it that the Neo-classicists have no social structures. You have to bring in this whole problem of institutions, and so on, otherwise you can't give reasonable explanations. It was shot down by the sociologists as well as the economists. (FE) These paradigms are ideologies - just like political ideologies. (HA) But you know, there is a small current, for example, Coleman belongs to it, which attempts to bring social structures into economics. Now and then there is a little article in {\em The American Economic Review} or somewhere else. All over the place. These articles are all very interesting. But this is never the dominant tendency. The dominant tendency are Arrow-DeBreu, post-Keynesianism. Coleman was a sociologist who learned economics, who is now tying them together. This is very rare. They are always short articles. You have to look for them with a magnifying glass. \subsection{AGASSI-GR\"{U}NBAUM EXCHANGE ON POPPER AND PSYCHOANALYSIS} % \WPindent{% {\bf Editor's Note:} Professor Joseph Agassi submitted the following three letters to the {\em Newsletter}, suggesting that they be published along with Professor Gr\"{u}nbaum's replies, provided Gr\"{u}nbaum would agree. Gr\"{u}nbaum instead submitted the response following Agassi's letters. % }% \subsubsection{Agassi to Gr\"{u}nbaum: May 6th 1983} \begin{rawhtml} 
Professor Adolf Grünbaum            May 6th 1983
President, APA Eastern Division,
2510 Cathedral of Learning,
University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh Pa. 15260/USA


Dear Adolf:
\end{rawhtml} Please forgive my having addressed you formally in my last letter. I am not well versed in etiquette and did not want, while complaining about your conduct in your Presidential Address, to presume upon our personal relations. I stand corrected and am grateful. So here we are, back on a first name basis, calling each other names. You remind me that the thinkers you were criticizing in your Address are all irrationalists who influence many of our colleagues and are respected by many more of our colleagues who are not familiar with their writings so that your critique was 'both substantially germane and sociologically imperative'. I have said in my letter of complaint by the Chairman of the Board of APA, Professor Ruth Barcan Marcus, that these are not in any way the objects of my complaint. Now you ascribe to me the view that the Presidential Address should not be polemical. Why do you ascribe to me a view I reject so explicitly and emphatically? What I said in my complaint is that a Presidential Address should be unifying rather than contemptuous of a part of its audience. You ascribe to me the view that a Presidential Address should be unifying 'rather than polemical'. Is it that you identify all criticism with contempt? Had you said and elaborated in your address your reason for your criticism, and had you avoided your expressions and tone of contempt, you would have had more success in executing your 'sociologically imperative' task, and you would have then also won my applause. Your quotation of my spontaneous response from the floor to your calling the physics of the targets of your criticism 'antediluvian' or 'stone-age' is inexact. It was, 'that goes a bit too far'. I do not think you will deny that these expressions are exaggerations which are usually taken to express contempt. Your reminding me that many of our colleagues who were present admire these people may lead one to conclude that they felt slighted. I do not think making them feel that way is 'sociologically imperative' or commendable. The Freudian character of your analysis of my motive has its own irony, which you have noted, your Address being a grand critique of Freud. To use this against you would be ad hominem since I am more Freudian than you - but not in the same way: I assume that your motives are honorable. I would like to assume that of us all, but you ascribe to me ill motives and no one is a competent judge of one's own motives. So let my motives be what they are; let my complaint stand as valid: your presidential address was unnecessarily contemptuous. You are right, though, observing that I have another complaint about another insult of yours. But that insult, prompted by my published report of Hempel's view of Kuhn, was to me personally, and made in a private letter. Now that you mention it, it will correct your statement. That old letter of yours contained mere insult: no criticism and, as far as I remember - I do not have your letter here with me - no challengedespite what you now say. I do not claim authority for my report, which, anyway, was extremely brief, but I do not see in it any cause for insult either. In my reply to you I was not evasive, despite what you say, but clear and to the point: I demand an apology. In your reply you offered a conditional apology. This I could not accept. Consequently, as you accusingly observe, I do not seek your company. This is how things stand until you properly apologize: we need not be enemies and I hope we remain on good terms, but I prefer not to seek the company of people who insult me with no cause. You tell me now, speaking as a witness, that my very brief report on Hempel's view of Kuhn has distressed him. This, despite what you say, is news to me. Please permit me to check this with Hempel, as is only proper, and attempt to make proper amends as his response might invite. It may turn out that I was in error about him; it may turn out that though not in error I unnecessarily caused him pain. I am unlucky in this respect. My old review of {\em Minnesota Studies}, Volume II, by which I still stand, has caused Feigl much pain, and he bitterly complained to Popper about it. For years I tried to do all I could to mitigate, yet he demanded no less than that I change my views on the value of his own contribution to philosophy. My highly respectful review of {\em Objective Knowledge} of my beloved teacher Karl Popper led to worse results, and he meets all my offers of reconciliation with disdain. Still, one has to try. Also I hope to have more success with Hempel (if I did hurt him). My image of Hempel is different: I think he is more philosophical that Feigl and Popper. Your refusal to forgive me for him, even your explanation of his distress as caused by my report on his view being 'very unfair and sloppy', do not tally with my picture of him as a person with a highly philosophically temperament. I do hope you permit me to check this with him. Your comments about my person and about my history are not relevant to my complaint, since motives are not relevant to validity. But I do not wish to endorse your statement about my notoriety, nor to discuss your share in the making of my public image, such as it is. Allow me to confess, in all humility, that I have no memory of even having met you in Bloomington nor of having been 'gratuitously wounding' or 'personally derisive or abusive' there. We all fail to live up to our own standards, and so I will not deny your charges; I regret that having no details I must suspend judgement. I only hope you permit me, as long as we are at it, to say that I read the statement you quote me as having made to you in Indiana in passing conversation as something else: I always try to train my students not to take criticism as wounding, following Popper's teaching that criticism is an expression of respect not to waste on unworthy targets. This is, incidently, why I said to Professor Barcan Marcus that her mention of the regrettable absence of contemporary criticism of {\em Mein Kampf} opens an avenue to much discussion. You refer to my response to her on this as a 'well controlled, but philistine indignation'. It serves me right. I should have written her a longish letter explaining why I think standards of criticism in national politics differ from standards of criticism within a voluntary association, especially a learned society, and perhaps add a reference to Hume and Smith and their observation that one cannot easily leave one's own country so that politics is not purely voluntary. In addition to calling me a philistine who turns your stomach, you call me a hypocrite and declare my complaint about your misconduct an ill-willed sanctimonious personal vendetta. I will not reciprocate and say my alleged insulting conduct is no excuse for yours, and yours, but not mine, is a matter of the official record of the APA. Your gracious readiness to forgive me most, but not all of my wickedness, however, prompts me to say we are engaged in a correspondence on a public matter concerning the public interest, between the President and a member of a learned society, albeit on a first name basis. I greatly appreciate your good will and expressed readiness to be completely candid with me (despite your view of me as so very wicked) and since your abusive epithets are parts of your expressed effort to reach me, I accept your letter ofApril 28, 1983, as it stands, appreciate the effort, wish to assure you both personally and formally that you have indeed reached me, reject as uncalled for both your readiness to forgive me one thing and your refusal to forgive me another, stand on my old personal demand for an apology, stand on my public formal complaint to the APA, request your permission to write Hempel on the matter you have now raised, and salute you across the ocean, \begin{rawhtml} 
Sincerely,

Joe


bc:Ruth Marcus
   Philip Quinn
   Robert S. Cohen
\end{rawhtml} \subsubsection{Agassi to Gr\"{u}nbaum: October 30th 1985} \begin{rawhtml} 
Professor Adolf Grünbaum Chairman   October 30, 1985
Center for Philosophy of Science,
2510 Cathedral of Learning,
University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh Pa. 15260/USA

Dear Adolf:
\end{rawhtml} Many thanks for your having sent me the Fall 1985 {\em Free Inquiry }issue with four reviews of your book. I am particularly grateful as I would not have come across it otherwise. And I will not conceal the fact that the mounting force of evidence tends to sway me to concede: I had hoped that the standard of scholarship reflected in your book is not representative of the best that individuals concerned with the issue can exhibit; and I confess that my faith is severely tested and I am now willing to admit that you fare no worse than some of the other best known writers in the field. For example, I had thought Frank Solloway a competent and candid writer until I met his boast "I have actually read the book several times" coupled with his statement that "all of Gr\"{u}nbaum's sentences ...make... perfect sense in context". If I were to cross examine him under oath and ask him for the perfect sense of your sentences concerning neo-Baconianism, I do not think he would stick to his guns. In other words, I am pained to find him so pompously sloppy. Since Michael Ruse confesses Popper constitutes a grave moral danger, and does not say why, I cannot but treat him as a clown - especially since he is the one who used Popper in court to defend Darwinist dogmatic indoctrination against creationist obscurantist mind-bending. Also, his claim that Whewellian consilience of induction is the same as what you, Adolf, consider inductive consilience in Freud, is pushing an already tenuous, but still commonsensically permissible, analogy beyond its breaking point. I despair, anyway. I am sympathetic to Eysenck, since he finds in your book the belated vindication of his 1952 work. If this does not "{\em convince}" you that this somewhat tallies with Popper's censure, I do not know what will. I am touched by the gentleness of Eysenck's wording of his criticism of your views. Since he himself is no stranger to the sledgehammer, there is an obvious irony in his comments on your alleged over-use of this proverbial instrument; except that in my opinion you flex your muscle to lift but a rubber sledgehammer, need I say. Until you spell out your neo-Baconianism, your performance is, and will remain, a mere sleight of hand. Do you really need it? As to Nisbeth, he declares his hand when he writes in pseudo-logical shorthand a redundant formula which I, for one, could not read (on lines 5 and 4 from bottom in his first column). He also misrepresents you in the paragraph covering the bottom of his first column and the top of the second. He does so while praising you. Do you like misrepresentation coupled with praise better than a presentation coupled with dissent? Nisbeth says that post-Darwin research proves that organisms which cannot adapt die. Even in my undergraduate courses students are not allowed to talk on this low intellectual level. Dear Adolf, I do not know if I can reach you. Our profession needs an exemplary conduct, and preferably from an acknowledged leader - like you. I appeal to you. Concede publicly the fault of your book: admit that you have yet to explain what neo-Baconianism is, that you have not as yet adequately expounded this doctrine, and that since the label of neo-Baconianism is yours, you have to do so as soon as you can. You also have to admit that your counter-examples to Popper are not valid repeatable observations which contradict Freudian theories - that a change of mind is not the same as the admission of refuting repeatable experience. This will really do a tremendous good to the commonwealth of learning (and to your reputation too, but you really do not need it - your reputation is high and secure enough and I hope you and yours enjoy it to the full). \begin{rawhtml} 
Yours sincerely,


Joe
\end{rawhtml} \subsubsection{Agassi to Gr\"{u}nbaum: November 26th 1985} \begin{rawhtml} 
Professor Adolf Grünbaum Chairman   November 26, 1985
Center for Philosophy of Science,
2510 Cathedral of Learning,
University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh Pa. 15260/USA

Dear Adolf:
\end{rawhtml} Thank you very much for yours of the 15th and the enclosed review of your book by Allan Hobson. You once more draw attention to the warmth of the reception of your book from different quarters. I am glad for you. I am impressed. I have no personal objections to join the chorus of its admirers; I have, however, some rational objections, and will be glad if you could dispel them. To that end please allow me to comment in detail on your letter. Yes, everyone knows what the methods of controlled studies are that are used to test casual hypotheses, as you say in your opening sentence of that letter. Everybody knows what a test is, too. Everybody, likewise, knows what control is. Yet philosophers write lengthy studies to explain them, and then they disagree with each other, from which fact it is hard not to conclude that not everybody sufficiently knows these things. For example, you yourself wrote something regarding controlled experiments, with which I happen to disagree - but I will not take this up here-and-now, since in your book on Freud you say nothing about it. Rather, let me ask you, please: do you agree that proper tests are attempts to refute? If you say no, then I say, you do not sufficiently know what is a test and, a fortiori, you do not sufficiently know what are the methods of controlled studies that are used to test causal hypotheses. If you say yes, however, then I would say that youdisplay a lack of modicum of good will [forgive my using your idiom while not following your style of underlining words] towards Karl Popper. You say of Bacon and of Mill that they pioneered the modern methods of controlled inquiry for testing casual hypotheses. This makes me wonder whether we mean the same thing. Quite apart from Bacon's explicit opposition to the method (proposed by Leonardo, incidently) of varying the circumstances of an experiment, quite apart from the fact that Mill was echoing Herschel who was much more explicit on causality in this context, to think of Mill as a forerunner of any serious proponent of any theory of testing may be to indicate a view of testing that I would like to see expounded in some detail before I comment further. So, with all the good will and all the imagination I can amass, I do not know what you mean by the label of neo-Baconianism. More importantly, I conducted a market study and found that some of your admirers who sing the praises of your book do not know either. I mentioned one of them in a previous letter; I now report a repeat observation: I found no reader of your book who would say they know what this expression means, when I asked them point blank. You owe it to some of your readers, therefore, to explain your terminology. I am amazed that you should appeal to good will as a substitute for performing a task that is obviously yours to execute as best you can. You say, to move to your second paragraph, that my depiction of your critique of Popper is a travesty. I say your depiction on Popper is a travesty. You say you have popular acclaim on your side and it supports your claim, and you yourself also say Popper has popular acclaim on his side and you consider it to be an epidemic. I can and do explain this popular acclaim he and you have gained in a friendlier way than you do. Still, this is not to deny that I have misread you: one does not act, says Bacon, as one's own witness, judge and jury. And he was just lovely when he said that. And so I am glad to learn that you have written for {\em Behavioral and Brain Sciences} sixty typeset pages of a reply to Popper: it is needed. I do hope that in this reply you take the medicine you prescribe me and show Popper a modicum of good will. If you do, then I request a copy at your convenience, and promise to read it with good will and, if it is not too late, I will alter my review as necessary as a result of being corrected. Many thanks in advance. I worked very hard trying to understand your book. Possibly I have travestied it, and when corrected I will gladly admit error. As even your admirers censure you for being so hard to comprehend, I cannot see you avoiding some responsibility for my difficulties, though you may plead mitigating circumstances, of course. I make the same conjecture concerning your contribution to {\em Free Inquiry}, which you now also mention, and any other contribution you may make. If your contribution does show good will to Popper, then I do request a copy of it as well. Many thanks in advance. Moving to your third paragraph, I am happy for you that you claim to have made a contribution in your critique of Freud's use of free association as supporting his causal hypotheses and that you are gratified by public recognition of your claim. Do forgive my not joining this recognition: I do not know what is support and what is causal, unless you mean by support failed refutations and by the causal the deductive nomological. If you do, then I say Freud had no deductive nomological hypotheses to attempt to refute and no attempts to refute. And so I do not know what is the subject matter of Freud's contention that you criticize and claim to have made a contribution thereby. If you mean by support something else, I wish you would tell your readers what it means; and the same goes for the causal. We now come to the crowning paragraph of your last letter. You find my obsessive need to put down your book and my aggressiveness hard to understandexcept psychologically. And your psychological explanation, that I am obsessive and aggressive because I could not respond to a challenge of yours, may indeed be true. You are a professor of psychiatry and I cannot say much in defense of my obsession and aggression except by piling up more of the same. Moreover, your diagnosis and your etiology are both backed by the fact that they echo the diagnosis and etiology I received from Karl Popper. Yet I feel a bit squeezed that the same diagnosis and etiology is offered when I attack Popper, and also when I attack you for having no good will towards Popper. Woe to me. Also, may I ask, what was your challenge to me? I remember none. You have once told me, and now you repeat yourself, that you have challenged what I wrote about Hempel. So let me repeat my denial and my correction. You once censured me - not challenged, but censured - for my having ascribed to Hempel a certain criticism of Kuhn. In response, I told you that this was my near quotation, a mere paraphrase at most, of an observation I heard Hempel make in Tel-Aviv. And I added that even if I was in error, this gave you the right to dissent and to criticize, not to censure. You responded with a conditional apology which I could not accept. I still await your apology. Whether it comes or not I cannot say, but that you have challenged me is not the case. I challenge you. Ah, now you add my formal complaint against your Presidential Address to my list of sins. Your use of the epithets "antediluvian" and "stone-age" in your Presidential Address was an exaggeration and out of place there (I do not object to your use of them in the book). I know you agree with me, and regret you did not express your agreement in time for me to withdraw my complaint. Now my complaint is on record and I do not know what we can do about it. To say, as you now do, that here I exhibited a lack of a modicum of good will towards a colleague, may be to say the truth, but to remember that the colleague was calling other colleagues names in a Presidential Address is not to say that I am the only one exhibiting this defect. \begin{rawhtml} 
Very truly yours,



Joe
\end{rawhtml} P.S. Thanks for the remark on M. We all wish him a successful operation and good health. P.P.S. Allow me to make one comment on Allan Hobson's review in {\em The Sciences}, Nov/Dec 1985, which you have kindly sent me. It is clear that this review is a travesty on your book, since its peak point. Its final paragraph, concerns your alleged "award of tentative scientific status to psychoanalysis". I ask you again, do you prefer a friendly misreading to a not-friendly but proper reading? {\em Final Postscript} Thanks for your additional note and the Eysenck review. Yes, this does convince me, with ease, that Eysenck's position is different from Popper's. You are right about that. Also, may I add my position is. And I even agree with Eysenck that some superstitions are empirically refutable and refuted and hence that Popper is in error though my concept of refutation is of the Whewell-Popper style and so much more stringent that Eysenck's. But this matters little. I think Eysenck does not say what is Bacon's criterion of scientificity, to use your idiom, yet he writes, at the end of his third paragraph, as if he does. I have no quarrel with him, but cannot accept his review as an exoneration of you or as a release of you from my challenge to you to do your duty and explain what you mean by neo-Baconianism. I confess I was favorably impressed both by his concise summary of your five points and by his praise of your book. I was even more impressed by his ascription to Freud of a "careful argument" (second line afterpoint 5) which, he says, he cannot summarize. It may be that here my puzzle is solved: if you convince even Eysenck that Freud argued carefully, than you have quite a forceful pen: "an intellectual delight to read" he calls your book, which is more than some of your ardent supporters will claim! Since Eysenck refers to Farrell, I wonder why he does not say Farrell already spoke of Freud's (alleged) refutation of his own catharsis theory, especially since he says of him merely that he has failed. Ah, well. I hope you respond to my present letter even though I know how busy you are. I enclose another copy - still further corrected - of my review of your book to show you how friendly to you my final ending is. \subsubsection{Gr\"{u}nbaum replies} {\bf JOSEPH AGASSI'S REBUTTAL TO MY CRITIQUE OF POPPER} \begin{rawhtml} 
Adolf Grünbaum 
 (California Institute of Technology 
  and University of Pittsburgh)

                                       February 1, 1990

Dear Professor Eidlin:
\end{rawhtml} I appreciate your invitation to publish the letters I wrote to Joseph Agassi, when he suggested to me that I reply to an essay of his occasioned by the appearance of my 1984 book {\em The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophic Critique}. The burden of his desultory, rambling essay was that my book had contained nothing new. Yet the book had quickly provoked a large literature from writers representing the entire spectrum of views on psychoanalysis. When Agassi's essay was rejected for publication by the journals to which he had submitted it, he decided to publish it in a volume of his own articles. Then he offered me the opportunity to reply in that same volume. But I found his diatribe to be undisciplined, woefully undocumented and even personal. Thus, I saw no point in writing a retort and declined his offer. Since he persisted in pestering me to change my mind, it took several letters to convince him that I meant it. Hence my letters to him were not intended to respond substantively to his claims, and I did not even keep copies of them. By the same token, I do not think that their publication would materially advance the discussion of the issues, and therefore I won't avail myself of your otherwise welcome offer to make them public. But I am concerned that our readers be aware of published work, ranging from 1976 through 1989, in which I have challenged in detail Popper's falsificationist conception of scientific rationality. It behooves me to outline their contents briefly with special attention to psychoanalysis, if only because I am satisfied to let them serve indirectly as my answer to Agassi. Throughout his career, Popper has championed two cardinal theses concerning the psychoanalytic enterprise: 1) Logically, Freudian theory is irrefutable by any human behaviour, and 2) In the face of seemingly adverse evidence, psychoanalysts always dodged refutation by resorting to immunizing maneuvers. But if Popper were right in asserting that "Freud's theory...simply does not have potential falsifiers," why would it be necessary for Freudians to neutralize refutations by means of immunizing gambits? Popper's 1) and 2) seem incoherent. Conversely, 2) might be true even though 1) is false: After all, a theory may well be invalidated by known evidence, even as its true believers refuse to acknowledge this refutation. Besides, the failure of 2) to warrant 1) also emerges from Popper's own doctrine that theories, on the one hand, and the methodological conduct of their protagonists, on the other, "belong to {\em two entirely different 'worlds'}." Yet, he had offered psychoanalytic theory as the gravamen and benchmark of his case for the purported superiority of his own falsifiability criterion of demarcation over the received inductivist one. In chapters 1 (B) and 11 of my {\em Foundations}, I had taken issue with both of Popper's principal tenets on psychoanalysis, although I had been more concerned with the first. As against his claim of superiority for his criterion of demarcation, I had argued for the following contention ({\em Foundations}, p. 280): % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% It is ironic that Popper should have pointed to psychoanalytic theory as a prime illustration of his thesis that inductively countenanced confirmations can easily be found for nearly every theory, if we look for them... {\em it is precisely Freud's theory that furnished poignant evidence that Popper hascaricatured the inductivist tradition by his thesis of easy inductive confirmability of nearly every theory}! % }% % }% Within a few weeks after the appearance of my book, {\em The New York Times} of January 15, 1985 carried a lengthy news article on it by Daniel Goleman in its {\em Science} section. It included excerpts from my answers to questions about my judgement of Popper's account of psychoanalysis, which Goleman had put to me in an interview for his article. Popper had not read my book. But when Goleman telemetered these excerpts to him, Popper gave him his written reaction to them under the title "Predicting overt behaviour versus predicting hidden states." By consent of Popper, Goleman and myself, the editor of the journal {\em Behavioral and Brain Sciences} (hereafter "BBS") published that response as one of nearly 40 commentaries on {\em Foundations} in a review symposium (BBS vol.9, No. 2, June 1986). This symposium consists of (i) my chapter-by-chapter Pr\'{e}cis of the book (pp. 217-228), (ii) 39 commentaries by as many authors, who include Frank Cioffi (pp. 228-266), and (iii) my "Author's Response" to all of them (pp. 266-281). In sections entitled "The falsifiability of psychoanalysis" (pp. 266-269), and "Experimental and 'quantitative' studies of psychoanalysis" (pp.269-270), I gave my reply to Popper's commentary. Chapter II of his 1983 Postscript volume {\em Realism and the Aim of Science} is devoted to "Demarcation". It contains his first "published...detailed analysis of Freud's method of dealing with falsifying instances and critical suggestions" (p.164, n.1). But this {\em Postscript} volume had not yet been available to me, when I was completing the writing of {\em Foundations}. And my BBS "Author's Response" had to deal with his BBS commentary, not with his {\em Postscript}. However, the 1989 appearance of a {\em Festschrift} for John Watkins, entitled {\em Freedom and Rationality} (ed. by D'Agostino and I.C. Jarvie), afforded me the opportunity of publishing a detailed critical scrutiny of Popper's {\em Postscript} chapter II, which I had presented in one of my 1985 Gifford Lectures at the Scottish University of St. Andrews. Entitled "The Degeneration of Popper's Theory of Demarcation," my contribution argues that Popper's most detailed account of psychoanalysis is multiply untenable. Besides, I exposed two other flaws that are unrelated to Freudian theory. One looks in vain in Agassi's diatribe for a responsible attempt to come to grips with the painstaking arguments I offered against Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science in four interconnected papers that appeared in 1976: One of them was published in {\em Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos} (vol. 39 of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science), and the other three appeared respectively in the March, June and December issues of vol. 27 of the {\em British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}. Finally, it behooves me to supply some motivational context for the letters that Agassi wrote to me. My previously tenuous but untroubled personal contact with him went sour, when I chided him for publishing an altogether undocumented, irresponsible misrepresentation of the views that Carl Hempel had expressed - as part of a lecture attended by Agassi - concerning Thomas Kuhn's ideas. Agassi demanded that I retract my reproach to him with an apology. But I stood firm and challenged him to supply the missing documentation. As I knew from Professor Hempel, such documentation did not exist. And Hempel told Agassi so. Thereupon, Agassi saw fit to send a written request to the Executive Committee of the American Philosophical Association. (Eastern Division), asking that I be formally censured for some of the content of my 1982 Presidential Address to the Association at its December meeting in Baltimore, MD. Ostensibly, his demand was prompted by his claim that I had displayed shockingly poor academic manners during my Address, when I characterized Habermas's and Gadamer's depictions of the natural sciences assmacking of stone-age physics. The Executive Committee of the Eastern Division of the APA then wrote to Agassi, informing him that it had considered his request for censure, but had "decided to take no action." It would seem that his cumulative pique then inspired his lengthy attempt to establish that my {\em Foundations} contains nothing new. Try as he may, there will be no response from me beyond the present statement for your {\em Newsletter}. % [HPG] \subsection{POPPER AND PERESTROYKA - Marian Dobrosielski (Warsaw)} % \WPindent{% {\bf Editor's Note:} Dr. Marian Dobrosielski is a retired Professor of Philosophy, former Polish Ambassador to England, former Director of the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs and former Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland. This note was received before the collapse of the Communist regime in Poland. % }% The views of Karl R. Popper, especially those on the philosophy of history and politics, are practically unknown (except to some specialists in sociology and philosophy) in the socialist countries. Popper was very often and still is even now sometimes criticized as an "enemy of socialism and marxism." In my short remarks I shall concentrate on the actual situation in Poland in this regard. Popper's philosophy of science, his {\em Logic of Scientific Discovery}, his quite well known among Polish philosopher and students of philosophy. 'Already during his Vienna years, Popper, as is well-known, maintained good relations with Polish philosophers from the Lviv-Warsaw school, first of all with Alfred Tarski, but also with Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Maria Kokosz\'{y}nska and others. The philosopher of this school, which in many respects was close to logical positivism, have had an important impact on the development of Polish philosophy after the Second World War and on many Polish marxist philosophers. Popper's {\em Logic of Scientific Discovery} appeared in Polish in Poland in 1977; his {\em Open Society and Its Enemies} and {\em Poverty of Historicism} in 1988. There are several dissertations on Popper's philosophy, articles and reviews, very often one-sided, of some of his works. In the libraries of universities one can find practically all Popper's works and a lot of publications from all over the world about Popper. Despite this, his {\em authentic} views are practically unknown to the larger public and very often the criticism shows (as in so many other countries East and West) only a superficial knowledge and understanding, especially of his philosophy of history and politics. Having thoroughly studied Popper's main works, I reached the conclusion that his views concerning history and politics are of tremendous topicality and importance for the discussions going on now in Poland and other socialist countries concerning "new thinking," {\em Perestroika}, {\em glasnost}, democratization and humanization of the socialist systems. I decided, therefore, to write a series of essays presenting Popper's views concerning the aforementioned topics. These essays put together will, I hope, form a consistent book. My main aim is not to write an "academic" book, with hundreds of footnotes, with attempts to show where Popper is right and where he is wrong, what is original and what is borrowed from others in his thought, etc. I try to show what is new and valuable in his philosophy of history and politics, what is important for the discussions and controversies in Poland and elsewhere on the "new political thinking and acting," the openness, "glasnost" of our social life, its democratization and humanization. Despite the fact that I do not share some of Popper's political views, I do not try to be polemical. On the contrary, I try first of all to present his views in a positive and objective, clear and simple way. The title of the series of essays and of an eventual book I borrowed from Popper: "In Search of a Better World: Karl R. Popper's philosophy of history and politics." The title shows my main interest in the philosophy of Popper. I plan to write some 10 essays under the following titles: \WPindent{% 1. Popper about himself and his philosophy (based mainly on his {\em Unended Quest}). % }% \WPindent{% 2. Popper's Apology of Rationalism (Critical Rationalism). % }% \WPindent{% 3. On Popper's philosophy of science. % }% \WPindent{% 4. The "3-Worlds theory" (Critical Realism). % }% \WPindent{% 5. Dualism of facts and standards (Critical Dualism). % }% \WPindent{% 6. "The poverty of historicism." % }% \WPindent{% 7. "'Open' and 'closed' societies. % }% \WPindent{% 8. False prophets: From Plato to Hegel. % }% \WPindent{% 9. Popper's critique of Marx and marxism. % }% \WPindent{% 10. The perception and reception of Popper's philosophy. % }% Six of these essays are ready (Nos. 1,2,3,5,6 and 7) and will be published in the Polish weekly, {\em Kultura}, the monthly {\em Nowe Drogi} (New Ways), organ of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party and other periodicals. May I add that I consider myself a marxist and have always considered Marx and marxism (authentic marxism, not the dogmatic-stalinist one) to stand and fight for an "open philosophy," for an "open social system," and against all forms of dogmatism and irrationalism. I agree to a very high degree with Fred Eidlin's articles, i.a. "Isn't Popper the Best Marxist?" and "The Radical, Revolutionary Strain in Popper's Social and Political Theory." Popper's criticism of marxism concerns what I would call the mechanistic, historicist, dogmatic, stalinist marxism, but not the authentic, humanistic, democratic marxism, which unfortunately has not been implemented until now anywhere. I think that Popper's criticism of the historicism of Marx is one-sided, and based mostly on what Marx wrote in the Introduction to {\em Das Kapital}. One can find in the writings of Marx many instances where he comes out very strongly against different historicist views. But I do not intend to defend Marx. He doesn't need it. And no serious, authentic marxist would try to say that all the views of Marx are topical today. Marx wasn't and didn't want to be a prophet. He was a scholar, who has made tremendous contributions to social sciences, but also has made great mistakes, as almost all of his great contemporaries, scientists and philosophers. One more remark. I don't think that Popper's views on the philosophy of science and the philosophy of politics are fully consistent. I have in mind his concept of "piecemeal social engineering." It does not follow from his philosophy of science, and I think that the experience of human history proves him wrong. "Piecemeal social engineering" might be good in a developed democratic society, but such a society could never have been developed without attempts to implement "utopian social engineering." I wonder what Popper thinks of {\em Perestroika}, {\em glasnost}, "new thinking," the revolutionary, but rational and humanistic attempts to modernize and democratize all spheres of life in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. I think that these attempts are not contrary to Popper's basic philosophical view, that they are neither historicistic nor utopian. If {\em Perestroika} succeeds - and I think it will - then Popper will have to give up, or redefine his concepts of "utopian" and "piecemeal" social engineering. \subsection{GEDANKEN ZUR PHILOSOPHIE KARL RAIMUND POPPERS - Knut Goth} % [Center] {\bf Student, Sektion Philosophie, Universit\"{a}t Leipzig} % [center] % \WPindent{% {\bf Editor's note:} This note was received before the demise of the former German Democratic Republic. % }% "Heutzutage ist es durchaus n\"{o}tig, sich zu entschuldigen, wenn man sich mit Philosophie in irgendeiner Form besch\"{a}ftigt. Vielleicht mit Ausnahme einiger Marxisten scheinen die meisten Fachphilosophen die Verbindung mit der Wirklichkeit verloren zu haben. ... Nach meiner Auffassung ist der gr\"{o}{\ss}te Skandal der Philosophie, da{\ss}, w\"{a}hrend um uns herum die Natur - und nicht nur sie - zugrundegeht, die Philosophen weiter dar\"{u}ber reden - manchmal gescheit, manchmal nicht -, of diese Welt existiert. Sie treiben Scholastik..." (Popper, 1973: 44). Gedanken dieser Art, haben mich - einen Marxisten - dazu bewogen, die Philosophie Poppers genauer zu studieren. Dies um so mehr, da er ein erkl\"{a}rter Anti-Kommunist ist. Da{\ss} solch ein "ideologischer Gegner" S\"{a}tze schreibt, an deren Richtigkeit und Wichtigkeit ich keinen Zweifel hege, war f\"{u}r mich sehr \"{u}berraschend. Noch erstaunter allerdings war ich, nach dem vollst\"{a}ndigen Studium einiger Arbeiten Poppers. Obwohl mir bisher nat\"{u}rlich l\"{a}ngst nicht alle B\"{u}cher, Artikel, Interviews etc. Poppers zug\"{a}nglich waren, erscheinen mir die Resultate der bereits erfolgten Studien, zumindest pers\"{o}nlich, sehr wertvoll und interessant. Die nachfolgende kurze Darstellung einiger der wichtigsten Ergebnisse soll das belegen. Eine umfassende Begr\"{u}ndung dieser \"{U}berlegungen wird allerdings aus Platzgr\"{u}nden nicht m\"{o}glich sein. % \WPindent{% 1.Die meisten Kritiken am erkenntnistheoretischen Ansatz Poppers gehen am Objekt ihrer Kritik in den wichtigsten Punkten vorbei. Das liegt (1) daran, da{\ss} mit gleichen Worten verschiedene Bedeutungen verbunden werden und (2) an einer ungen\"{u}genden Gesamtsicht von Poppers Erkenntnistheorie. % }% % \WPindent{% 2.Die Schwierigkeiten, die sich aus der unterschiedlichen Verwendung von gleichen Worten ergeben, treten dort am deutlichsten hervor, wo von Falsifikation und Verifikation die Rede ist. Falsifizierbarkeit ist f\"{u}r Popper eine rein logische Eigenschaft von Aussagen, die sie besitzen sollen, um als wissenschaftlich zu gelten. Das bedeutet, da{\ss} die Falsifikation einer Aussage f\"{u}r Popper immer logischer und nie empirischer Natur ist. Auf letzteres aber zielt die Kritik, wenn behauptet wird, da{\ss} jede Falsifikation einer Aussage eine Verifikation einer anderen Aussage voraussetzt. D.h. jedoch, da{\ss} man von verschiedenen Dingen und somit aneinander vorbei redet. Die Verifikation einer Aussage ist nach Popper unm\"{o}glich, da der Bereich der m\"{o}glichen Erfahrung niemals als abgeschlossen gelten kann (d.h. der Individuenbereich, \"{u}ber den sich eine Behauptung erstrecken soll, ist prinzipiell unendlich). % }% % \WPindent{% 3.Der Grund f\"{u}r die Mi{\ss}verst\"{a}ndnisse hinsichtlich der Falsifikationsidee ist die verschiedenartige Fassung des Verh\"{a}ltnisses von Theorie und Erfahrung. F\"{u}r Popper sind Theorie und Erfahrung keine korrelativen Begriffe. Jede Aussage ist theoretisch. Einen Theoriebegriff im Sinne einer besonders ausgezeichneten Art von Wissen gibt es bei Popper nicht. Erfahrung f\"{a}llt in den Bereich der psychischen Erlebnisse, d.i. "Welt 2". Als Korrelat zu Theorie fungiert bei Popper Praxis. Praxis wird dabei (im weitesten Sinne) als Anwendung von Wissen (welches immer theoretisch ist) verstanden. Die Argumentation, da{\ss} Poppers Erfahrungsbegriff auf sinnliche Wahrnehmung und damit auf das Individuumbeschr\"{a}nkt ist und so die prinzipiellen Voraussetzungen jedes Empirismus teilt, ist ungerechtfertigt. Popper l\"{o}st die Probleme, die sich aus seinem "empiristischen" Erfahrungsbegriff ergeben durch die Annahme, da{\ss} es so etwas wie eine "Welt der objektiven Gedankeninhalte" ("Welt 3") gibt, in der sich die Gattungserfahrung speichert. Subjekt dieser Erfahrung ist nicht das vereinzelte Individuum, sondern die Menschheit.% }% \WPindent{% 4.Nach der Ansicht Poppers geht jeder Erfahrung etwas Theoretisches voraus. Erfahrung, Wahrnehmung etc. ist somit immer "theoriebeladen". Neues Wissen entsteht nicht durch einen Schlu{\ss} aus der Erfahrung, sondern entspringt einer "k\"{u}hnen Idee", einer "unbegr\"{u}ndeten Antizipation" o.\"{a}. (Induktionsproblem). Der Gefahr eines unendlichen Regresses entgeht Popper durch die Setzung eines "genetischen Apriori", das sowohl am Beginn der Entwicklung der Menschheit als Gattung stand als auch am Beginn der Entwicklung jedes einzelnen steht.% }% \WPindent{% 5.Theorien, die in Poppers Sinn als falsifiziert gelten, werden nicht einfach aus der Wissenschaft eliminiert sondern (dialektisch) aufgehoben. Waren sie vor ihrer Falsifikation anwendbar, so k\"{o}nnen sie auch weiterhin angewendet werden. Nur ihr Geltungsbereich ist nun eingeschr\"{a}nkt.% }% % \WPindent{% 6.Das Wort "Wahrheit" verwendet Popper immer im Sinne von "absoluter Wahrheit". Mit "Bew\"{a}hrung" und "Bew\"{a}hrungsgrad von Theorien" beschreibt er das, was mit der Dialektik von relativer und absoluter Wahrheit erfa{\ss}t wird. Insofern Wahrheit immer absolute Wahrheit ist, existiert in Poppers Erkenntnistheorie auch kein Wahrheitskriterium. Wahrheit ist lediglich "regulatives Prinzip" allen Erkennens, ein Idealbegriff.% }% % \WPindent{% 7.Wissen ist nach Popper immer Vermutungswissen. Das ist aber nicht gleichbedeutend damit, da{\ss} Popper alle Erkenntnis auf das Niveau der Vermutung {\bf einebnet}, sondern nur eine {\bf Konstatierung} eben dieses Charakters allen Wissens. Dies folgt aus Poppers Annahme, da{\ss} Fakt und Aussage \"{u}ber diesen Fakt grundverschieden voneinander sind. S\"{a}tze k\"{o}nnen nur durch S\"{a}tze, niemals durch Erfahrung, Tatsachen etc. begr\"{u}ndet werden. Insofern besteht eine logisch un\"{u}berwindbare Kluft zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Diese Kluft wird theoretisch dadurch "\"{u}berwunden", da{\ss} man festsetzt, wann eine Aussage als Tatsachenaussage gilt. In diesem Sinne ist Popper Konventionalist. Die "Tatsachenaussage" mu{\ss} dabei so formuliert sein, da{\ss} sie nachpr\"{u}fbar bleibt. Sie gilt - wie jeder andere Satz - nicht als gesichertes Wissen sondern nur als Vermutung. (Deshalb besitzt die logische Falsifikation einer Theorie auch keinen endg\"{u}ltigen Charakter, denn der Individuenbereich, f\"{u}r den eine Theorie gelten soll, kann sich ver\"{a}ndern.)% }% % \WPindent{% 8.Aus der konsequenten Trennung von Theorie und Praxis ergeben sich die wichtigsten Ansatzpunkte daf\"{u}r, Poppers Gedanken weitergehend fruchtbar zu machen. Dies ganz im Sinne von Poppers Hauptanliegen: die immer gegebene M\"{o}glichkeit des Irrtums systematisch in Rechnung zu stellen, um so eventuellen Fehlern zu entgehen bzw. deren praktische Konsequenzen zu mildern. Es w\"{a}re zu untersuchen, welche "rein" theoretischen Mittel es gibt, Fehler zu erkennen, ohne sie zu begehen und welche sozialen Voraussetzungen gegeben sein m\"{u}{\ss}ten, um zu vermeiden, da{\ss} irgendein Wissen zu einem wie immer gearteten Dogma erstarrt. {\bf % }% % [HPG] } \subsection{CRITICAL RATIONALISM AND CRITICAL THEORY - Jeremy Shearmur} William Fusfield's interesting essay "Mein Mi{\ss}verst\"{a}ndnis mit Miscevic" ({\em Newsletter}, volume 3, Numbers 3 and 4) prompts me to write with a rather different suggestion as to how critical rationalism might learn from critical theory: in the realm of ideas. For it seems to me that while there is much in Habermas and especially in the older critical theory that stands in need of criticism, there are two respects in which Habermas has done something from which critical rationalism itself should learn. What it should learn, however, is to develop something that is already implicit within its own intellectual resources. \subsubsection{1. Intersubjectivity and ethics} My first point concerns ethics, and Habermas's ideas about the discursive redeemability of ethical claims. Here, it seems to me, critical rationalism can improve over Popper's own explicit formulations in the text of {\em The Open Society}, by applying to ethical claims the very theory of intersubjective testability that Popper developed, with reference to Kant, in his {\em Logic of Scientific Discovery}.% \footnote{% See, on this, my "Epistemological Limits of the State", an unpublished paper which extends an argument developed in part of my "Popper and Liberalism", which was delivered at the First Annual Conference on the Philosophy of Karl Popper in Manchester, 1984.% }% Popper's own account of ethics in the text - as opposed to the Addendum - to {\em The Open Society}, while admirable in its (Kantian) stress on the autonomy of ethics from command, brute facts, or supposed tendencies immanent within history, is unclear as to how an individual's ethical judgments are constrained - if they are constrained by anything at all. If we introduce, as I would suggest, a closer parallel with the idea of inter-subjective assessment as it occurs within Popper's epistemology, several advantages follow. We avoid any appearance of subjectivism in ethics, and we show how it is that ethical claims are fallible. In addition, we may clarify an aspect of Popper's political thought. For there, Popper appeals to the idea that a broadly negative utilitarian agenda for politics may be generated through intersubjective agreement, while suggesting that other issues - such as the pursuit of positive visions of the good life - must be undertaken by voluntary means. He also works with a conception of the criticism of policy proposals by citizens which, similarly, seems to assume a procedure of intersubjective agreement like that which we find in Popper's epistemology, but which we do not, in fact, find in Popper's explicit writings about ethics in the text of {\em The Open Society}.% \footnote{% If the parallels that Popper draws between ethics and the search for truth in his Addendum to {\em The Open Society}, "Facts, Standards and Truth" were pursued, however, I suggest that they could lead us towards the ideas developed in my text.% }% In addition, this approach provides us with a rationale for treating individuals as something like ends in themselves - because their judgments are the means through which {\em any} ethical claim is to be assessed; and their autonomy plays a vital role in this context. Such an approach may thus draw - from Popper's work - a theory of who should be accorded such respect, and why. In addition, it would allow - through what might be seen as an updating of the moral sense theory of Hutcheson and Adam Smith into a{\em fallibilistic} form of ethical intuitionism% \footnote{% See, on this, my "From Brother Sense to Brother Man: Adam Smith's {\em Theory of Moral Sentiments} as Epistemology", delivered at the American Philosophical Association, New York, 1987. And just as - in Hutcheson's work - what our moral sense led us to agree upon could, independently, be discovered to have a broadly utilitarian character, so, I would suggest, the kinds of things that Popper suggested should form the agenda of politics (the relief of avoidable suffering, injustice) might, indeed, be things concerning which we can achieve a consensus, or which may be legitimated by decision-making processes upon the desirability of which we can achieve a consensus.% }% - an alternative path to something like a Kantian ethic. One difference from Kant, however, would be that the content of ethics would be supplied not by pure reason, but by what results when ethical claims, made by individuals, pass through the filter of inter-subjective assessment. Another would be that universality would also have a rather different character. For rather than its having simply to be asserted as a purely formal property of ethical claims, it would come through the acceptability, in principle, of substantive ethical claims, and moral principles, to all moral agents - i.e. those who can engage in critical argument about them. And autonomy - another major concern of Kant's - would come through our recognition of the importance of the protection of the autonomy of individuals to make ethical judgments - because these, as mentioned above, would be the means through which any substantive ethical claim would be assessed. If we adopt such an approach, more consequences follow than can be explored in a brief note such as this. But one point that is, perhaps, worth spelling out explicitly is that, within it, individuals may have rights both as participants in, and as the objects of reasoned consensus within, ethical argument. Who counts as the former is, essentially, an empirical matter. (This suggests a further improvement over Kant, for whom, as far as I can see, there is no way in which we can identify who a moral agent is, as everything, as it presents itself to us, is on a par in being explicable in purely causal terms, and Kant offers no empirical criterion as to the conditions under which we should introduce a teleological form of understanding, as an Idea of reason). However, there is good reason to suppose that the realm of moral agents - in the sense of those capable of participation in ethical argument - is not co-extensive with the human species. For those apes capable of communication - however imperfect - in American Sign Language would seem clearly to have showed the capacity for participation in such discussions, at least at the level of the descriptive if not the argumentative functions of language. While the foetus, the very severely disabled, and, say, those in the most advanced states of senile dementia, do not possess such a capacity. I do not wish to claim that there are not important disanalogies between judgement and argument in ethics and in science, some of which I have discussed elsewhere.% \footnote{% See my "Epistemological Limits of the State", and also my "From Dialogue Rights to Property Rights", delivered at the American Political Studies Association, 1987; and my "Dialogue Rights and Property Rights", delivered at the British Political Studies Association, 1988.% }% But I do claim that there are greater parallels than critical rationalists seem customarily to admit of, and that these parallels are suggestive, and would prove a fruitful area for investigation by critical rationalists. \subsubsection{2.Epistemology and Social Criticism} The role, in Popper's work, of intersubjective assessment of empirical claims - which, if my suggestions above are accepted - may also be extended to the ethical, also suggests a further line for the development of critical rationalism which would take it into areas that are currently occupied by Habermas and his followers. For intersubjective consensual assessment (which, of course, is typically something to which we will aspire, rather than actually reach) will only play its appropriate epistemological role if it is reached {\em freely}. Someone in the subway cannot claim that I expressed consensual agreement to some claim of his (to the effect that he should have my wallet), when he had a knife pressed into my ribs at the time. And we cannot claim, say, that some proposal has passed the scrutiny of critical discussion with flying colours if, at the time, the women members of the relevant group were prevented from voicing their objections because they had, by custom, at that point to leave the room to make tea and sandwiches. All this suggests that the epistemology of critical rationalism has within it facilities upon which we can call in the scrutiny of social arrangements, insofar as we are interested in truth and in the validity of ethical claims. This suggestion, if accepted, leads to a further question concerning which kinds of economic and political arrangement are most appropriate, from such a perspective. Into this issue I cannot now enter - other than to suggest that the answer to which I think that we will be led is rather different from that which is usually read out of Habermas's theory of epistemologically-guided social criticism, and is closer to classical liberalism than to any form of socialism.% \footnote{% See, for some discussion, my "Habermas: A Critical Approach", {\em Critical Review}, volume 2, No. 1, 1988.% }% This approach also suggests how we might develop a sociology of knowledge of a non-relativistic character - in the sense that we might explain defects in specific theories in terms of the kind of inter-subjective criticism to which they have {\em not} been submitted, by virtue of particular social arrangements.% \footnote{% See, on this, my "The Religious Sect as a Cognitive System", {\em Annual Review of the Social Sciences of Religion}, 4, 1980, and my "Epistemology Socialized?", {\em Et cetera}, Fall 1985.% }% % [HPG] \subsection{"CRITICISM/SOLIDARITY" PARADOX AND THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZING CRITICAL RATIONALISM AS AN INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT - William Fusfield} % [center] % [Center] {\bf Public Speech Program, University of Pittsburgh} % [center] In a recent contribution to {\em The Newsletter}, "Mein Misverst\"{a}ndnis mit Miscevic: Or, On the Dilemmas of Organizing a Critical Rationalist Movement", I mentioned, but did not elaborate upon, a certain point "3" which suggested that if Critical Rationalism (CR) is to survive - not to mention prosper - as an intellectual movement in the highly ideology-charged days ahead, it must manage to accomplish "substantial intellectual recruitment from the rising generation of scholars". This is necessary, I claimed, because "CR is doomed by what I called the 'criticism/solidarity paradox' (CSP) to have an unusually high turnover of adherents". In the present article I wish to explain what I mean by this "paradox", and show why I think it poses some significant organizational problems for the development and dissemination of CRist ideas well worthy of our consideration. The basic problem is simple enough and arises naturally out of the reflexive application of the standard CR modus operandi. Being fully committed to falsificationism, CR is all about actively promoting criticism of all conceptualizations currently maintained, that any remaining errors in our knowledge might be detected and eliminated as quickly as possible. CRists are thus people who see it as one of their primary intellectual functions, nay duties, to maintain a critical attitude to all knowledge claims they may encounter. Hence, as one becomes more committed to CR, one tends invariably to expose ever greater realms of human knowledge and opinion, as well as one's own experience, to critical scrutiny; for there is simply no area that ought artificially to be exempted from continuing criticism. It is thus perfectly natural to expect that as the recent CR recruit's own critical prowess develops, he or she will sooner or later turn these critical powers to the very epistemological "foundations" of CR itself; that he or she shall begin actively to search out any remaining errors in this particular system of "knowledge" claims just as in any others. Such individuals will thus take a much closer look at the standard theses of the CR doctrine itself and attempt to "falsify" its primary theses by adducing evidence and building arguments against them. In doing so they will - even if their powers of criticism remain quite modest - undoubtedly detect a wide variety of remaining theoretical problems, as well as several plain and simple logical errors, in the methodological writings of even the most carefully formulated of CRist theorizations. (For, as Adorno once very correctly noted, it is one of the minor tragedies of human intellection - but also one of its minor miracles! - that "even the dullest of minds are generally quite capable of finding the faults in the very finest".) As the new recruit comes to see ever more clearly just how thoroughly "flawed" CR too really is, however, he is faced with a difficult choice. Either he will simply grow "disenchanted" with it, (just as he has probably already grown disenchanted with many other doctrines before it, should he have genuinely critical proclivities!). In such a case, he will probably simply begin gradually to disassociate himself from CR until he is no longer a part of its sphere of critical discourse. On the other hand, he might adopt a more principled and productive attitude, and decide that, formidable problems and flaws or not, CR is still far better than all of the other methodological doctrines around, and hence fully deserving of whatever corrective influences that the dissemination of his own critique of it may occasion. In that case, he will set about at once to write up an account of the problems and errors that he has perceived and begin to engage actively in critical discussion with those other CRist who have not - or perhaps merely not yet - perceived such hidden sources of error. Now as the CR neophyte begins to do all this, strange things begin to happen. At first his criticisms are patiently listened to, perhaps even encouraged, and taken quite "seriously" by the rest of the CR community. Generally, however, it will be the case that something very similar to the criticisms that he is now making will already have surfaced within the discourse long before - as many other people before him will no doubt have asked very similar "troubling questions" in their readings of the CR "classics" as well. Thus, more often than not, some more seasoned proponent of CR, who has been through this particular matter several times before already, will be able simply to answer his criticisms at once; to convince him, that is, that the real "error" involved may very well be his own! The beginner will thus - at least at first - be glad to have received such wise and edifying correction, return to the CR "fold", and accept more strongly than ever the validity of traditional CR doctrines. But, of course, this means that he will also see it as even more vitally important than ever that he keep incisively criticizing things (especially now that he has learned so much himself by doing so!). Thus it will not be long before he has headed back to the "canonical" methodological texts of CR and detected a whole new batch of problems and errors, which he now feels even more strongly called upon to expose to his critical compatriots as well. This he will then do, only to discover - usually quite to his chagrin! - that the response this time is a little less patient and helpful than it was the first time. This time, that is, there will also be a certain measure of irritation with him as well; a wee bit of the old "we've been through all of this a dozen times before" attitude. But let us be optimistic for the moment and assume that this time too it is still possible for more established CRists to put our critical protagonist's newly discovered objections to bed in relatively short order. What will happen next? That's right, he will simply become still more committed to CR and its noble falsificationist doctrine, and go right back to seeking out new troubles once again! As these too are brought forward in the discourse, however, he will gradually come to be seen - and, from an organizational standpoint fully justly so! - as a rather "negative element" in the discourse; as someone who always takes the discussion off more "productive" tracks - tracks which simply tentatively presuppose the conventional principles - to pose endless "philosophical" questions regarding the "ultimate" status of the doctrine itself. More troubling still, there is bound eventually to come a time - if he possesses any real talent for criticism that is - when our precocious neophyte begins to pose questions so novel and incisive that even the most seasoned of his intellectual seniors has never encountered them before, and can thus produce - at least immediately - no convincing rebuttals to silence him. And yet, far from consistently thanking our now so prodigiously advanced young critic for having helped them eliminate a few more actually remaining flaws in their previous methodological conceptualizations, as they should, the rest of the group is far more likely to view the critic with great ingratitude, if not down-right contempt, for having just destroyed some of the very "foundations" upon which they had just been so sanguinely building all of their divers ideational habitations. In short, the consistently critical participant in CR discourse, as in any discourse, will eventually come to be viewed as someone simply "heretically" bent upon subverting all "WORKING" methodological agreement within the group, all intellectual "solidarity", rather than as one genuinely concerned to point out remaining problems. Well this process will go on for a while. But eventually something has got to give. (For it is simply so much easier for a quick and critical mind to discover ever new problems and errors far faster than it is possible for even the sharpest CRist grouping to invent workable "solutions" to each and every new difficulty detected.) Eventually, that is, one of two things will happen; with equally negative consequences, both for the individual involved and for the healthy development of CR as a whole. Either our overzealous falsificationist will continue his bothersome "hyper-critical" behavior and become ever more explicitly a persona non gratis within CR circles; someone eventuallyactually to be prevented from further participation, in the unlikely case that he doesn't sense the "bad vibes" beforehand, "take the hint", and drop out freely. In that case CR will simply have lost one of its most critically competent adherents; one, that is, of the very type which CR methodologically most requires! Or, the ever sceptical individual in question will eventually decide that his continued participation in CR discourse is so important to him that he will be willing to cease - or at least greatly curb - his previous activity of criticizing CR doctrine itself to the best of his ability. But in that case, he can hardly be expected to continue to serve his previous healthy role of allowing CR to detect and slowly eliminate its many remaining theoretical errors. Indeed, he will have - for all practical purposes - been reduced to the status of one more uncritical "believer" or "hack" in a highly hypo-critical "critical" cult more than willing to dish out criticism to others, but unwilling to suffer it amongst themselves! Thus it is that the most critical minds attracted to CR - the very same minds that have the most to offer CR intellectually - will very often - and within a span of time reciprocal to their original critical prowess! - begin to pose so many bothersome questions to their colleagues that they will either be drummed out of the movement altogether, or be "broken" of their critical spirit. As such truly critical spirits are - and by their very nature to boot! - subversive of all underlying doctrines which serve to give the group its very raison d'etre, they invariably begin to call the originally motivating basis of organizational "solidarity" itself into question and thus pose a real threat to the further existence of the group and all of its current activities. In short, precisely what is best for CR in one sense, incisive criticism of current ideas, is worst for it in another, eroding doctrinal unity, and we encounter the so-called "Criticism/Solidarity Paradox". Up until now we have viewed this "paradox" merely as an interaction between an isolated, consistently critical individual coming up against the CR "establishment". We should also make a few comments upon some of the aggregate organizational effects of this concomitant solicitation and suspicion of self-criticism among its membership upon CR as an intellectual movement, and make a few very tentative recommendations as to how to diminish its destructive potential as much as possible. Because of CR's - organizationally considered - nearly unique legitimation, if not also stimulation, of self-criticism among its adherents, we would, of course, consider the CSP to be reactivated fairly frequently as new people are "recruited" to take part in CR discussions and activities. This, in turn, should manifest itself in an unusually high turn-over rate of individuals participating in the movement, which, for its part, should then simply serve to exacerbate the already substantial problems of maintaining doctrinal and organizational coherence and structure. In addition, such rapid "burn out" of new members would be expected significantly to hamper the further numerical growth of the movement; perhaps even leading to its gradual collapse should it prove impossible to find enough new recruits willing to stick around long enough to counter-balance the natural attrition rate due to "falling away" and/or aging of the current membership. Perhaps most important of all, we should also expect to see the stress placed upon criticism, especially self-criticism, to become ever more attenuated; both because those new members who have stuck around are likely to be exactly those who are not so quick to criticize and who have hence not yet run into the paradox and already left, and also because the group itself will undoubtedly become ever more explicitly aware of the organizational problems that too much self-criticism occasions for any discourse community and thus - quite rationally - seek to find institutional means of preventing its continual disruptive articulation. All in all, then, we would expect - "a priori" as it were - CR to have an exceedingly rough go of it as an intellectual movement. Actively encouraging criticism, and thereby unintentionally legitimating self-criticism as well, for all of its noble commendability as an intellectual ethic, would thus seem - from the purely anticipatory perspective pursued so far here - to be a goodprescription for organizational suicide. One might well wonder then how CR has actually fared with respect to this paradox in recent years. Here one has to be somewhat pleasantly surprised as an observer of organizational coherence. For although CR seems indeed repeatedly to have encountered the paradox specified, continues to have a fairly high turn-over rate of participants, and even seems somewhat to have attenuated its tolerance for internal criticism over the years, it still seems to be both quite salubriously open to self-criticism, and, at any rate, to have fared considerably better than most other self-consciously "critical" organizations, (indeed, even as well as many organizations which are not burdened with the necessity of continually tolerating internal criticism!). Such relative "success", of which CR has every right to be somewhat proud, can be attributed, one assumes, to the exceptional patience, good humor and intellectual integrity of some of its more established members. Still, while CR has done a good job of surviving, perhaps even slightly expanding, in recent years, it can hardly be said to have prospered. The movement has a definite foothold in German academic life, but, even there is hardly an intellectual force to be reckoned with - as say are Critical Theory, Hermeneutics, Neo-Marxism, Deconstructionism, and a variety of others. Moreover, it has fared far less well in other European countries, and remains virtually unknown in the rest of the world as an intellectual movement; and this although it can in fact proudly claim a truly international representation of adherents. One has to wonder then what can be done concretely to ameliorate at least that impediment to further growth that is posed by the CSP. It should be stressed that there is clearly no simple solution here. There will always be some real tension between the self-critical enthusiasm of CR's new - and sometimes even older - recruits and the on-going need for organizational stability and solidarity upon the part of the movement as a whole. One can only hope to diminish the paradox's more overtly undesirable "unintended consequences". To do this will clearly require real effort and a preparedness to compromise upon the part of both the self-critical individuals and the established and organized movement. The former must come to realize that it is unfair of them to be continually and immediately disturbing the group with every single new suspicion or doubt that enters their heads. They must respect the other's right to get on with more advanced questions in situations where they already feel confident enough of a consensus upon such axiomatic principles. The latter group, on the other hand, must try hard to continue to show exceptional patience with the often only very "half-baked" objections raised by newer adherents; to view these as the necessary price to be paid for developing the confident independent critical thought so essential to the highest ends of CR. Moreover, this group must always manage to keep itself open to the real possibility that some of the problems and errors detected in CR by these actively self-critical adherents may in fact represent real matters of concern, that must be dealt with if CR is to continue to develop its theoretical conceptualizations and not merely fossilize into one more anachronistic ideology or "Philosophy of Science". At some point, it may even become necessary to introduce some specific institutional procedures to help ameliorate the CSP. Thus, for example, it might be desirable to hold special colloquia from time to time which are devoted completely to criticism of current CR doctrine itself, while at the same time requiring participants to withhold such criticisms at other functions, devoted to more specific CRist analyses of particular scientific, philosophical, social, political or economic matters. Should some balance eventually be found, which allows new adherents to CR to explore and express their many newly-discovered areas of weakness in CR itself, while yet sheltering the more established adherents from the need to be continually rehashing basic principles, the chances for CR's growth in future years should be measurably increased. Unfortunately, however, this paradox is only one of many organizational impediments to such a healthy expansion of the influence of CR in the years ahead. Still, finding some good solutionhere, could only serve to help the noble cause of promoting the spread of critical reasoning in a world increasingly dominated by its diametrical opposite: violence. \subsection{THE AUTHORITY OF SCIENCE - AND ITS ENEMIES - John R. Skoyles} % [center] Successful scientists pick out one philosopher as having articulated the rationality of what they do as scientists. He is Sir Karl Popper FRS. But Popper's ideas play no part in contemporary philosophy. As Popper has said "Here I am being showered with honours as no professional philosopher before me; yet three generations of professional philosophers know nothing about my work".% \footnote{% Bartley, W.W. III. "A Popperian harvest". In P. Levinson (Ed.), {\em In pursuit of truth}, pp. 249-289 (Humanities Press. New York, 1982), p. 272.% }% How did this situation arise? I suggest, because philosophers use a false analogy to model the nature of authority held by ideas. It causes them to find intellectual problems where there are none and ignore achievements where they exist. This analogy - which I call the "source" or geometry analogy started with Plato. It asserts that the authority possessed by empirical ideas in science is to be understood by analogy with that held by valid geometry theorems (more generally all valid theorems in axiomatisable systems). Geometrical ideas depend for their validity upon demonstration from a source of their truth - the axioms of their geometrical system. Both modern and ancient philosophy claim that something like this can be metaphorically applied to model the link between the authority of scientific conclusions about the external world and scientific reasoning. Plato's claim that knowledge is justified ideas is a simple analogy where knowledge itself corresponds to "geometrical theorem", justification to "proof" and truth to "geometrical axioms". This analogy takes for granted that the proper analysis of the authority of science must be in terms of a transmission of the authority of truth to ideas. Philosophers therefore search for the means to transmit truth to ideas to create "scientific knowledge" through justification or through some kind of dialectic. The history of philosophy is the history of the many imaginative attempts to model the nature of the source of science's authority: eternal forms, the logos, clear and distinct innate ideas, sense perceptions, a priori synthetic categories, socially defined meanings and epistemological contingencies. Though sometimes creative, analogies can be destructive. Thus it is disturbing that philosophers have known nearly since its beginnings that the geometry analogy was an implausible guide to the authority of reason. That no empirical idea can be justified has been noted by every skeptic from Pyrrho of Elis (BC 365 - 270) to David Hume. There are obvious problems. If the authority of ideas is deduced from a source, how do we know that this source has this authority except but by another source of authority? The authority of foundations must themselves have foundations. The geometry analogy leads either to an infinite regression to the ultimate source of authority, to an arbitrary dogmaticism that one authority is the authority, or to skepticism that is no such authority. As a scientist I blame the geometry analogy for the present absurdities written by many philosophers (and sociologists) about science. Contemporary philosophers have been taught to expect science's authority to be transmitted from truth. They conclude rightly that truth cannot be its source. But they do not seek to replace the geometry analogy. Instead they twist it. Science manifestly has authority but truth cannot be its source; therefore, what is its source? Philosophers have readily filled the gap by attributing the "source" of science's authority to a wide variety of things. This process is most clear in Feyerabend. He first demands science to possess a "method" deductive from truth of its authority. Then, failing to find it, concludes the only alternative sourceof the scientist's authority must be political power, trickery and propaganda. Philosophers (and following them, social scientists) have selected other sources of authority, attributing it to "epistemology authority of speech communities" (Rorty and followers of Wittgenstein), and the ideology of the dominant social class (sociologists of science). Do we need philosophers? Consider the following thought adventure. Imagine if scientists awoke one day with a collective amnesia as to every philosophical idea ancient and modern. Further, what if all trace of the prior existence of philosophers, their books and journals had disappeared. What kind of theory of scientific knowledge and authority might they invent? Scientists might hypothesis that the authority of science was analogous to that held by valid theorems in mathematics. But they would quickly reject this. Theories in science are constantly replaced. Nothing like this happens within mathematical systems. Further, though the ancients knew axioms were created by us, they were aware of only one axiomatization and so perhaps could not ignore this; but we now know of non-Euclidean geometries and cannot. Moreover we know that axioms systems, for instance those of arithmetic, exist, possessing true theorems which cannot be proved. The transmission of authority from sources does not completely explain the authority of reasoned conclusions even in areas where it was thought to reign. Scientists amnesic of philosophy would however appreciate the significance of authorities unknown in the ancient world. In the modern world, not all authorities originate in sources as some are created by goals and problem solving organised around them. Airworthiness is one example (discussed below). Scientists freed of philosophers would note close similarities with its authority and that of science. People (including philosophers) want to fly safe aircraft. This creates a problem. Aircraft are innately dangerous - they are complex boxes which aerodynamically suspended accelerate to (and from) great speeds and heights. Not surprisingly, there is priority to make flight safe - we want to avoid accidents. The problem of air safety is a problem about ideas. Though we do not fly ideas, how and what we fly depends upon ideas in the form of aircraft designs and protocols governing their operation. How and what we fly will therefore be determined by how their merits are argued, evaluated and debated. But what sort of problem intellectually is this? It is nothing like the reasoning done to demonstrate proofs - showing the transmission of authority from a source. Nevertheless reasoning over safety creates rational authority - airworthiness - to prefer one design over another. This is not reducible to its legal backing since this itself depends upon expert reasoning over safety. How does this reasoning create authority? The authority of airworthiness lies in the combination of the goal of air safety with a non-geometric kind of problem solving. There are two kinds of problem solving. Before showing the connection between problem solving and authority I shall discuss them. They can be of two broad types: closed or open. Closed problems have identifiable answers which end them. Solutions to open problems in contrast are always provisional and contingent. Finding a missing child is a closed problem: only the discovery of some specific child can end it. Another child, however similar, will not do. Finding the prettiest face in a baby competition, in contrast, is an open problem. Providing at least one child has been entered there is a prettiest baby. Which child wins is contingent upon individual judges' preferences (the criteria used) and those babies entered (the set of potential alternative solutions). Closed problems have the advantage of a definite solution at the cost of not having provisional ones. Unless the child is found the search can go on rewardless for ever. Open problems have the advantage over closed problems in always having solutions. If one candidate solution is not availableanother can take its place. If the winner of a baby competition is disqualified another baby can take its prize. the problem of creating airworthiness is of the open kind. A subset of closed problems concern transmission. A successful transmission preserves the identity of its input in its output. A subset of this subset are problems concerning deduction which seek to transmit truth and falsity - truth from an antecedent idea to a consequent one and vice versa for falsity. Finding proofs about mathematical theorems are transmission problems, hence problems par excellence of a closed intellectual problem solving. Whether a theorem given certain axioms is valid or not has a definite solution. Thus in viewing rationally as analogous with geometry philosophers restrict their modelling of the problem solving of reason to closed problems. There is an alternative - airworthiness shows authority can be created by goals. The authority of ideas can be created using open problem solving - a possibility denied historically by philosophers. Goals can do this because they can determine exhaustively the criteria and sets of candidate solutions used in open problems. We can use goals to restrict the ideas we hold. For any open problem there is a set of candidate solutions. This may be empty. But many sets are non-empty for instance the set of methods of reasoning. If there is a single member in the set, it is the solution by default - the set after all is made up of candidate solutions. Where more than one exists the solution is the one gaining by the criteria the highest merit. Which criteria should be used? This is determined by the induction of further problems by our goal. (Open problem solving has similarities to mathematical induction - you start with a given and use a procedure to replace it. The main difference is that this procedure is another "given" in a higher level). If air safety is our goal, we will be concerned to use the best methods to select safe designs. At a higher level we want to use the best methods of selecting these methods. We would not want to use a method of selecting methods which was inferior to another - we might be less effective in choosing those methods good at selecting safe designs and so the pursuit of our goal. This ascent is made up of provisional solutions (ideas and methods of selection) - the only non-provisional thing is our goal. This makes our reasoning contingent upon the ideas methods and criteria we use. But the problem solving is constantly evolving in an unending quest towards something non-contingent - our goal. The ascent to better methods is a better analysis of reasoning than the traditional analysis of the descent to its foundations. Successful problem solving does not transmit anything to their selected solutions. The reasoning and methods used to create air safety for instance do not give grounds for believing any flight is risk free. Instead of establishing the authority of the ideas methods in problem solving selects only the effectiveness of the problem solving used. In the case of air safety, effective methods reassure us we have done our best to search for potential causes of air disasters. Some may be missed but we know we have done our best to find them. Tomorrow, in our unending quest, we will do better. Goal authorities radically differ from source authorities. Instead of foundations it is the exhaustiveness of our search and evaluation which give the ideas of goal authorities their authority. A source authority is challenged by showing that the privileged given an idea is not transmitted from an authorising source. Goal authority is challenged by finding an idea better than ones we have which meets our goal. Alternatively, it ceases as soon as we stop caring about the goal. If air safety was not a problem - if it did not matter whether aircraft crashed or not, then neither would those ideas selected as airworthy in terms of it. Given a different goal different ideas and problems would be selected. A goal authority model of science explains three problems which philosophers fail to answer. First, the impossibility of finding foundations: goal authorities select ideasthey do not justify them. Theories in science are privileged only because we care whether they are true or not. Their privilege has no foundation other than this. Second, after Hume, we know that as no aircraft is known to be safe, no theory in logic can be known to be true - a few theory confirmations means as much for a theory being true as a few safe flights means an aircraft will not have a future accident. If scientific reasoning involves open problem solving this suggests the authority of any theory in science will be ephemeral awaiting a better one. But this ephemeralness fits what Hume showed about the status of empirical logic. Third, present philosophers cannot account for why scientists debate and criticise. However, as shown by the search for flight safety, the most efficient collective problem solving centred upon a goal involves a collective willingness to vigorously debate, test and criticize ideas. Debate becomes central to understanding scientist's rationality if we are pursuing a goal. In a world amnesic of philosophy, scientists would arrive at similar conclusions upon analogy with airworthiness as to Popper. First, science gains its authority from criticism. The authority of a theory rests upon the severity of the tests it has undergone (preproduction aircraft designs undergo vigorous testing; the more likely to uncover a design defect the better). Second, all theories are conjectures (no aircraft can be shown to be safe as accidents are always imaginable). Third, science aims not to show theories are true but to eliminate false theories (we cannot foresee the future, we only know the past; thus we can only eliminate designs and flights procedures known to have caused, or be likely, to cause accidents). The history of the relationship between philosophy and science is not happy. Final causes motivated on philosophical grounds hindered mechanics for over a millennia. The philosophical assumption that we are the centre of the universe enabled the Ptolemaic model of the universe to sidetrack astronomy into the Renaissance. I suggest philosophers mislead non-scientists and scientists about the nature of science's authority. The ancient philosophers mixed ends and causes. They took the physical world as seeking goals and the authority of reason as transmitted from truth. In contrast, after Galileo, we know the physical world is based upon transmission from causes. After Popper, we know the authority of reason comes from how we seek truth. \subsection{ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROPAGATION AND COMPETITION OF IDEAS: MORE COMMENTS SURPRISED OUT OF ME BY SKOYLES - Tom Settle} % [center] % [Center] {\bf Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph % [center] } \subsubsection{1. The Story so far.} You would gather from my comments on John Skoyles's 'What is Popper's Problem', (both in NEWSLETTER 3, nos 1/2, pp. 2-6) in which I explained why I did not think he had got the matter right, that I found his piece puzzling. I cast about a bit to try to make sense of it. Well, I never thought of taking a particular idea of his literally, the idea that ideas propagate themselves and are in competition. Far from taking it literally, I took it metaphorically and complained about the metaphor. I even likened his 'metaphor', disparagingly - and he properly took me to task for that - to a similar one used by sociobiologists. I thought the idea was bad enough (or, rather, worse than bad enough) as a metaphor. But it is clear from Skoyles's Reply (NEWSLETTER 3 nos 3/4, pp. 47-49) that that was a mistake. He really does mean me to think that ideas do actually, quite literally, propagate themselves and are actually, quite literally, in competition. He says this is a fact. I think he is dead wrong. Incidentally, he cannot claim to be expounding Popper here, since it is always clear from what Popper writes that he means the competition of ideas, and so on, metaphorically. And, incidentally again, not even genes literally propagate themselves, though concrete genes - I mean segments of DNA - can be said to behave, chemically, in such a way as to cause the assembly of other segments of DNA embodying the same patterns they do. This matter, whether ideas literally propagate themselves and are literally in competition, is much more important than whether Skoyles misrepresents my ideas, suggestions, intentions, criticisms, and so on, as I think he does. So I shall say nothing in self-defence except to express the hope that people will do me the kindness of reading what I wrote, rather than what Skoyles says I wrote, if they have any desire to get my point. Nor shall I spend time in defence of Popper's views against Skoyles's misrepresentation, important though I think it is to get Popper's philosophy right. There is a bigger fish to fry. \subsubsection{2. Must Ideas Be Literally Active for there to be Teaching and Learning?} The three arguments Skoyles adduces to try to show that ideas are active seem to me either to fail or to miss the point. First, he says, 'Settle...can criticize me by showing that such things as teaching and learning do not exist.' I take him to mean that the very existence of teaching and learning proves that ideas propagate themselves and compete with each other. I think it does nothing of the kind, but I shall have to say more about what teaching and learning are in order to show this. Let me try, starting with learning. Leave aside learning a skill, such as horseback riding or welding or surgery, to the extent that any of these go beyond the entertaining of ideas. Leave aside, too, the ideas involved where a learner might not be aware of having learnt them, as in the learning a golden retriever does in order to qualify as a seeing-eye dog. And leave aside all rotelearning where some behavioral repertoire, including the recitation of perhaps meaningful words, is rendered routine. (I do not here include an actor's learning his or her part, unless, unhappily, performance becomes routine.) Perhaps we should also leave aside all learning that results in enhanced aesthetic appreciation. I am trying to narrow things down to the learning of ideas that might count as knowledge, particular or general, empirical or theoretical. Given this narrowness, we can now say that a person can only actually learn what is true, though often people will say something has been learned which is merely thought true. Learning has all the problems knowledge has, in this respect. But learning is not merely knowing. It has affinities with understanding, which is a grasp of the interconnections of things and ideas with each other, and involves the resolution of puzzles or problems. But how does a person get ideas? Where do they come from? How do they enter the mind (if I may be permitted to use the term)? 'Come from' and 'enter' are spatial terms, which can only be used here metaphorically or analogically, if we are not to localize ideas, and I want to be cautious about localizing ideas. So let us try a different tack. When a person has an idea, when an idea, as it were, comes to him or her, we can certainly say that the person comes to think something so. Let us ask, then, how does a person come to think something or other so? There are obviously many different answers, of which three kinds are very important: perception (including proprioception); somebody else voicing or writing a sentence which expresses an idea; or a person may come up with an idea himself or herself, with or without some kind of external prompting such as being presented with a problem. I should like to know Skoyles's views on this subject, but my view is that my coming up with an idea myself is of absolute centrality to learning. Whenever anyone says anything to me, or I read something, quite out of the ordinary - a new poem, say, or a new theory in science - I feel my imagination at a stretch trying to come up with ideas that will match the words I have just encountered. Sometimes I cannot manage it. The poem remains obscure; or I do not understand the theory. Or understanding may be partial. In my view, the skill of imaginatively coming up with ideas that match verbal intake is absolutely central to even the learning and use of language, including body language. It is true, some kinds of signals may trigger fairly tightly wired reflexes. ('Wired' is a metaphor.) Shouts of warning, say, or of anger. The rapid approach of a flying object. The sudden falling away of the ground in front of one. But the meanings of most utterances do not make such direct connection with the nervous system. We have to invent meanings to make sense of our intake. Intake we are used to does not require fresh invention, just recollection. This is why learning is taxing and why imaginative people are your best listeners, unless you are a boring raconteur. On this account of learning, there cannot be any guarantee that a meaning taken from something seen or heard is the meaning intended by the utterer. If you want to be sure you have understood correctly, you have to test you comprehension by saying or doing something yourself which should have one result if you were right and another if not (provided the meaning of {\em your} utterance was correctly grasped). And if you want to be sure that the meaning of your own utterances has been grasped, you will set tests for your auditors which, if you are skilled at testing, they can pass only if they have understood what you said. (As all examiners know, there is the dreaded risk that examinees who did understand the matter at hand can still fail the test, for other reasons. There is no ready way to obviate this.) Learning to speak a language, learning how a machine works or what the composition of some substance is, or what the nature of some dimly apprehended regularity in natural occurrences is, all require the same method: imaginative trial coupledwith a sensitivity to the trial's effects that will let you know whether you were right. One can define successful communication as where the ideas the hearer comes up with are more or less the same as the ideas the utterer was trying to get across. Both utterer and hearer are active. The utterer finding words that hopefully will trigger the intended idea; the hearer looking for meanings that will satisfy the utterance. But throughout, it is people who are active, not ideas. On the account I am giving, people propagate ideas by actions designed to prod hearers into coming up with replica-ideas. The ideas do not propagate themselves. {\em The ideas themselves are passive}. Teaching, given this model of learning, becomes an exercise in providing circumstances most conducive to the student's imaginatively inventing the ideas he or she is supposed to be learning. Learning is fundamental and goes forward more by the energy of the learner than by the energy of the teacher. So, I can firmly believe both in teaching and learning without any commitment whatsoever to the idea that ideas are active. \subsubsection{3. Different Times Different Ideas.} Skoyles's second argument is hard to grasp. He says, simply, that ideas people have in 1987 differ from those people had in 1933 and 402 BC. Ideas get replaced, it seems. And the replacement is not arbitrary: 'successful ideas gain their success because they possess characteristics not possessed by those ideas they replace. It might not seem like competition' but it is, Skoyles wants us to believe. I am mystified as to why a person would want to insist that ideas do compete, even that it is a fact that they do, at the same as admitting that it does not seem that they do. Certainly, it cannot be an argument in favour of the idea that ideas compete, that, while not seeming to compete, some ideas get replaced by others, unless Skoyles thinks that the only possible explanation of the replacement is that the ideas have competed, contrary to appearances, with some losing while others won. (Of course, he would also have to say where any new ideas came from, and that might drive him towards my theory.) But there {\em is} another explanation. There are probably several, but here is mine. On my explanation, there is also a competition, but it is between people. People with certain ideas compete with people with different (perhaps, also, incompatible) ideas in an effort to gain followers or adherents or co-conspirators or just friends or power and prestige or the Nobel Prize. Let me explain why this is possible. Some ideas that people have are very difficult to test against the facts. The idea that ideas compete is one such, but any of the ideas that science has left for philosophers to argue about will do. Others are much easier to test, such as that water boils when heated and freezes when cooled or that bread nourishes. Or any of a thousand ideas that early scientists made it their business to investigate. It is an uphill battle getting much popularity for ideas that are easily shown to be wrong, once someone has found out how to show them wrong. It is much easier to gain adherents for ideas which cannot be shown up easily and which at the same time have a certain logical power. Ideas that solve painful puzzles or that bring coherence to one's personal pool of ideas are particularly welcome. So that if someone does or says something that suggests such an idea to me, I shall be inclined to believe him or her. Ricoeur remarked a while ago that if ideologies were to take popular hold they had to oversimplify things. Of course. The ordinary person can hardly be expected to come up with very complex and many-layered ideas in an effort to match a passing preacher's wayside or workplace utterances. But we have to be careful, here, about when one idea is the same as another or when two people can both have the same idea. For my money, this last expression is loose talk. Two people can no more have the same idea than two people can have the same genes. Identical twins or clones can have genes that embody the same patterns,though their actual material genes are numerically distinct. Similarly, two people may have occurrent ideas that are numerically distinct (one being entertained in one mind and the other in the other) but share logical content. The logical content of an idea lies in the realm of possibility and is eternal. Actual ideas that you and I entertain are fleeting. Sometimes we remember, sometimes we forget. It is perfectly possible in a society for no-one at all to have any idea with a logical content that was once upon a time more or less exactly shared by ideas everybody had. It would be a manner of speaking to say that such an idea died. It is more exact to say that everybody who entertained ideas with that logical content died. We also talk about ideas reviving or being revived. I do not have any trouble with this metaphorically. On the account I am giving, talk about ideas being alive and competing and so on resembles talk about computers thinking or playing chess. A pretty shorthand for ideas whose more exact expression would be cumbersome. \subsubsection{4. Why Criticism Matters in Science.} Skoyles's third argument is that 'realizing that ideas compete with each other is essential if we are to see why criticism matters in science.' By implication, if we suppose that ideas do not compete, then no sensible account can be given of criticism mattering in science. O.K. So I have to explain why criticism matters in a world where ideas do not compete. I start by assuming that everybody's imaginations are limited and fallible, scientists' included. Progress in science requires imagination. On Popper's account, imagination may come into play in seeing something as problematic which everybody before had taken for granted, or in seeing a possible solution to a problem everybody before had been stumped by. But one can be mistaken about what is really problematic or one can be mistaken about the correct solution to a problem. Criticism amounts to providing a reason, whether grounded in a fresh thought or in a fresh experience, for thinking one's conjecture possibly mistaken. Of course, one can think one's conjecture mistaken without having any reason to, beyond an appropriately modest belief in one's own fallibility. Criticism provides a specific reason to do so, and may, at the same time, suggest to one the way in which one might be wrong and the way to go to improve the conjecture. All this is true in philosophy or literary appreciation or theology as much as in science. The difference in science is that criticism is often grounded in matters of public experience, or at least of repeatable experiments, so that it is much easier to come to agreement with colleagues in the field that a conjecture was wrong and in need of remedy or replacement. In none of this are ideas active. People come up with conjectures and phrase them in a way that helps others have ideas with a similar logical content. People think up alternative critical ideas and voice them with a similar intent at communication, or do experiments that lead them to think the original conjecture in error, and publish their results in a manner designed to provoke their colleagues' understanding. \subsubsection{5. What's Next?} I have tried, here, to expose a rough theory (if that is not too dignified a handle for my ideas) of the dynamics of the propagation of ideas which does requires activity, not on the part of ideas themselves, but, rather, on the part of the people who entertain the ideas. I should very much like it if Skoyles could reciprocate by taking me step by step through his own rival theory. Then I should have a better chance to understand what he is talking about and to see whether there are any reasons why I should thinkhe is right rather than myself. Of course, anyone else can join in, too. It's an open society. % [HPG] \subsection{POPPER AND THE RED PRUSSIAN - Antony Flew (Reading)} % [center] % \WPindent{% {\em {\bf Editor's Note}:} Professor Flew has obtained Professor Popper's consent to reprint a passage from a letter he received from him. Professor Popper gave his consent on the condition that we reprint along with it his note on {\em The Red Prussian} from Addendum II of Vol.2 of {\em The Open Society}. % }% In a note first added to the Fifth Edition of {\em The Open Society} (Vol. II, P. 396) Popper wrote: "Some years after I wrote this book, Leopold Schwartzschild's book on Marx, {\em The Red Prussian} (translated by Margaret Wing: London 1948) became known to me. There is no doubt in my mind that Schwartzschild looks at Marx with unsympathetic and even hostile eyes, and that he often paints him in the darkest possible colours. But, even though the book may be not always fair, it contains documentary evidence, especially from the Marx-Engels correspondence, which shows that Marx was less of a humanitarian and less of a lover of freedom, than he is made to appear in this book. Schwartzschild describes him as a man who saw in `the proletariat' mainly an instrument for his own personal ambition. Though this may put the matter more harshly than the evidence warrants, it must be admitted that the evidence itself is shattering". But at that time (1965) Popper added nothing about Marx as a supposedly sincere seeker after scientific truth. Now, in a letter to me, he has done so. This is the story. Although I only became aware of Popper's 1965 Note much later - Until then my own copies of {\em The Open Society} had been of the First Edition, awarded as a College Prize in 1947 - I immediately began to search for a copy of the Schwartzschild volume, which had already been out of print for twenty or more years. Once I had had the chance of reading it I resolved that it absolutely must be got back into print. Now at last it is (ISBN 0948859-00-8 from Pickwick Books, PO Box 925, London W21FA). Unfortunately this New Edition does not include the updating Appendix, which was intended to cover some more recent revelations: both about the begetting and shabby disposal of an illegitimate son by the `au pair' Lenchen Demuth; and about the Marx finances. This can now be found, along with other materials more academic, in Leslie Page {\em Karl Marx and the Critical Examination of his Works} (London: Freedom Association, 1987). But the New Edition does contain an Introduction in which I argue, with explicit reference to Popper, and on what I take to be Popperian lines, that the systematic and lifelong failure of Marx to attend to intellectually formidable and truth-concerned criticism, both of his supposedly scientific conjectures and of his proposals for wholesale Utopian social engineering, revealed a basic and pervasive bad faith: both that is, a lack of a sincere concern about truth; and a lack of any genuine concern as to whether the policies commended would actually achieve the emancipatory and welfare results which were their pretended justification. I recently received a characteristically far too generous letter from Sir Karl, provoked by the Introduction aforesaid. The passage which readers of the {\em Newsletter} will wish to see runs as follows:- % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% I was personally shattered by Schwartzschild's book, and it was only my view of Marx's moral stature which was shattered. The reason that my view of Marx's stature as a scientist was not shattered is very simple. I had not a {\em very} high opinion to start with, but I had given him all the benefit of the doubt; and my opinion had {\em slowly} deteriorated, bothwhile writing the book and after having written it; so slowly that I never clearly noticed it. When I read Schwartzschild there was nothing left to be shattered. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% So it was only when I now read your Introduction that I saw that I ought to have referred to my changed view of Marx's scientific sincerity. I therefore accept your criticism {\em fully}. % }% % }% Sir Karl goes on to say that, if opportunity arises, he intends to add another note to {\em The Open Society} "briefly referring to this new edition with your excellent Introduction, and to my full acceptance of its criticism". % [HPG] \subsection{ELABORATION D'UNE HERMENEUTIQUE EPISTEMOLOGIQUE BASEE SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE DE KARL POPPER - Bente B{\o}ggild} J'ai largement profit\'{e} de la philosophie de Popper pour \'{e}laborer une m\'{e}thode herm\'{e}neutique susceptible d'\^{e}tre appliqu\'{e}e aux oeuvres litt\'{e}raires fran\c{c}aises. Premi\`{e}rement, j'ai utilis\'{e} sa division en trois mondes. Deuxi\`{e}mement, je me suis servie de la th\'{e}orie d'\'{e}volution de Popper et par l\`{a} de ses quatre fonctions de langue. Les deux fonctions de langue inf\'{e}rieures m'ont servie dans les analyses litt\'{e}raires en m'aidant \`{a} former une premi\`{e}re interpr\'{e}tation superficielle que j'ai appel\'{e}e "r\'{e}cit communicatif", c'est \`{a} dires un r\'{e}sum\'{e} de l'action telle qu'on la comprend \`{a} la premi\`{e}re lecture. Les deux fonctions de langue sup\'{e}rieures jouent un r\^{o}le d\'{e}cisif pour la th\'{e}orie d'\'{e}volution de Popper. C'est \`{a} travers elles que l'homme (par \'{e}volution exosomatique) d\'{e}veloppe de nouveaux outils, et \`{a} travers ceux-ci qu'il peut augmenter ses connaissance et par l\`{a}-meme sa capacit\'{e} d'adaptation \`{a} de nouveaux cr\'{e}neaux dans la soci\'{e}t\'{e}. Elles sont fonctions de la connaissance et de la volont\'{e} des \^{e}tres humains. Dans mes analyses d'oeuvres litt\'{e}raires con\c{c}ues dans une langue plus ou moins ambigu\"{e} on peut rep\'{e}rer les deux fonctions de langues sup\'{e}rieures en suivant le sch\'{e}ma $P_1 \rightarrow{} TT \rightarrow{} EE \rightarrow{} P_2$, bien qu'elles ne soient pas directement \'{e}crites dans le texte, comme c'est le cas des deux fonctions de langue inf\'{e}rieures. Ainsi l'analyse est divis\'{e}e en deux: % \WPindent{% 1. un r\'{e}cit communicatif, qui est lu directement dans le texte.% }% \WPindent{% 2. un r\'{e}cit de connaissance qui est fond\'{e} sur le r\'{e}cit communicatif et aussi sur une th\'{e}orie tentative qu'on va essayer d'\'{e}liminer. % }% La phase d'\'{e}limination est une phase de r\'{e}v\'{e}lation. On peut lire un roman bien connu dans une nouvelle optique (celle de la th\'{e}orie tentative) et d\'{e}couvrir avec quelle exactitude il a \'{e}t\'{e} \'{e}crit. Il semble qu'il n'existe pas un seul \'{e}l\'{e}ment qui ne fasse partie d'une \'{e}conomie merveilleusement r\'{e}ussie en ce qui concerne l'oeuvre comme entit\'{e}. Le r\'{e}sultat de cette phase de lecture constitue une nouvelle interpr\'{e}tation enrichie des deux fonctions de langues sup\'{e}rieures - interpr\'{e}tation qui, \`{a} sa mani\`{e}re, \'{e}limine sinon la th\'{e}orie tentative du moins le r\'{e}cit communicatif. Les traits oppos\'{e}s des deux lectures sautent aux yeux: Le r\'{e}cit communicatif para\^{i}t st\'{e}r\'{e}otyp\'{e} et opportuniste. Il semble \^{e}tre le miroir d'un public contemporain. Un public dont on voit peint le portrait. Par contre le r\'{e}cit de connaissance nous int\'{e}resse tous, du fait qu'il r\'{e}v\`{e}le un message ind\'{e}pendant de l'\'{e}poque historique o\`{u} l'oeuvre a paru. Un message d'importance pour l'humanit\'{e}. Il est le plus souvant de nature r\'{e}volutionnaire et \'{e}galement peu apte \`{a} \^{e}tre ouvertement pr\'{e}sent\'{e}. Je peux bri\`{e}vement r\'{e}sumer les perspectives qu'ouvrent mes analyses: A partir de la p\'{e}riode classique, o\`{u} les auteurs se trouvaient divis\'{e}s par la "Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes", le genre romanesque a cr\'{e}\'{e} une langue litt\'{e}raire ambigu\"{e}. Cette langue s'est d\'{e}velopp\'{e}e au cours des si\`{e}cles jusqu'\`{a} sa culmination dans "Le nouveau roman". D\'{e}chiffrer la langue litt\'{e}raire ambigu\"{e}, qui semble vouloir \`{a} tout prix tromper les lecteurs (chose curieuse: tromper de sorte que les lecteurs ne s'aper\c{c}oivent pas du vrai message, et de sort que les lecteurs se contentent de la banalit\'{e} de son r\'{e}cit communicatif) - cela exige justement une th\'{e}orie de la croissance de notre connaissance. Contrairement \`{a} ce qu'on pense ordinairement, les oeuvres d'art gagnent beaucoup en richesse, lorsqu'elles sont lues et analys\'{e}e au travers des principes du rationalisme critique. Pour plus d'informations \'{e}crire \`{a} Bente B{\o}ggild, Udbyh{\o}jvej 186, 8900 Randers, le Danemark. % [HPG] \subsection{POSITIVISMUS ODER POSTPOSITIVISMUS? - Michael Schmidt} Kritische Bemerkungen zu Jeffrey Alexanders Neubegr\"{u}ndung der soziologischen Theorie im Lichte der Methodologie Karl Poppers. \footnote{Untersuchung zu J. Alexander, {\em Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. 1, Positivism, Presuppositions and Current Controversies}. Routledge \& Kegan Paul, London/Henley 1982.} \WPindent{ Michael Schmid Universit\"{a}t Augsburg} In den Jahren von 1982-1983 hat Jeffrey Alexander, Professor f\"{u}r Soziologie an der Universit\"{a}t of California, Los Angeles, ein vierb\"{a}ndiges Konvolut% \footnote{% J.C. Alexander, {\em Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. 1, Positivism, Presuppositions and Current Controversies}. Routledge \& Kegan Paul, London/Henley 1982; {\em Vol. 2, The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim}, London/Henley 1982, {\em Vol. 3, The Classical Attempt at Theoretical Synthesis: Max Weber}, London/Henley 1983, {\em Vol. 4, The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons}, London/Henley 1983.% }% erscheinen lassen, das einen \"{u}beraus ehrgeizigen Plan verfolgt: Die soziologische Theorie soll aus ihrer Zersplitterung in verschiedenartige, sich wechselseitig bek\"{a}mpfende Schulen erl\"{o}st und in der Form einer einheitlichen Handlungstheorie rekonstruiert werden. Alexander verfolgt dieses Programm vermittels einer eingehenden Untersuchung einer Reihe klassischer' Theorien (der Werke von Marx, Durkheim, Weber und Parsons), deren jeweiligen Beschr\"{a}nkungen und Einseitigkeiten dazu benutzt werden, die von ihm favorisierte, vereinheitlichte 'theoretische Logik in der Soziologie' (so der Obertitel aller vier Volumina) kontrastreich zu dokumentieren. Sinn und Verdienst einer solchen Zielsetzung m\"{o}chte ich ebensowenig kommentieren wie deren Verwirklichungschancen, obgleich, wie mir scheint, einige kritikw\"{u}rdigen Unzul\"{a}nglichkeiten der Alexanderschen Bem\"{u}hungen unschwer ins Auge fallen% \footnote{% Vgl. die Diskussion um den Alexanderschen Versuch eines synthetisierenden Neubeginns der theoretischen Soziologie bei R. Collins, Jeffrey Alexander and the Search for Multidimensional Theory, {\em Theory and Society}, 14, 1985, S. 877-892, T. Burger, Multidimensional Problems: A Critique of Jeffrey Alexander's Theoretical Logic in Sociology, {\em The Sociological Quarterly}, 27, S. 75-90, H. Joas, Ein Schritt vorwa5rts, zwei Schritte zuru5ck. Jeffrey Alexanders Neofunktionalismus als theoretisches Geru5st der Soziologie?, Skript, Erlangen 1987. Ich selbst ha5tte u5ber die in diesen Arbeiten diskutierten Einwa5nde hinaus zu anzumerken, da{\ss} in meinen Augen die Skala, vermittels derer Alexander den Tatbestand der Multidimensionalita5t ausdru5cken mo5chte, logisch fehlerhaft konstruiert ist, und da{\ss} ich die im ersten Band, S. 64-112 vorgestellte Rekonstruktion der soziologischen Handlungstheorie fu5r bedauernswert unzula5nglich halte.% }% . Vielmehr m\"{o}chte ich die Aufmerksamkeit auf einen augenscheinlich ganz nebens\"{a}chlichen Teilaspekt des Alexanderschen Unternehmens lenken, auf die im ersten Band ausf\"{u}hrlich diskutierte \"{U}berzeugung, da{\ss} dessen Durchf\"{u}hrung der Unterst\"{u}tzung einer 'postpositivistischen' Philosophie bed\"{u}rfe% \footnote{% Vgl. Alexander, 1982, Vol. 1, S. 5ff.% }% . Mit ihrer Hilfe soll verhindert werden, da{\ss} philosophische Probleme ausschlie{\ss}lich dort identifiziert werden und diskutiert werden, wo das Wechselverh\"{a}ltnis von (empirischen) Verallgemeinerungen und empirischen Befunden zur Debatte steht oderdie Beziehung zwischen Theorien und ihrer \"{U}berpr\"{u}fungsbasis, wodurch in der Auffassung von Alexander nur ein sehr eingeschr\"{a}nktes Verst\"{a}ndnis der Problemlage erm\"{o}glicht wird. Vielmehr geht es seiner Meinung nach darum, die sehr viel anspruchsvollere Fragestellung zu verfolgen, in welchem Umfang und mit welcher Berechtigung man bei der Erstellung von Theorien bestimmte (innerhalb der positivistischen und empiristischen Tradition zumeist unbeachtet gelassene) methodologische, ideologische, modellogische und vor allem metaphysische Voraussetzungen machen mu{\ss}. Dies ist in letzter Instanz gleichzusetzen mit der Frage nach den Bedingungen der M\"{o}glichkeit von empirisch gehaltvollen Theorien oder Thesen, womit gleichzeitig ein eigenlogischer Problembereich ausgegrenzt wird, der genau insoweit eine autonome Behandlung beanspruchen darf, als sich die Standards m\"{o}glicher Probleml\"{o}sungen der empirischen Erfahrung nicht werden entnehmen lassen. Der Anerkennung dieses Sachverhaltes aber steht in den Augen Alexanders entgegen, da{\ss} die \"{u}bergro{\ss}er Mehrheit aller Soziologen die Bedeutung jener trans-empirischen Bedingungen der Hypothesenbildung und -\"{u}berpr\"{u}fung \"{u}bersehen. Alexander h\"{a}lt eine derartige Verk\"{u}rzung der wissenschaftlichen Reflexion f\"{u}r den Auswuchs einer kollektiv wirksamen 'positivistischen Verf\"{u}hrung'% \footnote{% Alexander 1982, Vol. 1, S. 5, 140f., 48, 33, 7 u.a.% }% , der man entgegenzutreten habe. Infolge eines solchen Schrittes soll verst\"{a}ndlich werden, da{\ss} die entscheidenden Divergenzen zwischen sich widerstreitenden soziologischen Schulen nicht darin zum Ausdruck kommen, da{\ss} sie ganz heterogene und bisweilen auch divergente Teilbereiche der sozialen Realit\"{a}t behandeln; jene Divergenzen liegen vielmehr (auch und gerade) in der Verschiedenartigkeit jener implizit mitverhandelten, nicht-empirischen Voraussetzungen begr\"{u}ndet, die der erforderlichen metatheoretischen Klarstellungen wegen offen miteinander konfrontiert, einander angeglichen und auf einen gemeinsamen und vertr\"{a}glichen philosophischen Nenner zu bringen sind, um das \"{u}bergeordnete Ziel, das soziologische Denken mit einer einheitlichen 'theoretischen Logik' zu versehen, zu erreichen. Unabdingbar f\"{u}r eine ertragreiche Gegen\"{u}berstellung jener nicht-empirischen 'presuppositions' aber ist - so Alexanders mehrfach betonte \"{U}berzeugung - eine neuartige, postpositivistische Philosophie. Es soll im Folgenden nicht darum gehen, die zentrale Doppelthese Alexanders zu bestreiten, wonach die soziologische Theorienbildung trans-empirische Voraussetzungen besitze und diese zu diskutieren seien, um zu einer einheitlichen Auffassung dessen zu gelangen, was die soziologische Theorienentwicklung vorantreibe. Und ebensowenig bedarf es einer gesonderten Betrachtung des Arguments, man ben\"{o}tige zur \"{U}berwindung der 'positivistischen Verf\"{u}hrung' einer Philosophie, die dazu bef\"{a}higt sei, dem Einflu{\ss} nicht-empirischer \"{U}berlegungen auf die Konstruktion empirischer Theorien nachzugehen. Alles dies sei als zutreffend zugestanden. Strittig allerdings scheint mir die Alexandersche Position in einem anderen Punkt zu sein: Alexander bem\"{u}ht sich um eine Rekonstruktion der Frontlinien, die seinem Verst\"{a}ndnis nach eine positivistische Philosophie von einer postpositivistischen trennen, und er vertritt in diesem Zusammenhang die These, da{\ss} die Wissenschaftsphilosophie Karl Poppers eindeutig der positivistischen Seite zuzurechnen sei. Alexander begr\"{u}ndet diese Zuordnung nicht n\"{a}her, scheint aber dem Glauben anzuh\"{a}ngen, da{\ss} die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kuhn und Popper genau dies gezeigt habe, und sieht sich \"{u}berdies offenbar durch die Beurteilungen Poppers seitens einiger Teilnehmer an dem damaligen sogenannten 'Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie' zu seiner Deutung ermuntert% \footnote{% Zu Kuhn vgl. Alexander 1982, Vol. 1, S. 24, 27, 146, 150, 153, 157f.; zur Beurteilung Poppers durch Habermas vgl. S. 156f.% }% . Ich will g\"{a}nzlich davon absehen, Jeffrey Alexander durch eine neuerliche Rekonstruktion der Popper-Kuhn-Kontroverse und des sagenumwobenen Positivismusstreits \"{u}ber die damals tats\"{a}chlich verhandelten Probleme zu belehren, um auf diesem viel zu aufwendigen Wege seiner Meinung entgegenzutreten, Popper sei mit Gewinn f\"{u}r ein angemessenes Verst\"{a}ndnis der Problemlage als ein 'Positivist' zu kennzeichnen. Gleichwohl kann ich andererseits nicht empfehlen, seine Beurteilung der Popperschen Philosophie unbesehen stehen zu lassen, denn sie ist nachgerade falsch, mehr noch: sie ist in einem hohen Grade irref\"{u}hrend. Diese These m\"{o}chte ich im nachfolgenden plausibel machen, wobei ich mich von der m\"{o}glicherweise tr\"{u}gerischen Hoffnung tragen lasse, da{\ss} sich eine Klarstellung und Korrektur der mi{\ss}gl\"{u}ckten und verfehlten Lokalisierung der Popperschen Methodologie im Lager des Positivismus insoweit lohnen kann, als auf diese Weise wenigstens ansatzweise sichtbar wird, welche von Alexander v\"{o}llig \"{u}bersehene Bedeutung Poppers Denken f\"{u}r die Entwicklung und St\"{u}tzung seines eigenen Programms besitzen k\"{o}nnte% \footnote{% Burger, 1986, S. 287 scheint diese Deutung der Sachlage zu st\"{u}tzen, wenn er darauf hinweist, da{\ss} Alexander Popper zu leichtfertig beiseite schiebe.% }% . Zu diesem Zweck werde ich in zwei getrennten Abschnitten die Alexanderschen Rekonstruktionen der beiden kontr\"{a}ren wissesnchaftsphilosophischen Lager widergeben, um sodann zu untersuchen, inwieweit Popper die jeweils benannten Definitionsbedingungen des positivistischen bzw. postpositivistischen Standpunkts erf\"{u}llt. Der Auffassung Alexanders nach% \footnote{% Vgl. Alexander 1982, Vol. 1, S. 5-9.% }% beruht die \"{U}berzeugungskraft der {\em positivistischen Position} auf vier Grundannahmen oder Postulaten und drei, das letzte dieser Postulate erg\"{a}nzenden, Korollarien. Das erste Postualte geht davon aus, da{\ss} zwischen empirischen Beobachtungen und nicht-empirischen Aussagen eine un\"{u}berbr\"{u}ckbare Kluft bestehe; das zweite Postulat behauptet, da{\ss} wegen dieser Kluft allgemeinere intellektuelle Fragen, die als 'philosophische' oder 'metaphysische' zu bezeichnen sind, innerhalb einer empirisch orientierten Disziplin keine grundlegende Bedeutung gewinnen k\"{o}nnen; das dritte Postulat beschreibt eine normative Forderung, die sich aus den beiden ersten ergibt. Dieser Forderung folgend sollte sich die Soziologie um ein 'szientifisches' Selbstverst\"{a}ndnis bem\"{u}hen, das wie jenes der Naturwisssenschaften auf der Festlegung beruhe, da{\ss} alle nicht-empirischen Bez\"{u}ge zu eliminieren seien. Dem vierten Postulat zufolge k\"{o}nnen alle 'theoretischen' oder 'philosophischen' Probleme in korrekter Weise unter Rekurs auf empirische Beobachtungen, die ihrerseits keine (philosophischen) Fragen aufwerfen, gel\"{o}st werden. Diesem letzten Postulat entsprechen offenbar folgende Pr\"{a}zisierungen: Ein erstes Korollar behauptet, da{\ss} man allen theoretischen Problemen dadurch asus dem Wege gehen kann, da{\ss} man allgemeine Aussagen aus empirischen Beobachtungen induziert; es gibt demnach Induktion und damit enthalten die allgemeinsten Annahmen, die ein Positivist vertreten hat, in letzter Instanz nicht mehr Bestandteile, als er seiner Beobachtungsbasis entnehmen kann. Dem zweiten Korollar folgend k\"{o}nnen alle Konflikte zwischen Theorien durch empirische Tests entschieden werden und damit - so formuliert das dritte und letzte - gibt es keine eigenst\"{a}ndigen theoretischen Auseinandersetzungen und Divergenzen. Ich m\"{o}chte nicht untersuchen, ob diese Rekonstruktion es verdient als gelungen bezeichnet zu werden. Offenbar ist sie viel zu vage und in wichtigen Details unklar geraten. Wenn indessen unterstellt werden kann, da{\ss} die angef\"{u}hrten Postulate und ihre Folges\"{a}tze den wissenschaftsphilosophischen Positivismus widerspruchsfrei und hinreichend bestimmen, dann kann Popper kein Positivist sein. Ich belege diese These,indem ich die angegebenen Postulate der Reihe nach mit den jeweiligen Auffassungen Poppers konfrontiere. Das erste Postulat ist unpr\"{a}zise und l\"{a}{\ss}t eine Reihe unterschiedlicher Auslegungen zu. Sollte damit der Tatbestand angesprochen sein, da{\ss} einige (positivistische) Philosophen der \"{U}berzeugung anhingen, da{\ss} sich Beobachtungsterme und theoretische Begriffe nicht aufeinander reduzieren lassen, dann wird man sich in Erinnerung zu rufen haben, da{\ss} Popper der Zwei-Sprachen-Theorie Carnaps ebenso widersprochen hat wie den korrespondierenden Auffassungen Neuraths und Schlicks% \footnote{% Vgl. K.R. Popper, {\em Logik der Forschung}, 2. Aufl., T\"{u}bingen 1966, S. 38, 62f., 376ff., ders. {\em Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie}, T\"{u}bingen 1979, Kapitel IX, ders. {\em Conjectures and Refutations}, New York/Evanston 1968, S. 119, 262f., 277ff.% }% . Alle empirischen Aussagen enthalten unausrottbare theoretische Elemente, weshalb es in dem Sinn genau dieser Popperschen These keinen un\"{u}berbr\"{u}ckbaren Hiatus zwischen empirischen Beobachtungen und nichtempirischen S\"{a}tzen geben wird. Dies gilt auch f\"{u}r die inverse Formulierung des Postulats; wenn es die Vermutung aussprechen sollte, da{\ss} Positivisten darauf festgelegt seien zu leugnen, da{\ss} nichtempirische Annahmen einen irgendwie gearteten Einflu{\ss} auf die Produktion und/oder Akzeptanz empirischer Beobachtungen haben k\"{o}nnten, dann findet eine solche Leugnung in den Einsichten Poppers nachweisbar keine St\"{u}tze. Popper hat die These, derzufolge es eine voraussetzungslose, und in diesem Sinne reine Beobachtung geben k\"{o}nne, zeitlebens verworfen% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1966, S. 31 (Anmerkung), 44ff., 48f., 71, 72, 93, 224f., 366f., 377f., ders. 1968, 23, 38, 41, 44f., 46ff., 118, 115, 173, 187ff., 190f., 387, ders. 1979, S. 42ff.% }% . Indessen ist Alexanders Bestimmung der nicht-empirischen Voraussetzungen theoretischen Denkens ganz heterogen und umfa{\ss}t u.a. auch (ideologische) Bewertungen% \footnote{% Vgl. Alexander 1982, Vol. 1, S. 39-46.% }% , wobei er davon auszugehen scheint, da{\ss} Positivisten eine Trennung zwischen Wert- und Sachaussagen nur akzeptieren, um Bewertungen jeden Einflu{\ss} auf den Gang der Wissensentwicklung abzusprechen. Da Popper in der Tat daran festhalten m\"{o}chte, da{\ss} man zwischen Fakten- und Werturteilen kategorial trennen solle% \footnote{% Vgl. K.R. Popper, {\em The Open Society and Its Enemies}, Vol. 2, 1966, S. 383ff.% }% , m\"{u}{\ss}te man ihn demnach als einen Positivisten einstufen. Eine solche Beurteilung \"{u}bersieht freilich, da{\ss} Popper zwar den (semantischen) Unterschied zwischen Bewertungen und Sachurteilen anerkennt% \footnote{% Mir ist aus Alexanders Ausf\"{u}hrungen nicht klar geworden, welche Interpretation er der Bedeutungsdifferenz zwischen Fakten-und Wertaussagen gibt, weshalb ich auf spekulative Erweiterungen dieses Diskussionspunktes verzichte. % }% , ohne aber daraus die Folgerung zu ziehen, Werturteile (aller Art) spielten f\"{u}r die Erstellung inhaltlicher Behauptungen keine nachweisliche Rolle; vom baren Gegenteil wird einem die Lekt\"{u}re von Poppers 'Open Society and Its Enemies' jederzeit \"{u}berzeugen k\"{o}nnen% \footnote{% Vgl. K.R. Popper, {\em The Open Society and Its Enemies}, Vol. 1 und Vol. 2, London 1966.% }% . Das zweite Postulat, demzufolge metaphysische Fragen innerhalb einer strikt empiristisch verstandenen wissenschaftlichen Disziplin keine Bedeutung gewinnen k\"{o}nnten, ist doppeldeutig. Es kann einmal meinen, da{\ss} metaphysische Aussagen keinen Sinn haben, der nach \"{u}berkommener positivistischer Lehrmeinung davon abh\"{a}ngt, da{\ss} Aussagen empirisch verifizierbar sind. Diese Version eines empirischen Sinn(losigkeits)kriteriums hat Popper indessen nie vertreten, sondern mit dem Hinweisabgelehnt, da{\ss} erstens keine Verifikation (im logischen Sinne des Begriffs) gebe und da{\ss} die empirische \"{U}berpr\"{u}fbarkeit einer Aussage kein Kriterium ihrer semantischen Bedeutung sein k\"{o}nne% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1966, S. 40f., 67, 376ff., ders. 1968, S. 41, 54f., 112, 114f., 192 u.a., ders. 1979, S. 301ff.% }% . Die Alexandersche Formulierung des benannten Postulats kann aber auch meinen, da{\ss} Metaphysiken ohne inhaltlichen Einflu{\ss} auf die praktisch-empirische Forschung seien. Eine solche These hat Popper zu keiner Zeit verfochten und einige seiner Sch\"{u}ler haben sich eindeutig und von Popper unwidersprochen gegen sie ge\"{a}u{\ss}ert% \footnote{% Zum Metaphysikverst\"{a}ndnis Poppers vgl., ders. 1968, 184ff., 253ff., ders. {\em Realism and the Aim of Science. From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery}, Totowa 1983, S. 194ff., ders. 1966, S. 199ff., 223, 319f., 391ff. u.a., vgl. auch J.W.N. Watkins, Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science, {\em British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, 26, 1975, S. 91-121, J. Agassi, {\em Science in Flux}, Dortrecht 1975, S. 208-239.% }% . Zwar hat sich Popper darum bem\"{u}ht, metaphyische Aussagen von wissenschaftlichen zu trennen% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1979, S. 341ff., ders. 1966, S. 8ff., 14ff., 54ff., ders. 1968, S. 33ff., 39f., 52ff., 196ff., 249f., 253ff., 259ff. u.a.% }% , dies aber nicht in der Absicht, damit jede Metaphysik ihres Einflusses zu berauben, sondern um diesen Einflu{\ss} methodologischen Regeln zu unterwerfen. Popper hat, wenn man so will, die Metaphysik methodologisiert. Mann kann einen solchen Versuch als unrealisierbar oder unerw\"{u}nscht einsch\"{a}tzen, aber ein derartiger Vorbehalt ist mit dem Hinweis, Popper habe der Metaphysik keinen faktischen Einflu{\ss} auf den Gang der Wissenschaften einger\"{a}umt, nicht zu st\"{u}tzen. Da{\ss} der Positivismus sich, wie das dritte Postulat vorsieht, darauf festlege, die Soziologie sei dem Ideal der naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung zu unterwerfen, welche auf jede nicht-empirische \"{U}berlegung verzichte, mag zutreffen. Indessen spiegeln sich in diesem Postulat nicht Poppers \"{U}berzeugungen. Die 'Logik der Forschung', das einzige systematische Werk Poppers, auf das sich Alexander glaubt beziehen zu m\"{u}ssen, behandelt die Frage nicht, inwieweit die Sozialwissenschaften dem Vorbild der 'natural science' zu folgen haben, und die Schriften, in denen sich Popper zu dieser Frage \"{a}u{\ss}ert, legen ihn eher auf die Meinung fest, da{\ss} die Sozialwissenschaften jeden Szientismus zu meiden h\"{a}tten, um den Fallstricken des Historismus, des Holismus und des Historizismus zu entgehen% \footnote{% Vgl. K.R. Popper, {\em The Poverty of Historicism}, London, ders. 1966, Vol. 1 und Vol. 2.% }% . Um dies zu erreichen, empfiehlt ihnen Popper die Methode einer verstehenden, sogenannten 'situationslogischen' Rekonstruktion, die das Handeln von einzelnen Akteuren als ein rationales, problem- oder situationsorientiertes Handeln begreift, und \"{u}ber-individuelle Ph\"{a}nomene als dessen aggregierte, nicht-intendierte kollektive Konsequenzen% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1961, S. 147ff., ders. 1966, Vol. 2, S. 93, 94, 97, ders. La Rationalit\'{e} et le statut du principe de rationalit\'{e}, in E.M. Claasens (Hrsg.), {\em Le fondements philosophiques des systemes economiques}, Paris, 1967, 143ff., ders. {\em Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach}, Oxford 1972, S. 170ff., 178ff. u.a.% }% . Diese \"{U}berzeugungen k\"{o}nnten zwar ihrerseits einer Kritik unterzogen werden, die auf Alexandersche Argumente zur\"{u}ckgreifen k\"{o}nnte, wonach es voreilig sei, menschliches Handeln auschlie{\ss}lich als ein 'rationales' zu verstehen% \footnote{% Vgl. Alexander 1982, Vol. 1, S. 72ff., 79ff., 94ff., ders. Vol. 4, S. 13ff.% }% - mit einem szientifischen' Selbstverst\"{a}ndnis der Sozialwissenschaften in dem Sinne, da{\ss} esdie Ber\"{u}cksichtigung nicht-empirischer Aussagen verbiete, sind sie indessen kaum zur Deckung zu bringen. Ganz im Gegenteil dazu hat man die nicht-empirischen Bestandteile des Popperschen Theorieprogramms f\"{u}r die Sozialwissenschaften mehrfach identifiziert und sogar vorgeschlagen, es wegen deren Pr\"{a}dominanz als ein 'metaphysisches' zu bezeichnen% \footnote{% Vgl. N. Koertge, Popper's Metaphysical Research Program for the Human Sciences, {\em Inquiry}, 18, 1975, S. 437-462, M. Schmid, {\em Handlungsrationalit\"{a}t. Kritik einer dogmatischen Handlungswissenschaft}, M\"{u}nchen 1979, S. 16-27, ders. Die Idee rationalen Handelns und ihr Verh\"{a}ltnis zur Sozialwissenschaft. Bemerkungen zu Karl Poppers Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften, in F. Wallner (Hrsg.), {\em Karl Poppers Philosophie und Wissenschaft}, Wien 1985, S. 89-107.% }% . Wenn man zu einseitigen Kennzeichnungen neigt, dann sollte man Poppers methodologische Vorschl\"{a}ge f\"{u}r die Sozialtheorie als eine Abart der Hermeneutik verstehen d\"{u}rfen, die einige der zentralen Postulate eines empirischen Theorienverst\"{a}ndnisses, etwa die Forderung nach einer durchg\"{a}ngigen empirischen \"{U}berpr\"{u}fbarkeit allgemeiner theoretischer Aussagen, in ganz postpositivistischer Weise ausdr\"{u}cklich suspendiert% \footnote{% Vgl. etwa Popper, 1967, S. 144.% }% . Auch das vierte Postulat, demzufolge es keine eigenst\"{a}ndigen theoretischen Probleme g\"{a}be und empirische S\"{a}tze, ohne philosophische Schwierigkeiten und Vorbehalte bef\"{u}rchten zu m\"{u}ssen, behauptet werden k\"{o}nnten, widerspricht Poppers methodischen \"{U}berzeugungen. Man kann sich dies vergegenw\"{a}rtigen, indem man die mit diesem Postulat verbundenen Korollarien betrachtet. Zun\"{a}chst die Annahme, es g\"{a}be Induktionen und daraus folgend die M\"{o}glichkeit, die Eigenst\"{a}ndigkeit theoretischer Formulierungen gegen\"{u}ber empirischen Daten zu leugnen. Wenn eine der Popperschen Leistungen die Zeiten \"{u}berdauern sollte, dann ist es seine Kritik am Induktivismus. Es kann keinerlei Zweifel geben, da{\ss} es in der Popperschen Methodologie der theoretischen Wissenschaften keinen g\"{u}ltigen Modus induktiven Schlie{\ss}ens gibt, womit auch alle jene Forderungen entfallen, die von der gegenteiligen Auffassung ausgehen m\"{o}gen% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1979, S. 3ff., ders. 1966, S. 3ff., ders. 1972, S. 1ff., ders. 1983, S. 18ff., ders., Autobiography, in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), {\em The Philosophy of Karl Popper}, La Salle 1974, S. 34ff., 112ff. u.a.% }% . Damit ist die Autonomie des theoretischen Denkens gegen\"{u}ber jeder noch so umfangreichen 'empirischen Basis' best\"{a}tigt und die best\"{a}ndige Betonung Poppers, der Erkenntnisfortschritt bed\"{u}rfe einer k\"{u}hnen, die Beschr\"{a}nkungen jeder empirischen Vorinformation \"{u}bersteigenden theoretischen Fantasie, verst\"{a}ndlich% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper 1966, S. 48, ders. 1968, S. 46, 115, 117, 185f., 191, 220, 231, 239, 245, ders. 1972, 53, 68, 164 u.a.% }% . Das zweite Korollar, wonach zwischen kontr\"{a}ren theoretischen Annahmen vermittels empirischer Tests entschieden werden k\"{o}nne, findet in der Popperschen Methodologie einigen R\"{u}ckhalt, indessen ist die Alexandersche Formulierung dieser Zusatzannahme zu unbestimmt, um eine genauere Diskussion zuzulassen. Deshalb nur soviel: Popper setzt den Begriff des 'Tests' gleich mit dem nachhaltigen Versuch, theoretische Behauptungen zu falsifizieren% \footnote{% Zur Verwendung von Tests in der Popperschen Methodologie vgl. Popper 1966, S. 47, 87, 185ff., 194f., 222, 245, ders. 1968, S. 41, 52, 60, 74, 103ff., 111ff., 118, 188f., 197, 220, 228, 240, 248, 256, 313 u.a.m.% }% , wobei er darauf vertraut, da{\ss} gelungene Falsifikationen endg\"{u}ltigseien% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper 1966, S. 47.% }% . Diese letzte Teilthese hat er sp\"{a}terhin in dem Sinne abgeschw\"{a}cht, da{\ss} die Akzeptanz von Falsifikatoren eines Hintergrundwissens bed\"{u}rfe, das zumindest eine alternative Hypothese enthalte, die die verwendeten Falsifikatoren st\"{u}tzt, wobei er indessen zu keinem Zeitpunkt unterstellen wollte, da{\ss} damit ein endg\"{u}ltig gesichertes Wissen in Anspruch genommen worden sei. Eione solche Sicherheit gibt es in keinem Bereich menschlichen Wissens% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper 1966, S. 12, 20, 22ff., 42, 48ff., 61, 69f., 232f. u.a., ders. 1972, S. 9ff, 21f., 37, 46ff., 62ff., 97f. u.a. Die Anzahl der Belege lie{\ss}e sich m\"{u}helos vervielf\"{a}ltigen.% }% . Auch jedes empirische (Test-)Wissen ist demnach unausrottbar 'hypothetisch'. D.h. aber: Popper war niemals testgl\"{a}ubig in dem Sinne, da{\ss} er empirischen Tests einen gesonderten epistemologischen Status zuerkannt h\"{a}tte. Da{\ss} Popper auf diese letzlich unabschlie{\ss}bare Suche nach wahrem empirischem Wissen mit einem milden Konventionalismus bez\"{u}glich der Basiss\"{a}tze reagiert, mit deren Hilfe Theoretiker Falsifikationen vorzunehmen w\"{u}nschen% \footnote{% Zur Logik der Basiss\"{a}tze vgl. Popper 1966, S. 60ff.% }% , f\"{a}llt so deutlich au{\ss}erhalb jedes empiristischen Verst\"{a}ndnisses des empirischen Wissens, da{\ss} man sich fragen kann, weshalb Alexander dies \"{u}bersehen konnte. Dieser deutlich konventionalistische Charakter der Popperschen Basiss\"{a}tze h\"{a}tte ihm einen unmi{\ss}verst\"{a}ndlichen Hinweis darauf geben k\"{o}nnen, da{\ss} Popper an die Unmittelbarkeit oder die fraglose Gegebenheit empirischer Daten, wie sie etwa die (empiristische) Theorie der Sinnesdaten vorsieht und die das Vertrauen in die letztentscheidende Schiedsrichterfunktion von Tests h\"{a}tte untermauern k\"{o}nnen, nie geglaubt hat% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1966, S. XVIII, 60f., 70f., ders. 1968, S. 82, 95, 180f., 277, 387.% }% . Aus genau diesem Grund f\"{a}llt es ihm auch nicht sonderlich schwer, bei der Entscheidung zwischen metaphysischen Annahmen jeden Rekurs auf solche empirische Tests zu meiden; man kann solche nicht-empirischen Aussagen auch beurteilen (und letztlich verwerfen), ohne sie mit einer eh nicht verf\"{u}gbaren unmittelbaren und sicheren Erfahrung konfrontiert zu haben% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper 1966, S. 29, 1968, S. 193ff., ders. 1983, S. 195-211.% }% . Alle Unterstellungen des zweiten Erg\"{a}nzungssatzes treffen auf Poppers Position somit nicht zu. Das das dritte Korollar eine logische Folge des zweiten darstellt, dessen G\"{u}ltigkeit Popper durchgehend bestritten hat, kann er sich entgegen der dort formulierten Annahme jederzeit darauf berufen, theoretische Probleme als autonome Probleme anerkannt zu haben. F\"{u}r metaphysische Fragen gilt dies a fortiori. Popper hat die Autonomie des theoretischen Denkens in seinem Sp\"{a}twerk durch die Einf\"{u}hrung einer eigenst\"{a}ndigen und eigenlogischen Welt-3 propositionaler Gehalte untermauert% \footnote{% Vgl. Popper, 1972, S. 106ff., 153ff., ders. 1974, S. 143ff., ders. {\em Auf der Suche nach einer besseren Welt. Vortr\"{a}ge und Aufs\"{a}tze aus drei{\ss}ig Jahren}. M\"{u}nchen/Z\"{u}rich 1984, S. 123f., 180ff.% }% . In der Summe betrachtet, hat er somit allen von Alexander angef\"{u}hrten Postulaten (jedenfalls zumindest einer deren m\"{o}glichen Interpretationen) und deren Ableitungen widersprochen. Sofern diese Postulate eine positivistische Auffassung zweifelsfrei definieren, kann Popper demnach kein Positivist gewesen sein. War er statt dessen ein {\em Postpositivist}? [{\bf {\em Editor's Note:}} Michael Schmid geht dieser Frage im zweiten Teil seines Beitrages nach, den wir in der n\"{a}chsten Ausgabe des {\em Newsletter} abdrucken.] % [HPG] \subsection{POPPER'S RULE CONCERNING THE ACCEPTANCE OF BASIC STATEMENTS - Robert Nola} % [center] {\bf % [Center] Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland. % [center] } Throughout {\em The Logic of Scientific Discovery} (LSD) Popper proposes a number of rules which, he thinks, ought to govern the scientific enterprise and which comprise his theory of scientific method. Some of these rules have been extensively debated. Hardly discussed is a rule in which Popper proposes to eliminate all observations which do not arise in the course of the testing of a theory.% \footnote{% % [FNote] One brief discussion can be found in John Watkins {\em Science and Skepticism} (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984), pp. 250-1.% }% I wish to argue that such a rule ought to have no place in any theory of method because it would exclude much that is valuable in science. In the LSD 30 Popper claims that `basic statements are accepted as the result of a decision or agreement...' and that such `decisions are reached in accordance with a procedure governed by rules'. In fact Popper gives us no full set of rules for the acceptance of basic statements, but he does mention two such rules. First there is a rule which tells us what is a basic statement. This is set out in LSD 28, the gist of which is that basic statements have the form of singular existential statements (which are restricted in scope), i.e., they are of the form: (x)[(x is in a finite space time region R). (x is $\Phi{}$)], where `$\Phi{}$' refers to an observable event process or property (`observable' is left undefined but is explained {\em via} examples). Second, there is the rule (LSD 30): % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Of special importance amongst these [i.e., the rules in accordance with which decisions are made to accept or reject basic statements] is a rule which tells us that we should not accept {\em stray basic statements} - i.e., logically disconnected ones - but that we should accept basic statements in the course of testing {\em theories}; of raising searching questions about theories, to be answered by the acceptance of basic statements.% }% % }% The rule, as stated, does not fully capture Popper's intentions since he subsequently talks not only of accepting basic statements but also of rejecting them. More explicitly, the second basic statement rule (BSR) can be expressed as follows: BSR:(i) Do not accept stray basic statements; (ii) only accept or reject basic statements in the course of testing a theory. In criticizing BSR I wish to set aside objections to the "decisionist" or "conventionalist" view Popper espouses concerning basic statements (see the latter parts of LSD 30) which comprises his anti-foundationalist epistemology. Rather, I wish to concentrate on the worth of BSR as a rule of scientific method. True, when we test theories we do, in the course of the testing, accept or reject basic statements, and we ought to do so. But is the converse the case? One version of the converse can be expressed factually: when we (or scientists) accept or reject basic statements then we do so only in the course of testing theories. This factual claim is false, one counter-example being Popper's naive inductivist who, while collecting basic statements, has no particular theory in mind, or has no particular theory under test at the time of the collecting. However BSR is not factual but normative. So a second version of the converse is prescriptive: one {\em ought} only to accept or reject basic statements in the course of testing a theory. It is this normative form of BSR I wish to criticize. Before doing so there is a further point of unclarity about BSR. Since basic statements are falsifiable then on Popper's demarcation criterion they should at least be accepted as scientific and not rejected as unscientific. Does this mean that BSR is in conflict with the demarcation rule in excluding a class of statements the latter would include within the realm of science? If BSR has priority over the demarcation rule then we would lack the entire class of basic statements whereby the demarcation rule is possible. But perhaps this objection is mistaken because there is a mistake about the purpose of acceptance and rejection in BSR. Acceptance and rejection in BSR may not be for the purpose of classifying statements as scientific or non-scientific. Perhaps acceptance and rejection in BSR are for the purpose of testing theories. If so, BSR is a uninteresting analytic truth about basic statements. More likely Popper intends acceptance and rejection in BSR for the purpose of assigning a truth-value to basic statements; that is, we are to accept a basic statement as true or reject a basic statement as false only in the course of testing a theory, and not otherwise. Such an interpretation fits better with Popper's anti-justificationism for basic statements. We can accept them as true or reject them as false recognizing that a different verdict may be possible for each basic statement since none of them is incorrigible or certain. With this point now made we can ask: should scientists only accept basic statements as true, or reject them as false, while in the course of testing a theory? I will answer `NO!' Scientists should be permitted to accept a basic statement as true or to reject it as false while not currently testing any particular theory. The reason is that the stock of significant observations made in science would be seriously depleted and science thereby rendered less progressive than it has been. I will cite four examples of observational reports which can be expressed in the form of basic statements, which are important observations, which are `stray' in the sense of BSR and which have been, and {\em ought} to have been, accepted without these statements arising in the course of testing a theory. {\em Example 1}: As is well known, Alexander Fleming noticed that one of his culture plates contained staphylococcal colonies which were undergoing dissolution near a foreign contaminating mould. Being an untidy worker Fleming% \footnote{% For an interesting account of Fleming's discovery and his work habits see R. Hare, {\em The Birth of Penicillin} (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1970).% }% did not throw the plate away but kept it as a curiosity and subsequently transferred bits of the contaminating mould to other culture plates. Though Fleming was working on a number of problems that led him to make the culture plates in the first place, none of this bears on his observing what was happening on the contaminated plate. Fleming did have an interest, going back to the First World War, in the problem of infected wounds and, in particular, of whether or not there were non-toxic antibacterial agents; and perhaps this interest lead him to take a closer look on that fateful day at what is a common occurrence with culture plates, viz., contaminating mould. Certainly Fleming was not testing any particular theory at the time he made his report. His attention was simply grabbed by what had occurred on one of his culture plates. Should Fleming have acted in accordance with BSR? We would all be the poorer if he had. Some might suggest that BSR be understood differently. Basic statements are not to be only accepted or rejected by scientists in the course of their testing a theory; they are to be accepted or rejected according to whether scientists entertain some belief or hypothesis to which they are logically connected, or the scientists have some expectation, conscious or unconscious, with which they are logically connected. Clearly this is very different from BSR and involves considerable broadening of the conditions under which basic statements are to be accepted or rejected. However it does accordwith claims Popper makes elsewhere about theory-driven observations in contrast with those philosophers who espouse a more empiricist view of observation. There are two objections to this weakened version of BSR. First, for any basic statement that might be accepted or rejected there is always some hypothesis that could be gerrymandered as the object of belief of a scientist or, more weakly, as the conscious or {\em unconscious} expectation of a scientist. In such a weakened form BSR would be trivially true but hardly a claim worthy of attention. Second, and more significantly, to have a genuinely informative version of the weakened BSR in the case of Fleming we would have to show that he ought not to have accepted his observation report (expressed in basic statement form) unless Fleming actually did have a belief, or a conscious or unconscious expectation, to the effect that, say, contaminating mould do not normally kill off staphylococci. But this is unacceptable. As a matter of fact Fleming held no such belief, nor had any such expectation, since such contaminating mould were often found in the culture dishes of experimental scientists, Fleming included. Nor {\em ought} Fleming to have held any such belief, nor {\em ought} he had to have any such expectation, {\em in order to} accept his observational report of what was happening on the contaminated plate. There is simply no ground for such a prescription. {\em Example 2}: In 1822 Dr. William Beaumont was lucky enough to come across the unfortunate Alexis St. Martin who had been shot in the abdomen. He had survived but his wound had not healed and left a permanent hole in the region of his stomach. Since no one had previously observed the processes of digestion the curious Dr. Beaumont struck up a relationship with the hapless St. Martin that enabled him to frequently peer into the wound to see what was going on. Here is a sample of Beaumont's observations: `At 9 o'clock he breakfasted on bread, sausages and coffee, and kept exercising. 11 o'clock, 30 minutes, stomach two-thirds empty, aspects of weather similar, thermometer 29 % [Sub] o % [sub] [F], temperature of stomach 101 1/2 % [Sup] o % [sup] and 100 3/4 % [Sup] o % [sup] . The appearance of contraction and dilation and alternate piston motions were distinctly observed at this examination. 12 o'clock, 20 minutes, stomach empty.'% \footnote{% For a brief account of Beaumont's work see R. Harr\'{e}, {\em Great Scientific Experiments} (Oxford, Phaidon, 1981); the quotation is from p. 44.% }% Beaumont's observations give us the first account of what actually goes on inside a person's stomach, something of considerable interest to medical science. Clearly there is no theory under test here! Of course Beaumont did perform some experiments such as extracting stomach juices from St. Martin to test various hypotheses about how the juices perform their action on food. But none of these experiments bear on Beaumont's important observational record of what went on inside St. Martin's stomach from the time food entered until it left. On Popper's BSR the observation record of the actual digestive processes in the stomach would be excluded from science. {\em Example 3}: For a host of reasons meteorologists have collected daily rain data and the maximum and minimum daily temperature, in some cases for several centuries. The recording of such data is clearly independent of any theory of the weather scientists may hold, especially the testing of some particular weather theory. However such data can reveal trends, for example whether or not the "greenhouse effect" is occurring. The "greenhouse effect" is an hypothesis about the heating up of the earth due to increasing amounts of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere. Meteorologists might well now be gathering temperature data to test the "greenhouse" hypothesis and so their acceptance and rejection of basic statements about temperatures takes place in the course of the test of a theory. But such data need not be collected {\em only} in the course of such a test and clearly was not when the "greenhouse" hypothesis had not even beenformulated. Importantly, early data collected {\em before} the formulation of the hypothesis is necessary for its test, both now and subsequently. {\em Example 4}: Robert Hooke's {\em Micrographia} (1665) records the delight of looking for the first time at the features of small objects under a microscope. Quite untrammelled by the need to test any theory Hooke both records the observations he made and drew diagrams of what he saw, e.g., the rough point of a pin, the hairs on the legs of lice, the pores in cork, the various crystalline shapes of flakes of snow, and so on. The point of making such observations, carefully and scrupulously recorded by Hooke, was to expand the range of observable phenomena hitherto available to us and not to test any particular theory. Of course, any of these observations could be used by anyone else at any subsequent time to test some theory, but this is not necessary for either the activity of observing or the significance of the observation made. What the above examples show is that the collection of data can be a significant scientific activity which can, and {\em should}, on many occasions take place in the absence of any theory contemporaneously under test by the collectors of the data. This is not to say that data collectors may not have some interest in collecting the data. Rather that interest need not be an interest entirely driven by the need to test some theory as BSR requires. Scientists can have other equally legitimate interests in collecting basic statements, i.e., observational reports, besides theory testing; e.g., sheer curiosity can be one impetus for making observations. It is these interests that bestow significance on the reports. The interest a scientist has in testing a theory would be sufficient to bestow significance on an observation; but no one particular interest is always necessary. Observations can become significant in science for a host of reasons having nothing to do with theory testing. % [HPG] \subsection{REPORT ON ANNUAL ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF SIR KARL POPPER - Ray Percival} The main purpose of the Annual One-Day Conference on the Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper is to stimulate fruitful debate on Popper's philosophy. Hence the challenging tone of the talks. Mere exposition is both boring and unproductive, and speakers are encouraged to be as critical as possible. Such a spirit of criticism is in line with Popper's method of conjecture and refutation: bold guess followed by severe criticism. The Conference was well attended by 150 people, some academic some from the general public. {\em Popper's Metaphysical Turn} Alain Boyer was concerned with Popper's changing attitude to metaphysics. Popper is probably most famous for his demarcation between science and metaphysics, which for decades has been shrouded in confusion. The logical positivists (alias the Vienna circle) were the first to bring metaphysics into disrepute, arguing that it was meaningless. Any non-verifiable or non-tautological sentence was classed as nonsense by the Vienna circle. In one stroke the whole of theology, astrology, and many long respected philosophical doctrines such as determinism, were swept away as intellectual gobbledegook. Only scientific sentences were then accepted as meaningful since the logical positivists thought they were verifiable. This is the famous verifiability criterion. Popper also wanted to demarcate science from such things as astrology, but his approach was fundamentally different to that of the logical positivists, though Popper is even now erroneously thought to dismiss metaphysics as meaningless. On the contrary, Popper thinks that metaphysics is both meaningful and important. It is worth expanding a little on this. In my interpretation the purpose of Popper's demarcation criterion is a solution to the problem: how do we make our knowledge grow as fast as possible without promoting error. Scientific statements for Popper are those that must be falsifiable by experiment or observation. If our aim in science is to increase knowledge, then we want to have the most general statements since they contain more information than singular statements. The most general statements are universal, applying to all space and time. At the same time, recognizing our fallibility, we want to have some control over our conjectures. There are two possibilities: confirmation or refutation. Now we cannot confirm a universal statement, since this would require an examination of every point in time and space, which is logically impossible. But we can refute a universal statement, since all we need is one negative instance. (This is where Popper differs greatly from the logical positivists, since the criterion made the most informative statements of science - universal statements - meaningless.) The positivist's criterion also ascribed scientific status to many metaphysical statements such as: "There is a Devil". Alain Boyer's talk had three parts. The first part dealt with the object and the style of Popper's {\em The Logic of Scientific Discovery}, his second great work on the philosophy of science. The second part concerned the origins of Popper's metaphysical turn, while the final section was a sketchy presentation of a Popperian philosophy of nature. Boyer pointed to the great style of {\em The Logic of Scientific Discovery}, something which he thinks derives from the unity of the work, which in turn springs from Popper's clear view of his objectives in this work. The first target of the work is the elimination of psychologism in every problem area: sociology, logic, epistemology, and even psychology. Psychologism, the analysis of the origin of a theory, is no part of the logicof knowledge. The epistemologist should have no concern with the psychological processes that lead to the generation of an idea, since the truth of a theory or the validity of an argument can be assessed independently of its origins. Psychologism is the neglect of what Popper calls World Three: all theories and arguments, considered as objective products of the mind and having an autonomous existence. The second target of the book was the elimination of metaphysics. Metaphysical sentences are, of course, meaningful, but in {\em The Logic of Scientific Discovery} Popper identifies the scope of rationality and scientificity with testability. Accordingly, at the stage of Popper's thought, everything which is not testable is not decidable; it is a matter of faith, an irrational decision. The element of decision in LSD is a dominant feature, which is less conspicuous in his later work. Boyer says that Popper was never a dogmatic falsificationist, but in the thirties, popper was, one might call, a decisionist falsificationist. There is not a single reference to the concept of decision in the Post Script to LSD (subtitled: Twenty Years On). Popper's attitude to metaphysics changed dramatically in the 1940s when he was writing {\em The Open Society and its Enemies.} In this book Popper deals with the Greek philosophers, and it is clear that in writing the book he came to realize that metaphysical ideas are arguable even if not empirically refutable. Before this metaphysical turn metaphysical assertions were made more amenable to rational assessment in the LSD by translating them into methodological rules. Thus the principle of the uniformity of nature can be rendered as the rule never to stop looking for laws. In the article What is Dialectic (1937) Popper still held to the idea that reason alone cannot decide between theories. In the 1940s Popper came to a slightly different position: that not all metaphysical theories were as good as one another, so one could argue reasonably between various metaphysical positions. Such theories can be judged by the standards of logical coherence, compatibility with well-tested scientific theory, and the ability to solve the problem for which they were introduced. This change of attitude brought with it a change in Popper's problem situation. Whereas in 1933 demarcation took precedence over the problem of induction, in the Postscript induction is regarded as the central problem. Boyer quotes a significant sentence from the Postscript: "The problem of demarcation is to be distinguished from the far more important problem of truth". Alain Boyer's main conclusion was that Popper became more a speculative metaphysician and cosmologist. The transcendental logic of Kant was replaced by what Popper calls the logic of the situation, and that is why evolutionary epistemology became so important. {\em Freud and the Philosophy of Science: Why Popperians are in for a Shock}. Dr. Christopher Badcock's talk was excellently delivered, clear and provocative. His contribution stirred much fruitful controversy, but it lacked a substantive attack on Popper's philosophy. Most of the talk was concerned with an exposition of the marriage of Freudian theory, which Badcock regards as a loosely knit set of astute observations of behaviour, and Sociobiology, which supposedly explains the former. Freud's theory of infantile sexuality, for instance, points to a set of behaviours which only make sense in an evolutionary context: as the infant's way of soliciting parental investment that would not otherwise be forthcoming, and therefore contributing to the survival of the infant's genetic material. For example, excessive sucking of the mother's nipples (oral stage) has a contraceptive effect, and may have evolved because any individual that practises it will postpone the birth of rival siblings and therebyincrease its own genetic reproducibility. Again, Oedipal behaviour may have evolved mainly as a way of raising parental investment. Badcock's arguments against Popper were rather less substantive. Badcock even opened with an anecdote that was intended to belittle the philosophy of science itself. Badcock was in Italy drinking coffee in a piazza, and in the middle of the piazza there was a policeman standing on a platform holding a baton and a whistle. A chaos of traffic was circling round the policeman as he whistled and waved his baton. Badcock said to his companion: is anyone taking the slightest bit of notice of the policeman? A few moments later the policeman answered his question when he got down from the platform and went off. The traffic continued without showing any indication that he had been there at all. Badcock said that he sometimes feels that philosophers of science are just like that policeman: they wave their batons and blow their whistles, but science goes its own way nevertheless. A strong claim, no doubt, but false. Strangely, the one example that Badcock offered of a scientist dismissing Popper's thought on method, the astro-physicist Stephen Hawking, actually enforces Popper's view. One could easily give a long list of prominent scientists who have been influenced by Popper in both their method and theory. Peter Medawar, the immunologist, has written many books on science which advocate Popper's ideas. Ilya Prigogine, the Nobel prize winning chemist, makes considerable use of Popper's ideas on constrained chaos and irreversibility in physics and chemistry. In his book, {\em The Cosmic Blueprint}, Paul Davies, Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, draws on Popper's arguments in favour of indeterminism and the importance of World Three in evolution. But the beneficial influence of the philosophy of science is not confined to the recruitment of Popperian knights, but also included the generation of dissent and debate. In Badcock's view this picture of the philosopher impotently waving his baton is the most sympathetic description of the philosopher's role. At worst, says Badcock, the philosopher of science can inhibit the more radical developments within science by applying too much criticism before the new ideas have been given a chance to blossom. But Popper has been keen to encourage the defense of new theories even against what at first seems insurmountable objections. It may take some time before the real strength of a theory becomes evident. But equally, to discover the strength of a theory, one needs both bold conjecture and severe criticism. Of course, much criticism can demoralise a theorist and lead him to abandoned a possibly important breakthrough. But this is a problem of inculcating the proper attitude, and does not undermine Popper's methodology. And it is within Popper's philosophy that the answer to this problem can be found. There are three facts that a scientist can draw fortitude from. % \WPindent{% 1) There is no shame in error, for there is no systematic way of avoiding error. Newton, despite the falsity of his theory of gravitation, has lost none of his greatness. In their quest for a breakthrough geniuses often produce a great number of false ideas, which is presumably a sign of their creativity. Error is a sign of intelligence. There is shame only in perpetuating error, failing to have the courage to make mistakes and to correct them.% }% 2)% \WPindent{% Theories are objective entities, and should not be seen as part of one's personality. Hence theories can be criticised and improved as one might do to a machine, without degrading the theorist. One should look on criticism of one's theories as a compliment; after all, who wants to be ignored?% }% 3)% \WPindent{% Thirdly, to criticise a theory is not to imply that presenting the theory is a waste of time. On the contrary, one should look on the refutation of one's theories as a worthy discovery in itself.% }% Badcock argued that the philosophical "policing" of science, according to Badcock, is futile, and leads to errors of fact. For example, the "crucial" experiment of Newton's {\em Optics} - separation and recombination of colours by prisms - could not be adequately carried out in his time and the modern definition of the length of the meter means that relativity could not be falsified by any experiments using meter lengths. Nevertheless, it would have been foolish to reject these theories because they were untestable at the time. This, Badcock says, illustrates Kuhn's paradigm theory: Paradigms validate themselves to a large extent because they set research agendas and establish validation criteria. This argument has no merit at all. The fact that a particular crucial experiment cannot be carried out does not mean that no crucial experiment can be found. More importantly, Popper's method of conjecture and refutation still applies. After all, it is only through trial and error that crucial experiments can be found and possible ways of carrying them out discovered. Badcock's Kuhnian alternative is a license for uncontrolled speculation, since the only valid control of universal statements - refutation - is forbidden. Badcock's talk was interesting in that it showed how the Kuhnian and Lakatosian confusion between an historical account of science and a normative account of science has caught-on outside of philosophical circles. Popper was concerned with what scientists ought to do if they wanted to promote the growth of knowledge, and not with what they actually do. The fact that scientists do not always abide by Popperian rules does not invalidate them. As David Miller, principal lecturer in philosophy at Warwick University, has aptly said: the whole of science may be wrong. Not even science can act as an ultimate authority. Popperians were not in fact very much shocked by Badcock. Most of the arguments, explicitly attributed to Kuhn, had been heard before. But Badcock did bring to our notice an important new field of problems and the first theoretical attempts to solved them. Sociobiology may well turn out to be the most exciting science to emerge in recent years, and deserves careful perusal from philosophers of science. Even if it is largely metaphysical it may be a very fruitful research programme. {\em Evolutionary Epistemology} Professor Michael Ruse argued that there are problems with Popper's evolutionary epistemology. Popper wished to draw a strong analogy between the growth of science and the growth or development of organisms. In particular, the growth structure of both science and biological evolution conforms to this model: Problems; Blind variation; Selection. Ruse attempted to undermine the analogy by pointing out that although science is in an important sense progressive, there is no obvious progressiveness in biological evolution. Popper, Ruse suggests, is uncomfortable about this point, and he has tried to build into evolutionary theory a quasi direction. (See Popper's Autobiography, {\em Unended Quest}. p.173-177). If he had succeeded in introducing orthogenic trends in to evolutionary theory then Popper could have upheld the analogy, but Ruse felt that Popper had failed to do this. Ruse's argument is that Popper draws an analogy between biological evolution and scientific advance. Badcock sees that there are differences between the two and thinks therefore that the analogy fails. But analogy is not identity, and Popper did not intend to imply identity. The analogy is not intended to justify Popper's view of science, butwas chosen to aid exposition. The important similarity between evolution and science stands: neither theories nor organisms are instructed by the environment but selected by it. Ruse's reservation centres around what he takes to be the implication that scientific hypotheses are produced completely at random. He is keen to point to the systematic nature of scientific enquiry. But neither Popper nor Donald T Campbell would want to deny the systematic nature of science; indeed Campbell is at pains to distinguish his concept of blind trials from random trials. Scientific hypotheses are produced with background knowledge in mind, and this must act as a filter on the scientist's imagination. There is systematic constraint on what scientists find worth testing. But equally, we must acknowledge that while constraining our hypotheses we consider; there are still imaginative leaps into the dark, "blind variation" as Campbell likes to call it. {\em Debate: Popper is Substantially Wrong on Marx} The afternoon debate was between the Libertarian David McDonagh (of the Libertarian alliance) and the Marxist, Professor M. Desai. Desai expressed his astonishment as to how marxist Popper is in certain respects, for instance in his endorsement of the autonomy of sociology and his criticism of Mill's psychologism. Popper also praises Marx for his understanding of the importance of unintended consequences. Desai sees the Open Society as an attack on totalitarianism, and on that understanding Marx does not belong with Hegel and Plato who are undoubtedly totalitarian. Marx, Desai maintained, believed in real freedom. Desai's focus of attack was on Popper's treatment of Marx's prophecies. Popper credits Marx with the discovery that unintended consequences to human action is the key to the social sciences. This, however, was not Marx's discovery but Adam Smith's. (Dr. David Miller interjected at this point to say that it was actually David Hume's discovery.) The whole Scottish Enlightenment program of explanation was based on this idea. Their program was to construct a theory of society on the basis of time series data plus variation between social circumstances. Desai emphasized that to have a stage theory of history does not tie you to a prophetic theory. Is Marx a prophet, as Popper maintains? Capital has very little prophecy in it. It is overwhelmingly concerned with the operating principles of capitalism, and not with the transition between feudalism and capitalism or that from capitalism to socialism. Desai stresses that the operation of capitalism was indeed Marx's life-long preoccupation, his prophetic period being largely confined to his early years as a writer. Contrary to popular interpretations, the predictions that Marx made were a) conditional; b) part of a model, which has to be tested as a whole; and c) recognized as having an effect on what actually does happen. Marx's class model is wrongly interpreted by Popper. There is, of course a two class model in the Communist Manifesto and Das Capital, and this model is used to make certain abstract explanations and predictions. But if one looks at the three pamphlets on France, with their analysis of a particular historical situation, Marx abandons the two-class model and furnishes a much more complex analysis. David McDonach opened with an apology. Whether the motion is true or false, Popper's book {\em The Open Society and its Enemies} is one of the most stimulating books ever written, surpassing even outstanding books such as {\em The Health Hazards of Not Going Nuclear} by Petra Beckman and {\em The Ultimate Resource}, by Julian Simon. Popper himself has said that it is better to have a stimulating false theory than a dull true theory. David did maintain that Popper is substantially right on Marx, but nevertheless was critical of certain aspects of Popper's treatment. When he first read {\em The Open Society} David was a Marxist and his adherence survived the reading, so although it is substantially right on Marx it is a very poor attack. On rereading the book he was able to see why. Popper actually eulogizes Marx to an excessive degree. And this eulogy of Marx is not in the least warranted, for the sad truth was that Marx was not only a failure but, much worse, a charlatan. By the time of the 1870s marginal revolution in economics, which Marx being an avid reader of economics, must have known about, Marx knew that the game was up. (He probably first encountered traces of it in Gossen's work of the 1850s.) In the last decade of his life Marx was looking failure in the face. (The book which prompted the insight was {\em Marx Contra Engels: the Tragic Dilemma}, by Norman Levine.) Round about 1870 Marx became demoralised, but did not admit it and did not discourage Engels. Engels had virtually to bully Marx into publishing volume one in 1867. In his treatment of Marx Popper makes the bold claim that the labour theory of value does not matter much to Marx. a marvellously bold claim, but rather like saying that Allah does not matter to Islam. On the contrary, the labour theory of value is of central importance to Marx, and this is why Marx was such a failure. Nevertheless, Popper goes on to redeem himself, for he asserts that the labour theory of value can do no more than the theory of supply and demand. Moreover, the labour theory of value is not adequate to the task that Marx set it, and he has in the end to take on board supply and demand. Marx begins his analysis in {\em Capital} with a straightforward labour theory of value, but subsequently introduces supply and demand theory in surreptitious steps through his definition of socially necessary labour time. All this excellent argument against the labour theory of value is, unfortunately, lost in the eulogy of Marx and in Popper's strange claim that it does not matter any way. % [HPG] \subsection{RAIMONDO CUBEDDU ON MILLER'S {\em POPPER SELECTIONS} - Raimondo Cubeddu, Pisa} I spent some time looking at David Miller's, {\em Popper Selections}% \footnote{% Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. % }% , section 23 - which is entitled {\em Historicism (1936)}, and section 24 - which is entitled {\em Piecemeal Social Engineering}{\em (1944)} - , of Part IV {\bf Social Philosophy}, pages 289-318. All of us know the circumstances of its publication through evidence provided by Popper, himself. But there remains some question regarding the date of "1936," given in brackets. As Miller, himself, writes on page 465 in the Editorial Note, Sources, and Acknowledgements: "'Historicism.' This consists of the Introduction, sections 12, 14-16 and 27 of {\em The Poverty of Historicism}; this was first read at a private meeting in Brussels in 1936. Two substantial cuts have been made in section 27;" and on page 466: "'Piecemeal Social Engineering.' This consists of the sections 20, 21, and 24 of {\em The Poverty of Historicism}, this was first published in {\em Economica} IX, 1944, and XII, 1945. Some cuts have been made at the beginnings and ends of sections," which makes us think that section 23 contains pieces taken from the text read in Brussels. This would have been of great interest in order to find out exactly what sort of conception Popper had of {\em Historicism}, before becoming familiar with Hayek and his essay {\em Scientism and the Study of Society}, which appeared in {\em Economica} IX, 1942, X, 1943, XI, 1944. And to understand also what he really owed to Hayek, as far as his methodology on 'theoretical social sciences' was concerned (which can be seen, nevertheless, trying to read {\em The Poverty} without the references to Hayek). I agree on the fact that we are dealing with a merely scholarly interest, perhaps even just a personal curiosity. But when you are dealing with the {\em Classics}, even this kind of problem is relevant in its own way, and perhaps even a general interest. Such a curiosity of mine, however, has not been satisfied. On the contrary it has become even stronger. In fact, not only in section 23 of the edited by Miller are there paragraphs taken from the edition of {\em The Poverty of Historicism}, 1957 (whose text is different to the one published in {\em Economica}). But the same paragraphs published in section 24 are not taken from the text published in {\em Economica}, but are also from the 1957 edition. Such a comparison, even if it is rather a superficial one, between the three texts allows us to see that the essays published by Miller are those of the 1957 edition and not those published in {\em Economica}. It's true that most of the time it's a matter of modifications of a formal kind, or added pieces (which are more or less consistent) in the 1957 edition (for example, here the Introduction is longer, and is different from the initial paragraph of {\em Economica}). What we can't work out is why Miller, who made an exemplary choice of essays, accompanied them with misleading editorial indications. I've not the slightest intention to support the substantiality of the modifications, nor do I want to exaggerate the importance of them, inasmuch as I think that we are dealing with philological matters. Nevertheless, I would have liked to and i would be very interested in reading the 1936 text. And I hope that one day it might be published, if it still exists. But the realization of such hopes does not depend on scholars like us. We, if anything, even on the basis of these brief indications, can wonder if a philological comparison between the text of {\em Economica} and the text of the 1957 edition, is nothing but a kind of pastime for scholars. Don't you think that we should find out if these modifications are simply stylistic improvements and clarification of concepts, or if, on the other hand, they are something different and more interesting? % [HPG] \subsection{POPPER'S NEW BOOK: {\em A WORLD OF PROPENSITIES} } {\bf From the preface:} I am of course not certain whether the two lectures which I here submit to the patient perusal or the possible refusal of my readers are, as I hope, the best I have produced so far; nor is this question, I admit, of any importance. But I wish to convey to my readers that I have worked hard to make them the best, since I myself have, in writing them, been able to learn things of great importance to myself. I am grateful to have been able to do this in my 87th and 88th year, despite the drawbacks of failing memory. A shorter version of the first lecture ["A World of Propensities: Two New Views of Causality"-Ed.] was given on August 24th, 1988 before the World Congress of Philosophy at Brighton, under the chairmanship of Professor Richard Hare. A shorter version of the second lecture ["Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge"-Ed.] was given on June 9th, 1989 before the Alumni of the School at the London School of Economics, under the chairmanship of its Director, Dr. I.G. Patel. I never should have been able to write either of these lectures without the help of my Assistant, Melitta Mew. \subsection{ CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM - Prof. Dr. Friedrich Wallner} {\bf Institute of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Austria } \WPindent{% A. Under the impression of the weak influence of philosophy of science to the natural sciences we elaborated an alternative approach of understanding.% }% % \WPindent{% \WPindent{% 1. The standpoint are the real needs of the working scientists.% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 2. The main thesis is that science does not describe the world, but constructs a new, an artificial reality.% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 3. We apply methods taken from hermeneutics for interpreting the sciences - for instance: strangification - a kind of distantiation (Verfremdung).% }% % }% % \WPindent{% \WPindent{% 5. We are using empirical methods - taken from the sociological research of the research too, for instance interview - methods.% }% }% \WPindent{% B. Goals of Constructive Realism% \WPindent{% 1. Self-understanding of the sciences especially the scientists (for avoiding that scientific work is to become alienated work).% }% \WPindent{% 2. To get some outlines for organizing the teaching of the sciences especially to reorganize Universities.% }% \WPindent{% 3. To make science surveyable for political decisions.% }% }% \WPindent{% C.The Group Beside the staff of my Department there are about fifty colleagues from different fields - (psychology, physics, philosophy, sociology, economics, etc.) working with me.% }% \WPindent{% D. I could offer a paper about Constructive Realism in general or papers about special questions of Constructive Realism (connected with psychology, philosophy, biology or physics). % }% % [HPG] \subsection{HEALTH AND JUSTICE - Jan Kryspin} {\bf Departments of Rehabilitation Medicine and Physiology University of Toronto } A new theory of health and justice is needed to deal with problems of world stability. The present, conventional, theory of health, based on the Cartesian-Newtonian outlook, draws a distinction between mind-body, subject-object, self-world, I-it. Such a theory has done nothing to alleviate the current state of global malaise in which real peace is little more than a distant hope, human beings perish of hunger in a world where there is plenty, and the environment is ravaged and destroyed. For the last thirty years I have been working on this problem. I have published a number of articles in various journals and am now now teaching a course: "Introduction to Chronic Pain Management" at the University of Toronto Medical School based on these principles. I propose a spiritual-holistic theory of health, akin to the tradition of Cusanus, Comenius and Leibniz, a 'dynamic equilibrium' which he calls 'non-distinction in distinction.' He relates this theory of health to John Rawls' theory of justification. Rawls' theory transcends the older social contract theories of Kant, Locke and Rousseau. It has three parts. Firstly, principles of justice, whether naturalistic (from nature) or deductive (from first principles), are utilized as applicable in a particular problem. Sometimes the judge must use many principles, at other times only a few, to match the facts of a given case. Secondly, this matching of theories with practical problems must be done by certain institutions or operations. And thirdly, the practice of administering justice as fairness (justification) depends on human beings and their dialogue. Every decision in court is reached by means of dialogue, including the facts and the principles. This is creative justice. The administration of healing by the doctor is governed by the same principles as the administration of justice by the judge. Healing is a dynamic design that reconciles the reality of the sick person with the reality of the healer. Healing and justification are manifestations of a deeper underlying process, or dynamic design, which is manifest in dialogue. The current state of western medicine, characterized by a yawning gap between the esoteric knowledge of physicians and that of patients, makes dialogue imperative. % [HPG] \section{CONFERENCES} {\bf past and future:} \subsection{L'INSTITUTIONNALISME EN QUESTION} % \WPindent{% {\bf 4 % [Sup] \`{e}me % [sup] Colloque de l'Association Charles Gide pour l'Etude de la Pens\'{e}e Economique (A.C.G.E.P.E.)% }% } % \WPindent{% Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille II, Facult\'{e} des Sciences Economiques, Marseille, 19 et 20 septembre 1991.% }% Colloque International organis\'{e} par le L.A.T.E. Laboratoire d'Analyse des Th\'{e}ories Economiques de la Facult\'{e} des Sciences Economiques de l'Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille II et le G.R.E.Q.E. Groupe de Recherche en Economie Quantitative et Econom\'{e}trie de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales et des Universit\'{e}s d'Aix-Marseille II \& III, URA CNRS 950 {\em Conferences Introductives}: % \WPindent{% Jacques Lesourne, Conservatoire National des Arts et M\'{e}tiers, directeur du Journal {\em Le Monde}% }% Paul Bush, California State University, Fresno, Etats Unis Geoffrey Hodgson, Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic, Grand Bretagne {\em Session I: Origines et Formes Historiques de l'Institutionnalisme} % \WPindent{% Marina Bianchi, Universit\`{a} degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", Italie, How to learn a Sociality: True and False Solutions to Mandeville's Problem.% }% % \WPindent{% Phillippe Fontaine, Harvard University, Cambridge, Etats Unis, Aux Orignes de la Pens\'{e}e Institutionnaliste: "l'Individualisme Institutionnel" de Turgot% }% % \WPindent{% Jean-Jacques Fislain, Universit\'{e} de Nantes, Les Institutions-Granties de Sismondi% }% % \WPindent{% Jean Rosio, Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille II, L'Institution Mon\'{e}taire selon Fran\c{c}aise Simiand et la Tradition Economique et Financi\`{e}re Fran\c{c}aise% }% % \WPindent{% Maurice Basle, Universit\'{e} de Rennes I, Mise en perspectives de l'Institutionnalisme de quelques Economistes Allemands.% }% {\em Session II: Institutionnalisme et M\'{e}thodes} % \WPindent{% Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira \& Ragip EGE, Universit\'{e} de Strasbourg I, Abstraction Th\'{e}orique et Inductivisme. A Propos des Rapports entre la Jeune Ecole Historique Allemande et l'Ecole Allemande d'Inf\'{e}rence Statistique% }% % \WPindent{% Philippe Adair, Universit\'{e} de Paris XII, La Contribution de W.C. Mitchell \`{a} l'Economie Quantitative L'Analyse des Business Cycles.% }% % \WPindent{% Michel Gutsatz, Universit\'{e} d'Aix Marseille II, Questions de M\'{e}thode. Economistes et Econom\`{e}tres: Keynes et Tinbergen Revisit\'{e}s.% }% % \WPindent{% Marc Penin Universit\'{e} de Montpellier I, Comptabilit\'{e} Nationale et Institutionnalisme% }% % \WPindent{% Jean-Jacques Friboulet, Universit\'{e} de Fribourg, Suisse, Institutionnalisme et Macro\'{e}conomie keyn\'{e}sienne% }% {\em Session III: Institutions, Marches et Organisations} % \WPindent{% Guy Caire, Universit\'{e} de Paris X, Institutionnalisme et Relations Industrielles: Paradigmes et M\'{e}thodologie, Mise en Perspective% }% % \WPindent{% Olivier Favereau \& Laurent Thevenot, Universit\'{e}s de Paris X \& Paris II, R\`{e}gles, Coordination et Apprentissage; Relecture de Trois Th\'{e}ories Institutionnalistes de l'Entreprise% }% % \WPindent{% Liliana Basile \& Paola Casavola, Universit\`{a} di Napoli, Italie, the Firm as an Institution: Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts% }% % \WPindent{% Sylvie Diatkine, Universit\'{e} de Lille I, "N\'{e}oinstitutionnalisme" et Th\'{e}orie Contemporaine de l'Institution Financi\`{e}re% }% % \WPindent{% Soizic Le Livec, Universit\'{e} de Rennes I, L'Entreprise partenariale Discriminante% }% {\em Seance Pleniere}: % \WPindent{% Anne Mayhew \& Walter Neale, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Etats Unis, The Implicit Theory and Method of the (Old, or Real) American Institutionalists% }% % \WPindent{% Mark Perlman, University of Pittsburgh, Etats Unis, Understanding the "Old" American Institutionalism% }% {\em Session IV: Th\'{e}orie des Institutions et N\'{e}oinstitutionnalisme} % \WPindent{% Kurt Dopfer, Universit\'{e} de St. Gallen, Suisse, A Theory of Institutions: Path Dependency and Synergetic Behaviour% }% % \WPindent{% Marcello Corti, F.N.S.R.S., Universit\'{e} de Fribourg, Suisse, Limites et Port\'{e}es de l'Explication Individualiste des Institutions.% }% % \WPindent{% Pierre Livet, Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille I, L'Economie des Conventions est-elle institutionnaliste?% }% % \WPindent{% Marc Bassoni, Universit\'{e} de Lille II, un Institutionnalisme peut en cacher un autre: Institutionnalisme Am\'{e}ricain Versus Institutionnalisme Hayekien% }% % \WPindent{% John Adams, Northeastern University, Boston, U.S.A., Reinventing the Mos: Neoclassical Ignorance of Institutionalism as a Source of Fame and Employment% }% {\em Session V: Economie et Societe} % \WPindent{% Dorothy Ross, The Johns Hopkins Univeristy, Baltimore, U.S.A. (titre de communication \`{a} pr\'{e}ciser)% }% % \WPindent{% Philippe Steiner, Universit\'{e} de Paris IX, Le Fait Social Economique et l'Economie Politique chez E. Durkheim% }% % \WPindent{% Michel Renault, Unversit\'{e} de Reness I, L'Instrumentalit\'{e} et l-Artificiel chez J. Dewey et C. Ayres: de la Matrice Biologique \`{a} la Matrice Culturel% }% % \WPindent{% Henri Denis, Universit\'{e} de Paris I, Le Refus de la Dialectique dans l'Evolutionnisme Veblenien% }% % \WPindent{% Thierry Boidart \& V\'{e}ronique Dutraive, Universit\'{e} de Lyon II, Perspectives Institutionnaliste et Evolutionniste sur le Progr\`{e}s Technique et la Dynamique Economique% }% {\em Session VI: Institution et Monnaie} % \WPindent{% Maurice Netter, Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille II, Monnaie, Production, Crise et R\'{e}gulation chez Veblen% }% % \WPindent{% J\'{e}r\^{o}me Maucourant, Universit\'{e} de Lyon II, Westley Clair Mitchell et la Question Mon\'{e}taire, Du Lib\'{e}ralisme Institutionnel \`{a} l'Institutionnalisme% }% % \WPindent{% Jean-Michel Servet, Universit\'{e} de Lyon II, L'Institution Mon\'{e}taire de la Soci\'{e}t\'{e} selon Karl Polanyi% }% % \WPindent{% Suzanne de Brunhoff C.N.R.S., Paris, Analyses Institutionnalistes de la Monnaie: quelques Recherches Actuelles% }% % \WPindent{% Camille Baulant, Banque de France, L'Ambivalence de la Monnaie et la N\'{e}cessaire Evolution des Institution: Mon\'{e}taires du R\'{e}gimes Fordiste% }% % \WPindent{% Colloque plac\'{e} sous le Haut Patronage de Paul Rollin, Recteur de l'Acad\'{e}mie d'Aix-Marseille; Claude Mercier, Pr\'{e}sident de l'Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille% }% {\em Comite de programme} Richard Arena, Universit\'{e} de Nice; Maurice Basle, Universit\'{e} de Rennes I; Alain Beraud, Universit\'{e} de Rouen; Arnaud Berthoud, Universit\'{e} de paris X; Robert Delorme, C.E.P.R.E.M.A.P.; Pierre Dockes, universit\'{e} de Lyon II, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Universit\'{e} de Strasbourg I; Olivier Favereau, Universit\'{e} de Paris X; Roger Frydman, Universit\'{e} de Paris X; Louis-Andr\'{e} Gerard-Varet, E.H.E.S.S. Marseille; Jacqueline Hecht, I.N.E.D.; Patrick Maurisson, Universit\'{e} de Picardie; Claude Meidinger, E.N.S. de Cachan; marc Penin, Universit\'{e} de Montpellier I; Jean Rosio, Universit\'{e} d'Aix-Marseille II; Christian Schmidt, Universit\'{e} de Paris IX; Jacques Wolff, Universit\'{e} de Paris I; Andr\'{e} Zylberberg, Universit\'{e} de Paris I. {\em Organization} Louis-Andr\'{e} Gerard-Varet (G.R.E.Q.E.) \& Jean Rosio (L.A.T.E.), Coordination: Jean Rosio Tel. 94 59 89 71; 91 91 92 62 Secretariat du Colloque Colloque e l'Association Charles Gide, G.R.E.Q.E. Centre de la Vieille-Charit\'{e}, 13002 MARSEILLE \subsection{ THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER: 8th Annual One-Day Conference} % \WPindent{% Saturday 4th May 1991. 10.30 am - 6.00 pm, LSE Room A42 Houghton St. London WC2 2AE% }% Peter Binns (The University of Warwick) % \WPindent{% "Psychoanalysis, Hermeneutics and World 3"% }% Professor Shoshana Abel (San Francisco State, University and University of San Francisco) % \WPindent{% "Popper's {\em Logic of Scientific Discovery} in terms of Computer Implementation".% }% Patrick O'Neil % \WPindent{% "Karl Popper and the Descriptive/Prescriptive Dichotomy."% }% Professor Anthony O'Hear (The University of Bradford) % \WPindent{% "The Tradition of Criticism and the Criticism of Tradition"% }% Professor Neil Tennant (The Australian National University) % \WPindent{% "Cognitive Significance Reclaimed"% }% Organiser: Ray Percival, 70 Hillview Court, Astley Bridge, Bolton BL1 8NU (Telephone: 0202-593114). \subsection{THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER: 7th Annual One-Day Conference} London School of Economics, 26 May 1990 Andrew Massey (Director of Rhode Island Philharmonic and The Fresno California Philharmonic) % \WPindent{% "Music and Popper's World 3"% }% David Miller (University of Warwick) % \WPindent{% "In Memoriam: W W Bartley III: Comprehensively Critical Rationalism - an assessment"% }% Hans J Eysenck % \WPindent{% "Astrology: Science of Pseudoscience"% }% B. R. Cosin (Open University) % \WPindent{% "Race, 'Race,' and Pseudoscience"% }% Sabastion Gardiner (Birkbeck College, London) % \WPindent{% "Psychoanalytic Explanation"% }% \subsection{THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER: 6th Annual One-Day Conference} {\bf }% \WPindent{% Saturday, April 29, 1989, London School of Economics and Political Science% }% Alain Boyer % \WPindent{% "Popper's Metaphysical Turn"% }% % \WPindent{% Christopher Badcock (LSE)% }% % \WPindent{% "Freud and the Philosophy of Science: Why Popperians are in for a Shock"% }% % \WPindent{% Michael Ruse (University of Guelph), "Evolutionary Epistemology: barking up the wrong gum tree"% }% {\em Debate}: Popper is Wrong on Marx {\em % \WPindent{% For}: Professor M. Desai{\em Against}: David McDonagh% }% {\em Panel Discussion}: David Miller (University of Warwick) and Larry Briskman (University of Edinburgh) answered questions and responded to criticisms of Popper's philosophy \subsection{MORAL UND POLITIK AUS DER SICHT DES KRITISCHEN RATIONALISMUS} % [Center] Interuniversity Center for Postgraduate Studies Dubrovnik % [center] % [Center] September 25 - October 6, 1989 % [center] Kursdirektoren: Hans Albert (Universit\"{a}t Mannheim) Werner Becker (Universit\"{a}t Gie{\ss}en) Kurt Salamun (Universit\"{a}t Graz) {\bf Kursbeschreibung}: Karl R. Popper, der Begr\"{u}nder der philosophischen Denkrichtung des Kritischen Rationalismus, hat nicht nur auf den Gebieten der Erkenntnislehre und Wissenschaftstheorie interessante Gedanken entwickelt, sondern auch auf den Gebieten der Gesellschaftstheorie und politischen Philosophie. Seine Kritik anhistorizistischen, holistischen und utopistischen Denkweisen, die Konzepte eines "piecemeal social engineering" und einer offenen Gesellschaft stellen wichtige weltanschauliche Grundlagen zur Rechtfertigung von pluralistischen Demokratien dar. In diesem Kurs sollen sowohl die moralischen \"{U}berzeugungen als auch die gesellschaftstheoretischen und politischen Hauptgedanken des Kritischen Rationalismus dargestellt, kritisch diskutiert und konstruktive weitergedacht werden. {\bf Lehrkr\"{a}fte:} Darius Aleksandrowicz (Wroclaw), Junichi Aomi (Tokio), Fred Eidlin (Guelph/Kanada), Volker Gadenne (Mannheim), Joshihisa Hagiwara (Tokio), Reinhard Kamitz (Graz), Miomir Matulovi\'{c} (Rijeka), Nenad Miscevi\'{c} (Zadar/Split), Edgar Morscher (Salzburg), Claus M\"{u}hlfeld (Bamberg), Stanisa Novakovi\'{c} (Belgrad), Otto Peter Obermaier (Augsburg), Andreas Pickel (Toronto), Gerard Radnitzky (Trier), Lothar Sch\"{a}fer (Hamburg), Michael Schmid (Augsburg), Ernst Topitsch (Graz). \subsection{II GIORNATA SULLA SCUOLA AUSTRIACA DEDICATA ALL INDIVIDUALISMO METODOLOGICO} % \WPindent{% Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento S. Anna Classe di Scienze Sociali% }% % \WPindent{% 21 e 22 ottobre 1988, nei locali della Scuola, in via G. Carducci, 40% }% Prof. Alain Boyer (Universita di Clermont-Ferrand e C.R.E.A.). Individualisme politique et individualisme methodologique. Prof. Enrico di Robilant (Universita di Torino). Una riconfigurazione critica del diritto e della giustizia. Prof. Mario Stoppino (Universita di Pavia). Azione politica e istituzioni. Prof. Ferdinando Meacci (Universita di Padova). % \WPindent{% L'individuo di fronte al tempo nella teoria austriaca: capitale, mercati, imprenditorialita.% }% Prof. Luciano Pellicani (LUISS, Roma). L'individualismo metodologico in sociologia. Dr. ssa. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (Universita di Torino). Problemi filosofici dell' individualismo metodologico. Prof. Robert Nadeau (Universita di Quebec a Montreal) % \WPindent{% Unintended Consequences of Action and Methodological Individualism.% }% Dr. Antonio Rainone Teoria causale dell' azione e individualismo metodologico. \subsection{DIE GEDANKENWELT SIR KARL POPPERS: KRITISCHER RATIONALISMUS IM DIALOG} % [Center] 26-29 Oktober 1989 % [center] % \WPindent{% Ludwig Boltzmann-Institut f\"{u}r neuere \"{o}sterreichische Geistesgeschichte, Au{\ss}enstelle Vorarlberg% }% % \WPindent{% Internationale Akademie f\"{u}r Philosophie im F\"{u}rstentum Liechtenstein% }% {\em Tagungsleiter}: Univ. Prof. Dr. Norbert Leser (Boltzmann-Institut) Univ. Prof. Dr. Josef Seifert (Akademie Liechtenstein) {\em Zum Thema}: Sir Karl Popper und der auf seiner Philosophie aufbauende kritische Rationalismus verstehen sich als eine neue "Kritische Philosophie" jenseits von Dogmatismus und Skeptizismus, die zugleich den Historizismus \"{u}berwindet. Ziel des Symposiums ist die Darstellung dieser Position durch die f\"{u}hrenden Denker des kritischen Rationalismus und der Dialog \"{u}ber den kritischen Rationalismus selbst. Dabei sollen die Grundlagen philosophischer Rationalit\"{a}t, das Prinzip der fehlbaren Vernunft in Ethik und Sozialphilosophie, das Gespr\"{a}ch zwischen kritischem Rationalismus und Marxismus sowie die Anwendbarkeit der wissenschaftstheoretischen Prinzipien des kritischen Rationalismus auf die Biowissenschaften, die Rechtswissenschaft und abschlie{\ss}end auf die neuen Perspektiven nach Popper in einem sachlich wissenschaftlichen Dialog er\"{o}rtert werden. Begr\"{u}{\ss}ung:% \WPindent{% Dr. Martin Purtscher, Landeshauptmann% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% S.D. Prinz Nikolaus von und zu Liechtenstein Pr\"{a}sident des Stiftungsrates der Internationalen Akademie f\"{u}r Philosophie, Liechtenstein% }% % }% % }% % }% {\em Referate}: % \WPindent{% "Auszug aus dem Argument - Existenz-philosophie und Neomarxismus vom Standpunkt des kritischen Rationalismus" em. Univ. Prof. Dr. Ernst Topitsch% }% % \WPindent{% "Objektivismus in der Wissenschaft und Grundlagen philosophischer Rationalit\"{a}t: Kritische \"{U}berlegungen zu Karl Poppers Philosophie" Univ. Prof. Dr. Josef Seifert% }% % \WPindent{% "Wittgenstein und Popper: Eine Alternative?" Univ. Prof. Dr. Friedrich Wallner% }% % \WPindent{% "Moral und fehlbare Vernunft - Zur Frage einer rationalen Begr\"{u}ndung der Ethik" Univ. Prof. Dr. John Crosby% }% % \WPindent{% "Die philosophischen Positionen von Popper in marxistischer Sicht"% }% % \WPindent{% Univ. Prof. Dr. Herbert H\"{o}rz% }% % \WPindent{% "Marxismus oder kritischer Rationalismus? Zur Metakritik des Positivismus-Streits" Univ. Prof. Dr. Rocco Buttiglione% }% % \WPindent{% "Kritischer Rationalismus und Sozialphilosophie" Univ. Prof. Dr. Hans Albert% }% % \WPindent{% "Kritischer Rationalismus - im Recht?" Univ. Doz. DDr. Chrisoph Schefold% }% % \WPindent{% "Naturalismus im kritischen Rationalismus" Univ. Prof. Dr. Humberto Maturana% }% % \WPindent{% "Remarks on the Evolution Theory: A Reply to Konrad Lorenz und Karl Popper" Univ. Prof. Dr. Seifert% }% % \WPindent{% "Science after Popper: Towards a New Logic of Social Science" Univ. Prof. Dr. Cor van Dijkum% }% % \WPindent{% "Die neuen Perspektiven eines Popperianismus" Ein R\"{u}ckblick aug das Symposion? Univ. Prof. Dr. Barry Smith% }% \subsection{EMERGENCE ET FONDEMENTS DES CONCEPTS D'\'{E}QUILIBRE EN ECONOMIE} {\bf % \WPindent{% 3\`{e}me colloque de l'Association Charles Gide pour l'\'{e}tude de la pens\'{e}e \'{e}conomique (A.C.G.E.P.E.)}% }% % \WPindent{% Conseil de l'Europe, Strasbourg, 21 et 22 septembre 1989% }% Organis\'{e} sous les auspices du R\'{e}seau de Coop\'{e}ration Scientifique et Technique E-MRS (Sciences des Mat\'{e}riaux) du Conseil de l'Europe et avec le concours de l'Universit\'{e} Louis Pasteur de Strasbourg, du C.N.R.S., du Conseil G\'{e}n\'{e}ral du Bas-Rhin, du Minist\`{e}re des Affaires Etrang\`{e}res, du Minist\`{e}re de l'Education Nationale, de la Jeunesse et des Sports, de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme de Strasbourg. % \WPindent{% Frank H. Hahn (University of Cambridge, Docteur honoris causa de l'Universit\'{e} Louis Pasteur), "General equilibrium in an imperfect world"% }% % \WPindent{% Roger Guesnerie (Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris), "Doit-on croire aux \'{e}quilibres \`{a} anticipations rationnelles?"% }% % \WPindent{% Pierre Salmon (Universit\'{e} de Bourgogne, Dijon) et Alain Wolfelsperger (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) "De l'\'{e}quilibre concurrentiel \`{a} l'\'{e}quilibre d\'{e}mocratique: critique m\'{e}thodologique d'un transfert de concept"% }% % \WPindent{% R\'{e}gis Deloche (Universit\'{e} de Franche Comt\'{e}, Besan\c{c}on) "Equilibre et \'{e}quit\'{e}"% }% % \WPindent{% Alberto Chilosi (Universita degli Studi di Pisa) "Socialism, market and equilibrium"% }% % \WPindent{% Mauro Gallegati (Universita degli Studi di Ancona) "Period analysis and equilibrium conditions in Alfred Marshall's writings"% }% % \WPindent{% Hans Brems (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), "The Austrian time-interest equilibrium"% }% % \WPindent{% Hansjoerg Klausinger (Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration), "Equilibrium methodology as seen from a Hayekian perspective"% }% % \WPindent{% Olivier Favereau (Universit\'{e} de Paris X-Nanterre) et Laurent Thevenot (Centre d'Etudes de l'Emploi, Paris), "R\'{e}flexions sur une notion d'\'{e}quilibre utilisable dans une \'{e}conomie de march\'{e}s et d'organisations"% }% % \WPindent{% Jean Cartelier (Universit\'{e} de Picarde, Amiens), "Equilibre statique et monnaie: deux formes alternatives de la coordination des actions individuelles" % }% % \WPindent{% Riccardo Faucci (Universita degli Studie di Pisa), "Equilibre \'{e}conomique et \'{e}quilibre financier chez Luigi Einaudi"% }% % \WPindent{% Ragip Ege (Universit\'{e} Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg), "R\'{e}flexions sur les conditions d'\'{e}mergence d'un concept d'\'{e}quilibre comme fait spontan\'{e}: une lecutre de Hayek"% }% % \WPindent{% Martin Currie and Ian Steedman (University of Manchester), "Equilibrium and time: Hayek and Lindahl"% }% % \WPindent{% Philippe Mongin (C.N.R.S., Paris et Universit\'{e} Catholique de Louvain), "L'equilibre d'anticipations rationnelles et la rationalit\'{e} individuelle: examen de quelques mod\`{e}les d'apprentissage"% }% % \WPindent{% Dominique Torre (Universit\'{e} de Nice), "Equilibre g\'{e}n\'{e}ral, co\^{u}ts de transaction et coordination des activit\'{e}s"% }% % \WPindent{% Claude Schwob (Universit\'{e} Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg), "Les disparit\'{e}s de l'offre et de la demande comme ph\'{e}nom\`{e}nes d'\'{e}quilibre de march\'{e}"% }% % [HPG] \section{BOOKS \& JOURNALS} The JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES is an interdis\-ciplinary quarterly concerned with the unity, analogy, and relationships, theoretical and practical, between biological dynamics and mechanisms such as evolution, natural selection, and individual development, and social activities including tech\-nology, economics, politics, ideologies, literature, art, customs, and culture. As such, the JOURNAL embraces such disciplines as theoretical biology, evolution theory, develop-mental psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive and physical anthropology, paleontology, philosophy of science and technology, history of ideas, sociology, cosmology, and commun\-ication theory, and seeks thereby to help elucidate the human place in the cosmos. Founded 14 years ago by James Danielli and Harvey Wheeler, the JOURNAL in 1990 came under the Editorship of Paul Levinson. Author of MIND AT LARGE: KNOWING IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, and Editor of IN PURSUIT OF TRUTH: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 80th BIRTHDAY, Levinson has given the JOURNAL a Popperian flavor, placing such eminent Popperians on the Editorial Board as Donald T. Campbell, Ian Jarvie, and Gerard Radnitzky. Joseph Agassi wrote the lead-off commentary for the Spring 1991 issue (Vol 14 No 1). The JOURNAL welcomes contributions in the form of articles, book reviews and essay-reviews, commentaries, and theoretical notes ranging from 5 to 75 pages. These should be sent to the Editor on computer disk as well as paper copy to Paul Levinson, JSBS, 92 Van Cortlandt Park South, \#6F, Bronx, NY 10463. Subscriptions are \$75 a year for individuals, and \$180 a for libraries and institutions (outside of the US please ad \$10 for surface mail or \$20 for airmail shipment). These should be sent to JAI Press, Inc., 55 Old Post Road - \#2, PO Box 1678, Greenwich, CT 06836. {\bf Andersson, Gunnar.} {\em Rationality in Science and Politics} {\em Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science} (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 320 pp. ISBN 90-227-1953-5 Paper Dfl: 68,-/17.50; Cloth Dfl. 139-/33.00; ISBN 90-277-1575-0 Is the present widespread despair about the rationality of politics and the scepticism surrounding the rationality of science unwarranted? Criticism of proposed problem solutions is essential for rational action both in science and politic. In this volume, the role of criticism is investigated in various areas ranging from empirical testing of hypotheses in science to the critique of ideologies in politics. The problem of rationality in science is attacked by analyzing key issues in the philosophy of science, such as the demarcation of science from non-science,the acceptance of "basic" statements, induction, incommensurability and scientific progress. Other contributors deal with the social base of science, ethical and social aspects of rationality in communication and political beliefs. Among the contributors are Paul Feyerabend, Ernst Gellner, Adolf Gr\"{u}nbaum and Sir Karl Popper. Contents: Gunnar Andersson: Creativity and Criticism. Joseph Agassi: The Social Base of Scientific Theory and Practise. Hans Albert: Transcendental Realism and Rational Heuristics, Critical Rationalism and the Problem of Method. Gunnar Andersson: How to Accept Fallible Test Statements? Popper's Criticist Solution. W.W. Bartley III: Logical Strength and Demarcation. Paul K. Feyerabend: Xenophanes: A Forerunner of Critical Rationalism? Ernest V. Gellner: The Social Roots of Modern Egalitarianism. Adolf Gr\"{u}nbaum: The Placebo Concept. B. Kanitschneider: Analytical and Synthetical Philosophy. Noretta Koertge: Ethical Problems in Science Communication. Hiroshi Nagai: A Philosophical Conception of Finality in Biology. Marcello Pera: The Justification of Scientific Progress. Karl R. Popper: Against Induction: One of Many Arguments. Kurt Salamun: The Problem of Ideology and Critical Rationalism. Irene Szmuilewicz-Lachmun: Poincar\'{e} Versus le Roy on Incommensurability. Ernst Topitsch: On Early Forms of Critical Rationalism. Gunnar Andersson: Gerard Radnitzky: From Positivism, via Critical theory, to Critical Rationalism. Notes on Contributors. Index of Names. {\bf Flew, Antony,} {\em Power to the Parents: Reversing Educational Decline}. London: Sherwood, 1987. 171 pp. Hardback {\pounds} 12.95 (ISBN 0 907671 322), Paperback {\pounds} 6.95 (ISBN 0 907671 330) This argues that, however schools are owned and managed, they should, for reasons of efficiency as well as libertarian reasons, be subject to the incentives and disciplines of the market; that from whatever pocket, public or private, the fees ultimately come, the cash should follow the children to the schools of their parents' choice, and that each school should act an independent firm spending the fees it earns as it sees fit in order to maintain and perhaps increase custom. {\bf Haakonsen, Knud, ed.} {\bf Traditions of Liberalism. Essays on John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill}, by Shirley Letwin, Alan Ryan, Lauchlan Chipman; William Letwin, Donald Winch, Knud Haakonssen; John Gray, Chin Liew Ten, Philip Pettit; Kenneth Minogue. Introduction by Knud Haakonssen. Sydney 1988 (Centre for Independent Studies, PO Box 92, St. Leonards, N.S.W. 2065, Australia). {\bf Popper, Karl R.} {\em A World of Propensities}. Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990. ISBN: 1 85506 000 0 {\pounds}5.00. % \WPindent{% Preface% }% % \WPindent{% A World of Propensities: Two New Views of Causality% }% % \WPindent{% Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge% }% {\bf Radnitzky, Gerard, ed.} {\em Centripetal Forces in the Sciences Vol. I}. New York: Paragon House, 1987. ISBN 0-89226-047-5 {\bf Contents: }Foreword: Eugene P. Wigner Introduction: Gerard Radnitzky {\bf Part I: The Idea of the "Unity of Science" in Intellectual History and the Division of Knowledge} 1. Eugene P. Wigner: The Unity of Science - 2. Peter Munz: The Unity of Science and the Dubious Credentials of Positivism - 3. Vincenzo Cappelletti: Unity and History of Science - 4. John T. Blackmore: Comment - 5. W.W. Bartley III: The Division of Knowledge {\bf Part II: Methodological Aspects, the Unity of Physics, and the Unifying Potential of the Evolutionary Perspective} 6. Larry Briskman: Three Views Concerning the Unity of Science - 7. Noretta Koertge: Methodological Bootstrapping - 8. Max Jammer: The Problem of the Unity of Physics - 9. Bernulf Kanitschneider: Comment - 10. Gerhard Vollmer: The Unity of Science in an Evolutionary Perspective - 11. Percy L\"{o}wenhard: Comment {\bf Part III: The Unifying Potential of the Idea of Spontaneous Order and of the "Economic Approach"} 12. Friedrich von Hayek: The Rules of Morality are not the Conclusions of our Reason - 13. John Gray: The Idea of a Spontaneous Order and the Unity of the Sciences - Henri Lepage: Comment - 15. Walter B. Weimer: Spontaneously Ordered Complex Phenomena and the Unity of the Moral Sciences - 16. H\'{e}ctor-Neri Casta\~{n}eda: Comment - 17. Naomi Moldofsky: The Unification of Science Through the Economic Approach - Fact or Fiction? - Peter Bernholz: Comment {\bf Part IV: Lawlike Hypotheses and the Unity of the Social Sciences} 19: Antony Flew: Natural Laws in Social Science {\bf Radnitzky, Gerard, ed.} {\em Centripetal Forces in the Sciences Vol. II}. New York: Paragon House, 1988. ISBN 0-89226-048-3 {\bf Contents: }Foreword - Alvin M. Weinberg Introduction - Gerard Radnitzky {\bf Part I: Problems of the Unification of Science and of Reductionism in the Light of the Methodology of Research and of Science Policy} 1. Alvin M. Weinberg: Values in Science: Unity as a Value in Administration of Pure Science - 2. Noretta Koertge: Is Reductionism the Best Way to Unify Science? - 3. Walter B. Weimer: Comments on Koertge's Essay - 4. Werner Leinfellner: The Change of the Concept of Reduction in Biology and in the Social Sciences - 5. Larry Briskman: Between Reductionism and Holism {\bf Part II: Reduction and Emergence in Physics and Chemistry} 6. Bernulf Kanitscheider: Reduction and Emergence in the Unified Theories of Physics - 7. Max Jammer: Comments on Kanitscheider's Essay - 8. Hans Primas: Can We Reduce Chemistry to Physics? - 9. Marcelo Alonso: Comments on Primas' Essay with a Rebuttal by Primas - 10. Roman Sexl: Order and Chaos - 11. Erwin Schipper: The Evolution of Physics: Comments on Roman Sexl {\bf Part III: Reduction and Explanation in Biology, the Social Sciences, and History} 12. Percy L\"{o}wenhard: Mind and Brain - Reduction or Correlation? -13. Franz M. Wuketits: Comments on L\"{o}wenhard's Essay - 14. Karl-Dieter Opp: The Individualistic Research Programme in Sociology -15. Angelo Petroni: Comments on Opp's Essay - 16. Raymond Boudon: Explanation, Interpretation, and Understanding in the Social Sciences - 17. Alain Boyer: Comments on Boudon's Essay - 18. Peter Munz: Explanation in History - 19. Eileen Barker: Comments on Munz's Essay {\bf Part IV: The Reductionism of the Sociological Turn in the Philosophy of Science} 20. Ian C. Jarvie: Explanation, Reduction and the Sociological Turn in the Philosophy of Science or Kuhn as Ideologue for Merton's Theory of Science - 21. Peter Munz: The Philosophical Lure of the Sociology of Knowledge {\bf Reid, Thomas.} {\em Practical Ethics. Being Lectures and Manuscripts on Natural Religion, Self-Government, Natural Jurisprudence and the Law of Nations}. Edited from the manuscripts with an Introduction and a Commentary by Knud Haakonssen. Princeton University Press 1989. {\bf Ruelland, Jacques G. }{\em De l'\'{e}pist\'{e}mologie \`{a} la politique. La philosophie de l'histoire de Karl R. Popper}, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991. Si la contribution de Karl Popper \`{a} l'\'{e}pist\'{e}mologie est largement reconnue, sa position sur la politique en appara\^{i}t souvent comme le compl\'{e}ment pol\'{e}mique, plus ou moins ext\'{e}rieur \`{a} son projet central. C'est la coh\'{e}rence, \`{a} fois probl\'{e}matique et n\'{e}cessaire de ces deux dimensions, que cet ouvrage s'emploie \`{a} reconstruire de fa\c{c}on claire et pr\'{e}cise. De l'examen minutieux des arguments que Popper oppose au darwinisme, au platonisme et au marxisme, tant dans {\em Mis\`{e}re de l'historicisme} que dans {\em La Soci\'{e}t\'{e} ouverte et ses ennemis}, et des diverses critiques qu'ils ont suscit\'{e}es, se d\'{e}gagent les exigences d'interpr\'{e}tation des sciences sociales. V\'{e}ritable r\'{e}introduction \`{a} la pens\'{e}e popp\'{e}rienne en son unit\'{e}, cette enqu\^{e}te jette une lumi\`{e}re nouvelle sur un lieu strat\'{e}gique de la philosophie d'aujourd'hui. {\bf Salamun, Kurt, Hrsg.} {\em Karl R. Popper und die Philosophie des Kritischen Rationalismus}. Zum 85. Geburtstag von Karl R. Popper. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989. ISBN: 90-5183-036-X (Bound); ISBN" 90-5183-091-2 (Paper) {\em {\bf Inhalts\"{u}bersicht}:} {\bf I. Kritischer Rationalismus und Erkenntnislehre} % \WPindent{% Hans Albert: Die M\"{o}glichkeit der Erkenntnis% }% % \WPindent{% Stanisa Novakovic: Scientific Realism and Critical Rationalism% }% % \WPindent{% Franz M. Wuketits: Evolution\"{a}re-Erkenntnistheorie, Poppers "Dreiweltenlehre und das Leib-Seele Problem% }% {\bf II. Kritischer Rationalismus und Logik} % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Reinhard Kamitz: Was kann die Logik f\"{u}r die Philosophie Leisten? Erl\"{a}utert am Schicksal von K. Poppers Explikation der Wahrheitsn\"{a}he% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Otto-Peter Obermeier: Poppers "negative L\"{o}sung" des Induktionsproblems und die hieraus resultierenden Folgelasten% }% % }% {\bf III. Kritischer Rationalismus und Wissenschaftstheorie} % \WPindent{% Nenad Miscevic: Karl Popper und die kognitive Wissenschaft% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Gunnar Andersson: Die wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Kritik des Falsifikationismus% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Dragan Jakowljewitsch: Die Frage nach dem methodologischen Dualismus der Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften und der Standpunkt kritischer Rationalisten% }% % }% % \WPindent{% Michael Schmid: Rationalit\"{a}t und Irrationalit\"{a}t% }% {\bf V. Kritischer Rationalismus und Ethik} % \WPindent{% Dariusz Aleksandrowicz: Erkenntnis und Ethik% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Fred Eidlin: Poppers ethischer und metaphysischer Kognitivismus% }% % }% {\bf V. Kritischer Rationalismus und Politische Philosophie} % \WPindent{% Gerard Radnitzky: Der kritische Rationalismus in der Erkenntnistheorie und politischen Philosophie% }% % \WPindent{% Werner Becker: Kritischer Rationalismus oder Kritizismus% }% % \WPindent{% Yoshihisa Hagiwara: Einige Bemerkungen zum kritischen Rationalismus als politische Philosophie% }% {\bf VI. Kritischer Rationalismus und Ideologiekritik} % \WPindent{% Junichi Aomi: Popper's Criticism of Ideologies% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Kurt Salamun: Perspektiven einer Ideologietheorie im Sinne des kritischen Rationalismus% }% % }% % \WPindent{% Ernst Topitsch: R\"{u}ckzug aus dem Argument% }% {\bf Salamun, Kurt (Hrsg.),} {\em Moral und Politik aus der Sicht des}{\em Kritischen Rationalismus}. Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA (Rodopi) 1991. 294 pp. (Schriftenreihe zur Philosophie KarlR. Poppers und des Kritischen Rationalismus 1). Bound Hfl.120,00/US-\$60.00 ISBN: 90-5183-203-6; Paper Hfl.38/US-\$19.00 ISBN: 90-5183-204-4 {\em {\bf Inhalts\"{u}bersicht}: } {\bf % \WPindent{% I. Freiheit, Moral und Ethos der Aufkl\"{a}rung}% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Hans Albert: Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Bedingungen der M\"{o}glichkeit sozialer Ordnung. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Volker Gadenne: Karl Poppers Beitrag zum Problem der Willensfreiheit. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Yoshihisha Hagiwara: Zum Verst\"{a}ndnis von Liberalismus bei Popper und Hayek. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Klaus M\"{u}hlfeld: Bemerkungen zur bin\"{a}ren Struktur der Moral. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Kurt Salamun: Das Ethos der Aufkl\"{a}rung im Kritischen Rationalismus.% }% % }% {\bf II. Zur Idee der offenen Gesellschaft. } % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Evelyn Gr\"{o}bl-Steinbach: Von der offenen zur postmodernen Gesellschaft? % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Hardy Bouillon: Politische Philosophie im Rahmen einer offenen Gesellschaft: Anmerkungen zu Popper und Hayek. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Dariusz Aleksandrowicz: Die Kr\"{a}mer und die Ritter. Vom Ethos der offenen Gesellschaft, der Teilung Europas und der Politik des Friedens. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Lothar Sch\"{a}fer: Kritischer Rationalismus und \"{o}kologische Krise: \"{U}berlegungen zur Utopie- und Technikkritik.% }% % }% {\bf III: Demokratie, Souver\"{a}nit\"{a}t und soziale Marktwirtschaft. } % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Fred Eidlin: Popper und die demokratische Theorie. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Andreas Pickel: Fallibilismus und die Grundprobleme der Politischen Theorie: Zu Poppers Kritik der Souver\"{a}nit\"{a}tstheorie und seinem Neuansatz f\"{u}r die politische Theorie. % }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% Gerard Radnitzky: Die politische Philosophie des Kritischen Rationalismus und die soziale Marktwirtschaft. % }% % }% {\bf Salamun, Kurt (Hrsg.).} {\em Aufkl\"{a}rungsperspektiven. Weltanschauungsanalyse und Ideologiekritik}. T\"{u}bingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989. Ca. 240 S. ISBN 3-16-245473-5. Ca. DM 60,- Inhalts\"{u}bersicht: {\bf I. Aktuelle Gesichtspunkte der Religionskritik} % \WPindent{% Hans Albert: Zur Kritik der reinen Religion. \"{U}ber die M\"{o}glichkeiten der Religionskritik nach der Aufkl\"{a}rung% }% % \WPindent{% Gerhard Streminger: Religiosit\"{a}t eine Gefahr f\"{u}r Moralit\"{a}t? Bemerkungen zu einer in der modernen Weltanschauungsanalyse wenig diskutierten Problematik% }% {\bf II. Kritische Analysen spezifischer Ideologien} % \WPindent{% Werner Becker: Der fernethische Illusionismus und die Realit\"{a}t % }% % \WPindent{% Yoshihisa Hagiwara: \"{U}ber Begriff und Funktion der "kokutai"-Ideologie: Der Mythos des japanischen Kaisertums als Herrschaftsideologie vor dem zweiten Weltkrieg% }% % \WPindent{% Michael W. Fischer: Nation als v\"{o}lkische Vision. Genetische Perspektiven zum Nationalsozialismus% }% % \WPindent{% Claus M\"{u}hlfeld: Nationalsozialistische Familienpolitik: Der Proze{\ss} der weltanschaulichen Selbstgleichschaltung in der Rechtsanwendung% }% % \WPindent{% Johann G\"{o}tschl: Zur Kritik der Ideologie der Technikverteufelung% }% % \WPindent{% Kurt Salamun: Der holistische Grundzug in Herbert Marcuses neomarxistischer Gesellschaftstheorie und Ideologiekritik% }% % \WPindent{% Svetozar Stojanovic: Die jugoslawische antistalinistische Ideal-Logik% }% % \WPindent{% Dariusz Aleksandrowicz: Kommunismus: Die Dynamik einer Weltanschauung% }% {\bf III. Methoden und Positionen der Weltanschauungstheorie und Ideologiekritik} % \WPindent{% Ernst W. Orth: Ideologie und Weltanschauung. Zur Pathologie zweier Begriffe% }% % \WPindent{% Michael Schmid: Formen der Ideologiekritik% }% % \WPindent{% Peter Payer: Prolegomena zu einer Logik von Weltanschauungen und Ideologien% }% % \WPindent{% Elisabeth List: Mythos, Biologie, Politik. Feministische Ideologiekritik und Weltanschauungsanalyse% }% % \WPindent{% Peter Welsen: Ideologie und Ideologiekritik bei Paul Ricoeur% }% % \WPindent{% Junichi Aomi: Seelenglaube und die Evolution der menschlichen Sprache% }% {\bf IV. Ernst Topitsch: Grundlegende Denkmodelle in der Weltanschauungsanalyse} {\bf Sch\"{a}fer, Lothar.} {\em Karl R. Popper}. M\"{u}nchen: Beck, 1988. {\bf Inhalt:} I. Biographischer und zeitgeschichtlicher Hintergrund % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 1. Allgemeine Kennzeichnung der Ausgangslage% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 2. Poppers Leben und Schriften% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 3. Der philosophische Ansatz in Grundz\"{u}gen% }% % }% II.% \WPindent{% Methodologie der empirischen Wissenschaft und das Abgrenzungsproblem% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 1. Neukantianische Anf\"{a}nge% }% % }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 2. Logik der Forschung, Erkl\"{a}rung und Falsifizierbarkeit% }% % }% a) Logik der Erkl\"{a}rung b) Falsifizierbarkeit % \WPindent{% 3. Hypothesen-Test und die Festsetzung von Basis-S\"{a}tzen% }% % \WPindent{% % \WPindent{% 4. Sinn- und Abgrenzungsprobleme von Wissenschaft, Pseudowissenschaft und Metaphysik% }% % }% a) Das heuristisch-generative Argument b) Das kritizistische Argument c) Das explikative Argument 5. Das Ziel der Wissenschaft und die Idee der Wahrheit Die Propensit\"{a}ts-Interpretation der Wahrscheinlichkeit III. Poppers Sozial- und Geschichtsphilosophie 1. Das Elend des Historizismus 2. Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde a) Der Zauber Platons b) Die falschen Propheten: Hegel und Marx 3. Probleme der Rationalit\"{a}t 4. Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie IV. Objektives Wissen und evolution\"{a}re Erkenntnistheorie 1. Evolution und der Baum der Erkenntnis 2. Die Theorie des objektiven Geistes 3. Poppers 3-Welten-Lehre und das Leib-Seele-Problem V. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte von Poppers Ideen {\bf Sievering, Ulrich O. (Hrsg.)}, {\em Kritischer Rationalismus heute} (Arnoldshainer Texte - Band 54874: Schriften aus der Arbeit der Evangelischen Akademie Arnoldshain, Haag \& Herchen Verlag In der Diskussion um die Krise der Moderne wird in zunehmenden Ma{\ss}e der hypertrophen Katastrophenangst eine h\"{o}here Rationalit\"{a}t zugemessen als demn\"{u}chternen Risikobewu{\ss}tsein. Katastrophenangst motiviert zum R\"{u}ckzug auf pr\"{a}moderne Positionen, und sie dient der "rationalen" Rechtfertigung des Aufbruchs zum postmodernen Zeitalter einer neuen Ganzheitlichkeit. Das klassisch-rationalistische Letztbegr\"{u}ndungs - und Sicherheitsdenken triumphiert \"{u}ber die kritisch-rationale Einsicht der prinzipiellen Unsicherheit aller Erkenntnis und Fehlbarkeit allen Handelns. Es scheint, als habe die {\bf liberale Demokratie} nur noch die Wahl zwischen der alten und einer neuen geschlossenen Gesellschaft. Mit dem hier vorgelegten Band werden Gesichtspunkte in Erinnerung gebracht, die die Krise der Moderne als eine Krise ihres eigenen Rationalit\"{a}tskonzepts erkennen lassen. Den thematischen Focus bildet die {\bf Philosophie Karl Raimund Poppers}. Deren konsequenzen f\"{u}r die Erkenntnis- und Gesellschaftstheorie sowie f\"{u}r das Verh\"{a}ltnis von Religion, Ethik und Wissenschaft werden dargestellt und diskutiert. Der die einzelnen Bedingung der M\"{o}glichkeit eines Handelns im Bewu{\ss}tsein des Risikos seiner prinzipiellen Irrtumsbehaftetheit und seiner nicht intendierten Nebenfolgen. Gefragt ist nach {\bf den Chancen der Freiheit in einer Welt wachsender Risiken.} {\em Inhaltsverzeichnis} % \WPindent{% Kritischer Rationalismus: Erkenntnis ohne erkennendes Subjekt: Vorwort und Einf\"{u}hrung% }% Ulrich O. Sievering % \WPindent{% Kann unser Wissen zugleich vorl\"{a}ufig und objektiv sein? Zur Erkenntnistheorie des Kritischen Rationalismus% }% Gerhard Vollmer % \WPindent{% Die Evolutionstheorie im Werk Karl Raimund Poppers% }% J\"{u}rgen August Alt % \WPindent{% Evolution\"{a}re Gesellschaftstheorie und Drei-Welten-Modell Zum 50j\"{a}hrigen Erscheinen von Poppers "Logik der Forschung"% }% Bernhard Gie{\ss}en % \WPindent{% Methodologischer Individualismus, Historizismus und Historismus% }% Michael Schmid % \WPindent{% Mi{\ss}verst\"{a}ndnisse und Verdr\"{a}ngungen. Die Popper-Interpretation von Norbert Elias als Beispiel f\"{u}r die Rezeption des Kritischen Rationalismus in den Sozialwissenschaften% }% Hartmut Esser % \WPindent{% Freiheit und Rationalit\"{a}t. Das Problem der Willensfreiheit im Lichte des Kritischen Rationalismus und der Humanwissenschaften% }% Volker Gadenne % \WPindent{% Sollen impliziert K\"{o}nnen. Kritischer Realismus als Grundlage einer Evolution\"{a}ren Ethik% }% Gerhard Vollmer % \WPindent{% Religion, Theologie und Ethik aus der Sicht des Kritischen Rationalismus. Einige Thesen% }% J\"{u}rgen August Alt % \WPindent{% Religi\"{o}se Gewi{\ss}heit contra wissenschaftliche Fallibilit\"{a}t? Der erkenntnistheoretische Status christlicher Glaubensaussagen und Aussagen christlicher Theologie in kritisch-rationaler Pr\"{u}fung% }% Peter Suchla % \WPindent{% Erkenntnis und Entscheidung im Kritischen Rationalismus Karl Poppers% }% Klaus P\"{a}hler {\bf Williams, Douglas E.} {\em Truth, Hope and Power. The Thought of Karl Popper}. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989. 237 pp. ISBN: 0-8020-2643-5. Price: \$ 35.00. {\it {\bf Contents:} 1 Introduction; 2 Portrait of a critical individualist; 3 Kant, Popper, and the crisis in Enlightenment ideals; 4 Truth as consequences: the unity of Popper's thought; 5 Critical Rationalism and the logic of the social sciences; 6 Fallibilism and the sociology of knowledge: Popper on Mannheim; 7 Conserving liberalism: truth, hope, and power; 8 The limits of Popper's liberalism; 9 Conclusion. } One of the most heralded yet controversial philosophers of our century, Karl Popper has been called the last great Enlightenment thinker. In this sympathetic study Douglas Williams presents a coherent and systematic account of Popper's thought, by emphasizing the historical and contextual factors that have been decisive in the structure and development of his ideas, and by allowing Popper's own formulations to take precedence over those of his critics and followers. William's argues that the unity of Popper's philosophy lies in its moral dimension, his life-long determination to conserve the intellectual foundations of hope and progress that human autonomy requires - the distinctively Kantian belief that the mind can and should be decisive in practical affairs no less than in the struggle with nature, the twin pillars of the Enlightenment and modern liberalism alike. Given the nature of our times - a century of total wars, endless crises, and one intellectual revolution after another - such an endeavour is no small achievement. % [HPG] \section{ ARTICLES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS } {\bf Albert, Hans.} "Critical Rationalism: The Problem of Method in Social Sciences and Law," {\em Ratio Juris}, Vol.1, No.1 (March 1988): 1-19. The author characterizes the model of rationality devised by critical rationalism in opposition to the classic model of rationality and as an alternative to this. He illustrates and criticizes the trichotomous theory of knowledge which, going back to Max Scheler, is received in a secularized version by Habermas and Apel, also under the influence of the hermeneutic tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer and of the so-called "critical theory" of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. The author criticizes historicism as it expects to be an alternative to naturalism and not to make use of the method based on scientific laws. The author proposes as an example of technological social science the model developed in economics starting from Adam Smith. With regard to legal theories, natural law is rejected because of its sociomorphic cosmology. It is proposed that legal science as social technology has two parts. One part aims at efficient interpretations of valid law (for the space-time region concerned) and a second part aims at the construction of efficient norms for the modification of valid law by legislation. \_\_\_\_\_\_. Georg Simmel und das Begr\"{u}ndungsproblem. Ein Versuch der \"{U}berwindung des M\"{u}nchhausen-Trilemmas, in Wolfgang L. Gombocz, Heiner Rutte und Werner Sauer (Hrsg.), {\em Tradition und Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie}: {\em Festschrift f\"{u}r Rudolf Haller} (Wien: Verlag H\"{o}lder-Picher-Tempsky), 258-264 {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Hermeneutics and Economics. A Criticism of Hermeneutical Thinking in the Social Sciences," {\em Kyklos}, vol. 41 (1988), 573-602. {\it I. Toward a Hermeneutical Economics? II. The Problem of Understanding: Historism and Hermeneutics; III. The Problem of Understanding: Hermeneutics and Factual Science; IV. Ludwig von Mises and Theoretical Economics; V. Mises, Weber and the Hermeneutical Turn: The Austrians at the Crossroads. } \_\_\_\_\_\_. "Hermeneutik als Heilmittel? Der \"{o}konomische Ansatz und das Problem des Verstehens," {\em Analyse \& Kritik} 11(1989), S.1-22. Social scientists usually presuppose that individual behaviour is meaningful and understandable. At the same time they aim at nomological explanations. This is criticized by some economists who recommend a hermeneutical turn to overcome the crisis in economic and sociological thinking. The author tries to show that it is counterproductive to turn to hermeneutics to solve social science problems, and that it is misleading to use Max Weber in support of this claim because Weber's ideas are incompatible with hermeneutics \`{a} la Heidegger. \_\_\_\_\_\_. "Der Mythos des Rahmens am Pranger: Anderssons Antwort auf die wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Herausforderung," in Otfried H\"{o}ffe (Hrsg.), {\em Zeitschrift f\"{u}r philosophische Forschung} Band 44(1990) Heft 1, S.85-97. \_\_\_\_\_\_. "Die Wertfreiheitsproblematik und der normative Hintergrund der Wissenschaften," in Hans Lenk und Matthias Maring Hrsg.), {\em Wirtschaft und Ethik} (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1992), 82-100. {\it I. Max Weber und der Werturteilsstreit; II. Logische und erkenntnistheoretische Aspekte der Wertproblematik; III. Methodologische Aspekte der Wertproblematik; IV. Zum Problem der praktischenAnwendung der Wissenschaft; V. Zur Kritik des Zweck-Mittel-Denkens in den Sozialwissenschaften; VI. Zur Kritik der "kritischen Theorie"; } \_\_\_\_\_\_. "Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis und religi\"{o}se Weltauffassung," in Audretsch, J\"{u}rgen (Hrsg.), {\em Die andere H\"{a}lfte der Wahrheit: Naturwissenschaft, Philosophie, Religion} (M\"{u}nchen: C.H. Beck, 1992), pp. 113-133. {\it 1. Die Idee der reinen Religion als Reaktion auf die Aufkl\"{a}rung; 2. Die moderne Philosophie und er "Mythos des Rahmens"; 3. \"{U}ber den metaphysischen Gehalt religi\"{o}ser Auffassungen; 4. Zum Problem der rationalen Beurteilung der religi\"{o}sen Weltauffassung; 5. Zum illusion\"{a}ren Charakter der religi\"{o}sen Weltauffassung. } \_\_\_\_\_\_. "Zur Kritik der reinen Jurisprudenz Recht und Rechtswissenschaft in der Sicht des kritischen Rationalismus," in {\em Internationales Jahrbuch f\"{u}r Rechtsphilosophie und Gesetzgebung: Demokratie und Rationalit\"{a}t} (Wien: Manzsche Verlags- und Universit\"{a}tsbuchhandlung, 1992), pp. 343-357. {\it I. Zentrale Annahmen des kritischen Rationalismus; II. Das europ\"{a}ische Recht und der Charakter der europ\"{a}ischen Jurisprudenz; III. Die Jurisprudenz als dogmatische Disziplin; IV. Rationale Jurisprudenz als Sozialtechnologie; V. Politische \"{O}konomie als rationale Jurisprudenz.} {\bf Aleksandrowicz, Dariusz.} "Die Argumente gegen den Rationalismus. Zur Geschichte seiner Kritik im Hegelianismus und Liberalismus," {\em Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis}, No. 1107 (Wroclaw 1989), 183-191. {\bf Eidlin, Fred.} "Poppers ethischer und metaphysischer Kognitivismus (Warum W\"{o}rter manchmal wichtig sein k\"{o}nnen)," in Salamun, Kurt, ed. {\em Karl R. Popper und die Philosophie des Kritischen Rationalismus}. Zum 85. Geburtstag von Karl R. Popper. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989, pp. 157-176. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Uses of History as Legitimation in Soviet-type Regimes," {\em Bohemia}, Vol.30, No.1: 135-138. Attempts to fill the gap between the apparent low levels of legitimacy of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the relative stability they appeared to enjoy. Explores the missing sources of obedience to authority that filled the gap between official communist theory of legitimacy and the actual amount of obedience to authority which Communist party regimes in Eastern Europe have been able to command. These include, i.a., such {\em extra-legitimate} sources of obedience to authority, such as fear, habit, and existential pressures of the system. It is argued that these alone are not enough to explain the obedience enjoyed by these regimes. Also shows the influence of several other sources of {\em legitimate} authority such as respect for the regime's power, ability of the regime to satisfy various needs, and identification of the communist regime with the state, its laws, history, and symbols. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Popper und die demokratische Theorie." In Kurt Salamun (ed.), {\em Moral und Politik aus der Sicht des Kritischen Rationalismus} (Amsterdam: Rodopi Verlag, 1991) [in Russian as] "Karl Popper i teorie demokratii." Also in Russian in {\em Filosofskiye nauki} (Moskow) no.5 (1990): 69-80. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "The Power and Powerlessness of the Communist Power System." Published as "Mosch i bezsiliye v kommunisticheskoy sistemy vlasti," in {\em Polis} (Moscow) 1991 No.6. Despite the centrality of power to thinking about Soviet-type politics, however, the nature of power in such regimes has, strangely, remained largely unproblematic. Power has tended to be viewed as something that is self-evident rather requiring of explanation. Over the years, both empirical research and critical reflection how revealed gaping holes in this once standard picture of power in Soviet-type regimes. It has become clear that significant aspects and domains of society either remain outside the control of Soviet-type regimes or are only somewhat affected by them, that the power of general secretaries, CC praesidia secretariats, and other ruling institutions is significantly constrained, and that there is some kind of pluralism or dispersion of power in such regimes. The present paper explores this view of power in Soviet-type regimes, inquiring into the nature and limits of the power of the party apparat and power groups. It seeks to provide an integrated view of the power system, consistent with the evidence that the apparat and power groups actually are powerful in certain ways, but which is also consistent with evidence of the weakness and significant areas of paralysis of the power system. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Czechoslovakia: The Phoney Occupation 'Normalization in the Wake of the 1968 Intervention," {\em Bohemia}, Band 29, Heft 2 (1988): 262-279. % [Center] % [center] For seven months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, not only did the reformist leadership remain in power, virtually intact, but many aspects of the reform movement which had disturbed the Soviets actually continued to develop, almost as if there had been no military intervention. Despite persistent pressures, the Soviets could not seem to break the influence of the reformists and bring about the kind of "normalization" of the situation they desired. Even today, in "normalized" Czechoslovakia, evidence continues to appear, suggesting that the "Prague Spring" remains a live problem for the regime. Moreover, most of the important problems facing the Czechoslovak regime today - nearly 20 years after the 1968 intervention are those for which the reformist of 1968 were seeking stable solutions. This paper seeks to understand the legacy of the "Prague Spring" by examining the struggle under pressure to preserve its gains during the seven months after the invasion. Various constraints on the Soviets are examined, which prevented them from bringing about a quicker and more satisfactory (from their point of view) "normalization" of the political situation. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Updating Weber: Ideal Type Analysis and Popper's Situational Logic." {\em Polish Sociological Bulletin}, No.2 (1988). Attempts to repair and develop Max Weber's ideas on ideal type analysis by a sympathetic, critical confrontation with Karl Popper's ideas on the methodology of the social science - particularly with Popper's method of "situational analysis." The principal problem with Weber's explicit methodology of ideal types, it is argued, is that because of his instrumentalism, Weber does not, give an adequate account of the mechanism by which these types can be tested and corrected against reality. Popper's situational logic is presented as a closely related, "realistic" variant of ideal typical analysis, which, it will be suggested, can help correct and complete Weber's methodological program by giving an account of the linkage between reality and the constructs of science. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Przeznaczenie czy dzialanie: Marks, Popper i historia," {\em Edukacja Filozoficzna}, No. 3 (Autumn 1987): 121-138 (Polish version of "Call to Destiny or Call to Action: Marx, Popper, and History") Attempts a critical assessment of Popper's critique of Marx's alleged "historicism." The first section shows how, despite the serious criticism's of Marx's theoretical doctrines, Popper expresses substantial agreement with Marx and great sympathy for both his ideals and theoretical achievements. When criticism, praise, and endorsement of are tallied up, perhaps as much is left of Marxism as many who today call themselves Marxists would want to defend. The second section clarifies Popper's main charge against Marx, namely that he inadvertently acted as a kind of intellectual Pied Piper, mis\-leading "sco\-res of inte\-llig\-ent peo\-ple into beli\-eving that hist-ori\-cal prophesy is the scientific way of approaching social problems," thus contributing to the devastating influence of the historicist method of thought within the ranks of those who wish to advance the cause of the open society. The third section turns to the question of whether or not Marx actually believed in inexorable laws of history, concluding that, while Marx undeniably {\em claimed to have discovered} such laws, he {\em never stated any}. Thus, though his writings may not on balance put forward a "mechanical and simplistic view of history according to which all societies were predestined to go through a single, inexorable sequence of stages," several features of them strongly suggest and support historicist interpretation. The fourth section identifies problems in Popper's critique of Marxism: a) a possibility that the causal influence Popper's seems to attribute to Marx's ideas may itself have an historicist flavor; b) that Popper does not convincingly demonstrate a responsibility of Marxism for the downfall of democracy and rise of totalitarianism, and that his arguments in this regard contain inconsistencies and mistakes; c) that doctrines identified by Popper as necessarily pernicious can be and often have been tamed in practice; d) that it is not clear that Marx was in fact a moral positivist as Popper claims; and e) that historicism, by Popper's own testimony is rampant in the entire tradition of Western political thought, even within the ranks of liberal political thinkers. The fifth and final section zeroes in on what I think are Popper's most important criticisms of Marx's theory: a) its deceptive means of selling revolution as the only way to bring about real change in society, excluding any concern at all for social technology; and b) those of its features that provide it with a hardy resistance to correction by experience and criticism. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Radykalne i Rewolucyjne Watki w Popperowskiej Mysli Spoleczno-Polityczne," {\em Studi Nauk Politycznych}, No.4 (Autumn 1988) (Polish version of "The Radical, Revolutionary Strain in Popper's Social and Political Theory," {\em Et Cetera, Journal of the International Society for General Semantics}, 42(3): 283-298. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Ethical Problems of Imperfect Knowledge in the Policy Sciences," {\em Public Administration Quarterly}, Vol.11, No.1 (Winter 1988): 397-418; also in Edward M. Portis and Michael B. Levy (eds.), {\em Handbook of Political Theory and Policy Science} (Greenwood Press, 1988). Many decisions affecting the public welfare are based upon "expert knowledge." And policy scientists often have to decide what the best knowledge is and whether or not it is good enough to apply, even though the policy sciences, as sciences, have no authority to determine what is good or bad for society. Even where the policy scientist is intent on regarding duty to the public welfare as paramount, the problem remains of determining just what the public welfare is. Solutions that are expedientand tend to simplify reality are seductive, and people tend to confuse what exists both with what always will be and with what ought to be. The real problem, I try to suggest, lies in the tendency of the human mind to reify whatever appears to by real and whatever comfortably organizes reality, and then to hold tenaciously to such reifications, believing that they cannot be changed and that we, therefore, have no moral obligation to try to change them. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "The Breakdown of Newspeak," {\em Political Communication and Persuasion}, Vol.5, No.4: 225-236. Also in Russian as "Krusheniye Novoyaza", in Kara-Murza (ed.) {\em Totalitarizm' kak istoricheskiy fenomen} (Moscow: Filosofskoye Obshestvo, 1989) and (Moscow: Novosti, 1990): 351-368. Many attempts have been made to create Newspeaks. But in light of what is now known about such attempts, it is clear that not even the most successful of them have come anywhere near the ideal of Orwell's projection. Rather than these Newspeaks becoming increasingly fine-tuned, comprehensive instruments of totalitarian control as suggested in {\em 1984}, quite an opposite development has taken place. The peoples upon whom Newspeaks have been imposed have learned to live with and manipulate these artificial languages, and their effectiveness has tended to decline rather than increase. The present paper explores this degeneration of Newspeak, examining some of the assumptions about language, man, and society underlying Orwell's picture of the future. It makes explicit the theory of totalitarian control based on language that is implicit in {\em 1984}, and then shows that several fundamental assumptions of this theory are patently utopian while others are highly implausible. Apart from its rich insights into the dynamics of totalitarianism, even the utopian elements of {\em 1984} help us to understand better the limitations as well as the possibilities for totalitarian control in contemporary society by placing in relief the conditions that would have to be met for such control actually to be realized. Setting forth these conditions makes clear why these conditions could never be met in reality. {\bf Eidlin, Fred and Richard Appelbaum.} "Social Science, Social Engineering, and Public Policy" (With Richard Appelbaum), in O.P. Dwivedi, ed., {\em Public Policy and Administrative Studies}, Vol.4, 1988 (Guelph, Ontario: Department of Political Studies. Attempts to take stock of problems bound up with the application of reason and social scientific knowledge to public problems, to ask what role reason and social science can and should play in the formulation and execution of public policy, and to inquire into the nature and sources of disillusionment with rational debate and social science in contemporary society. The first part explores four categories of problems inherent in the application of reason and science to public policy - problems of knowledge, problems of rational discourse, ethical problems, and practical problems. The remainder of the paper deals with the question of what role rational debate and social science can and should play in the formulation and execution of public policy. Drawing upon arguments derived from Popper, the authors defend the ideal of a theory-guided approach to public policy that takes account of the kinds of problems identified earlier in the paper, while avoiding the pessimistic, anti-science, anti-rationalist, anti-theoretical conclusions often drawn in response to these problems. {\bf Lafleur, G\'{e}rald.} "Qui a peur des hypoth\`{e}se fausses?", {\em Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1988), 387-393. {\it 1. Friedman et la "Th\`{e}se de Fausset\'{e}" a. Expliquer et pr\'{e}dire; b. Subsumer; c. R\'{e}viser; 2. Friedman et la Conception Popp\'{e}rienne de la V\'{e}risimilarit\'{e}. } {\bf Middelmann, Hans.} "Towards an Open Society," {\em The Condenser} (Tongaat Hulett Group Ltd., South Africa). \_\_\_\_\_\_. "New Structures," {\em Leadership}, Vol. V (1986). {\bf Pickel, Andreas.} "Never Ask Who Should Rule: Karl Popper and Political Theory," {\em Canadian Journal of Political Science}, 22, 1 (March 1989), 83-105. The philosophy of Karl Popper has rarely been examined with respect to its fruitfulness and relevance for political theory. While his contributions to the philosophy of science may appear to be of only marginal significance for the fundamental concerns of political theory, his own forays into the field, particularly in {\em The Open Society and Its Enemies}, have been polemical in tone and explicitly political in motivation. This article reexamines Popper's critique of the theory of sovereignty and his own approach to political theory by employing a largely neglected element of his critical approach, namely his problem-oriented method. {\bf Radnitzky, Gerard.} "L'oggetivismo e la seduzione del relativismo epistemologico," in Rosaria Egidi, ed., {\em La Svolta Relativistica Nell'Epistemologigia Contemporanea} (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1988) ISBN 88-204-2991-8. {\bf \_\_\_\_\_\_.} "Wozu Wissenschaftstheorie? Die falsifikationistische Methodologie im Lichte des \"{O}konomischen Ansatzes," in Paul Hoyningen-Huene und Gertrude Hirsch (Hrsg.), {\em Wozu Wissenschaftsphilosophie? Positionen und Fragen zur gegenw\"{a}rtigen Wissenschaftsphilosophie}. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988. ISBN 3-11-011472-0 {\bf van Straaten, Zak.} "Philosophical method," {\em South African Journal of Philosophy}, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1989): 1-7. In this article the author argues that the method of conjecture and refutation proposed by Popper for science is, as a method, effective and sufficient for philosophy. The method is effective in those fields of philosophy where truth is fundamental to the first order theories, and to the philosophical theory, such as epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of psychology, etc. If this is true then most of what Rorty says about method and the nature of philosophy in {\em Philosophy and the mirror of nature} is false. Sceptics such as Wittgenstein are also refuted. {\bf A. Ziolkowski.} "Further Thoughts on Popperian Geophysics - The Example of Deconvolution," {\em Geophysical Prospecting}, 30 (1982), 155-165. Popper's demarcation criterion should be applied to all our theories in geophysics to ensure that our science progresses. We must expose our theories to tests in which they stand some risk of being refuted. But if we have a theory which has norivals it may be difficult in practice to devise a test in which the theory risks being refuted conclusively. The example of the deconvolution problem for seismic data is considered for the case where the source wavelet is unknown. It is shown that all our existing theories of deconvolutions are not scientific i Popper's sense; they are statistical models. We cannot compare these models in a way that is independent of the geology, for each model requires the geology to have a different set of statistical properties. Even in our chosen geology it may be extremely difficult to determine the most applicable model and hence determine the "correct" deconvolution theory. It is more scientific to attempt to solve the deconvolution problem (a) by finding the source wavelet first, deterministically, or (b) by trying to force the wavelet to be a spike - that is, by devising a "perfect" seismic source. A new method of seismic surveying, which has been proposed to tackle the deconvolution problem by the first of these approaches, is based on a theory which is open to refutation by a simple Popperian test. Since the theory makes no assumptions about the geology, the test has equal validity in any geology. It pays to frame our theories in such a way that they may easily be put at risk. Only in this way will we establish whether we are on firm ground. The alternative is simply to take things on trust. \section{WHO'S WHO} \subsection{Dariusz Leopold ALEKSANDROWICZ} {\bf Dariusz Leopold ALEKSANDROWICZ} is doc. dr hab. (associate professor) at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Wroclaw (Lower Silesia, Poland). He is at present occupied with the problems of the dissolution of the really existing socialism in Central Europe and is trying to contribute to both the understanding and the further progress of this process. Address: Odkrywco'w 13, PL-53-212 Wroclaw 63. \subsection{J\"{u}rgen August ALT} {\bf J\"{u}rgen August ALT}. (Arbeitsplatz) Deutsche Landjugend-Akademie, In der Wehrhecke 1, D-5300 Bonn-R\"{o}ttgen (Telefon) 0228/253074; (privat) In der Wehrhecke 1B, D-5300 Bonn-R\"{o}ttgen (Telefon) 0228/254612. Beruf: Dozent. Ausbildung: P\"{a}dagogik, Psychologie, Soziologie, Dr. phil. Sprachen: deutsch, englisch. Ver\"{o}ffentlichungen: {\em Vom Ende der Utopie in der Erkenntnistheorie} (Konigstein, 1980); {\em Die Fr\"{u}hschriften Poppers} (Frankfurt/Main: 1982); diverse Aufs\"{a}tze. Anfragen and die Leser: Idee der Vernunft (Geschichte, Theorie); Idee des Fortschritts (Geschichte, Theorie). \subsection{Bente B{\O}GGILD} {\bf Bente B{\O}GGILD}, Udbyh{\o}jvej 186, 8900 Randers, le Danemark. \subsection{Tyrrell BURGESS} {\bf Tyrrell BURGESS}, home address: 34 Sandilands, Croydon CRO 5DB, United Kingdom. Professor in the Philosophy of Social Institutions, Northeast London Polytechnic, London E15, England. Interest in Popper's philosophy: application to public affairs. \subsection{Andre W. CARUS} {\bf Andre W. CARUS}, address: (office) Open Court Publishing Co., 315 Fifth Street, Peru, IL 61354 USA, phone 815 224-4593 (home) 2604 Seventh Street, Peru, IL 61354 USA, phone 815 224-4539. Education: Ph.D. History, University of Cambridge, England. \subsection{Raimondo CUBEDDU} {\bf Raimondo CUBEDDU}, address: via Parini 1, 56010 Ghezzano Pisa, phone 050.878247 (office) Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari Sant'Anna, via Carducci 1 56100 PISA, phone 050.45074/45098; fax 050.46355. \subsection{Dr. Lorne L. DAWSON} {\bf Dr. Lorne L. DAWSON}, address: Department of Sociology, University of Waterloo, phone 885-1211 ext. 2421 (home) 124 Rosslyn Ave. South, Hamilton, Ontario, Can., L8M 3J2, phone 416 547-2456. Affiliation: SSHRCC Postdoctoral Fellow, Religious Studies and Sociology, University of Waterloo. Education: Ph.D. McMaster (Religious Studies). Interest in Popper: General influence on philosophy of science, social science and conceptions of "rationality." Publications: {\em Reason, Freedom and Religion: Closing the Gap Between the Humanities and the Scientific Study of Religion. }Toronto Studies in Religion (New York: Peter Lang, 1988). Queries to readers: Would be interested to consult with anyone in southern Ontario studying Habermas' theory of communicative action for detailed discussions. \subsection{John F. DEWHIRST} {\bf John F. DEWHIRST}, address: (office) Rm 329, A.S.B., Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University, Downsview Ontario M3J 2R6, phone 736-5066, (home) 177 Camlaren Cres., Kleinburg, Ontario L0J 1C0, phone 893-1776. Affiliations: Associate Professor, Faculty of Administrative Studies, York University. Education: B.Comm, M.B.A., Ph.D. Interest in Popper: Epistemology and scientific methodology, social philosophy and political philosophy. \subsection{Marian DOBROSIELSKI} {\bf Marian DOBROSIELSKI}, Kozia 9, m.14, PL-00-070 Warszawa, Poland. \subsection{A.S. DRIVER} {\bf A.S. DRIVER}, address: 53 Warwick Rd., Pietermaritzburg 3201, Natal, South Africa, phone 0331-472565. Education: M.Sc (Physics) Rhodes University, Grahamstown Cape 1960. Interest in Popper's philosophy: to develop its potential as one of the greatest positive influences in human affairs that there has ever been. Publications: Minor articles relating to Popper's philosophy, and many letters to the press about the growth of reason in educational, social, theological and political theory. Queries to readers: I would be delighted by any kind of interaction and criticism from anyone 'on my wavelength' anywhere, since I get almost no interaction whatever is South Africa. I would be glad to know about the co-ordination of 'mind skills' and their development for use in conventional education. \subsection{Roberto DUBUC} {\bf Roberto DUBUC}, address: Avenida Principal de Sebucan, Residencias Avignon, Apartamento 5-1, Caracas 1070, Venezuela. Affiliations: CATO Institute. Background in economy, is an economic consultant. \subsection{R. V. DUSEK} {\bf R. V. DUSEK} has taught for 20 years at the University of NH (Durham, NH) and is currently an associate professor involved in teaching logic, philosophy of science, and Marxism. Other interests include genetic engineering, biotech, evolution and philosophy, the history of economic thought, as well as work in Science for the People (State Contact, NH), and Amnesty International. Particular interests in relation to Popper include the Scientific method, metaphysics and science, the debate with Marxism, and relations to Peirce and Friess. Would appreciate information concerning Popper and the languages of psychopathology. Education: Ph.D. University of Texas, Austin. Publications include "C.S. Peirce; Geodesy and Geology in Work of" in Schneer ed. {\em 100 Years of Geology in America}, 1977; {\em Philosophy Forum} special issue on sociobiology, 1982/83; "Falsifiability and Power Elite Theory" {\em J Compar Admin}, Sept 1969; "Abduction, Ampliative Inference" {\em Telos} No. 6, 1968-9. Address: 2 Foss Farm Rd., Durham, NH, 03824. \subsection{Antony FLEW} {\bf Antony FLEW}, 26 Alexandra Road, Reading RG1 5PD, England. \subsection{Y. FRIED} {\bf Y. FRIED}, address: 9 Hatzvi Street, Tel Aviv, Israel, phone 03-5743111. Affiliations: Tel Aviv University Medical School. Professional background: Psychiatry. Interest in Popper: general epistemology. Publications: Y Fried and J. Agassi, {\em Paranoia}, Reidel, 1976; Y. Fried and J. Agassi, {\em Psychiatry as Medicine}, Nighoff, 1983. Activities: Psychiatry, History of Medicine. \subsection{Knut GOTH} {\bf Knut GOTH}, address: 0-5230 S\"{o}mmerda, Volkswohlstrasse 10, Germany \subsection{Dr. David G. GREEN} {\bf Dr. David G. GREEN}, address: IEA, 2 Lord North Street, London SW1P 3LB, phone 01 799 3745. Affiliations: IEA. Education: Political Science, Sociology, Ph.D (1980) Newcastle; Thesis published as {\em Power and Party in an English City} London: George Allen \& Unwin, 1981). Publications: {\em Mutual Aid or Welfare State: Australia's Friendly Societies}. Sydney: George Allen \& Unwin, 1984; {\em Working-Class Patients and the Medical Establishment: Self-Help in Britain From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1984}. London: Gower/Temple Smith; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985; {\em Challenge to the NHS: A Study of Competition in American Health Care and the Lessons for Britain}. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1986; {\em The New Right: the Counter-Revolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought}. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. (Published in USA as {\em The New Conservatism}. New York: St. Martin's Press.), 1987; {\em Everyone a Private Patient: An Analysis of the Structural Flaws in the NHS and How They Could be Remedied}. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1988; {\em Social Welfare: The Changing Debate}. Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies,1988; "The British Scene" in W. Mitchell, {\em Government as It Is}, London, IEA, 1988; "Tax funding is the flaw in the NHS", {\em Medeconomics}, May, 1988, pp. 106-8. Activities: Director, IEA Health Unit, Institute of Economic Affairs. \subsection{Adolf GR\"{U}NBAUM} {\bf Adolf GR\"{U}NBAUM}, Departments of Philosophy and Psychiatry, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA. B.A. with Highest Distinction in Philosophy of Mathematics from Connecticut Wesleyan University, M.S. in Physics from Yale, and Ph.D. in Philosophy from Yale. Adolf Gr\"{u}nbaum's writings deal with the philosophy of physics, the theory of scientific rationality, and the philosophy of psychiatry. His offices include the presidency of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), and the Philosophy of Science Association (two terms). He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences, and a Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism. In 1985, he delivered the Gifford Lectures in Scotland as well as the Werner Heisenberg Lecture to the Bavarian Academy of Sciences in Munich. He is the recipient of a 1985 "Senior U.S. Scientist" Humboldt Prize, and of a 1989 "Fregene Prize"(Rome, Italy). In 1989, he received the first-ever "Master Scholar and Professor Award" from the President of the University of Pittsburgh. And in May 1990, Yale University awarded him the Wilbur Lucius Cross Medal for outstanding achievement. Currently, he is the Andrew Mellon Professor of Philosophy, Research Professor of Psychiatry, and Chairman of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. In 1983, a {\em Festschrift} for him, edited by R.S. Cohen \& L. Laudan, appeared under the title {\em Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis}. Publications: "The Placebo Concept in Medicine and Psychiatry"; abstract: The standard technical vocabulary used to define placebo therapies and experimental placebo controls in medicine and psychiatry is both confusing and obscure. To achieve conceptual clarity in the theory of placebogenic phenomena, this paper offers a rigorous articulation of the placebo notion, a lucid new terminology that obviates the defects intrinsic to the traditional locutions employed in the placebo literature, and a substantial revamping of A.K. Shapiro's influential prior definition of "placebo" in Shepherd, M. and Sartorius, N. eds. {\em Non Specific Aspects of Treatment}. Toronto, Lewiston, New York, Bern, Stuttgart: Hans Huber Publishers, 1989, pp.7-38; Pr\'{e}cis of {\em The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique}, and Author's Response (to 39 reviews of {\em Foundations}), "Is Freud's Theory Well-Founded?" in {\em Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, Vol. 9, No.2 (June 1986), pp. 217-284; an Italian translation, with an Introduction by Marcello Pera, entitled {\em Psicoanalisi: Obiezioni E Riposte} was published in 1988 as a paperback by Armando Editore, Rome Italy; A German translation, together with some other essays, will be published by Springer Verlag as {\em Kritische Betrachtungen zu den Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse}; the Pr\'{e}cis portion of the American original was reprinted in P. Clark \& C. Wright (eds.), {\em Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science}. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. This Pr\'{e}cis is also being reprinted in J.H. Ghannam (ed.), {\em The Scientific Foundations of Psychoanalysis}. New York: The Guilford Press; "Are Hidden Motives in Psychoanalysis Reasons But Not Causes of Human Conduct?" in S.B. Messer, L.A. Sass \& R.L. Woolfolk (eds.), {\em Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory: Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy and Psychopathology}. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp.149-167, and "Rejoinder to Bernstein,"pp.175-181; "Psychoanalysis and Theism," {\em The Monist}, vol. 70, No. 2,(April 1987), pp.152-192; "The Psychoanalytic Enterprise in Scientific Perspective," forthcoming in C.W. Savage (ed.), {\em Scientific Theories}, Vol. 14 in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series. University of Minnesota Press, 1990. An Italian translation of an earlier version of this paper entitled'L'Impresa Psicoanalitica: Una Valtazione' appeared in {\em Nuova Civilta Delle Macchine IV}- nn.3/4(15/16) 1986, pp.123-130. A German translation will appear in Vienna; "The Role of the Case Study Method in the Foundation of Psychoanalysis," in H. Vetter \& L. Nagl (eds.), {\em Die Philosophen und Freud}, Vol.3 of Wiener Reihe, Themen der Philosophie. Vienna: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1988, pp.134-174; "The Degeneration of Popper's Theory of Demarcation," in I.C. Jarvie \& F. D'Agostino (eds.) {\em Freedom and Rationality}, Festschrift for John Watkins, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston and Dordrecht: Reidel, 1989, pp.141-161; "Why Thematic Kinships Between Events Do NOT Attest Their Causal Linkage," in J.R. Brown \& J. Mittelstrass (eds.). {\em An Intimate Relation: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science}, a Festschrift for Robert E. Butts. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston: Reidel, 1989, pp.477-493. An Italian translation appeared in the Italian journal {\em IRIDE}, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1989),pp.5-21; "Meaning Connections and Causal Connections in the Human Sciences: The Poverty of Hermeneutic Philosophy," to appear in the {\em Jl. of the American Psychoanalytic Assn.}, Vol 38(No.3),September 1990; "The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology" in {\em Philosophy of Science} vol.56, no.3, Sept. 1989, pp.373-394, abtract found in that publication: According to some cosmologists, the big bang cosmology and even the (now largely defunct) steady-state theory pose a scientifically insoluable problem of matter-energy creation. But I argue that the genuine problem of the origin of matter-energy or of the universe has been fallaciously transmuted into the pseudo-problem of creation by an external cause. A fortiori, it emerges that the initial "true" and "false" vacuum states of quantum cosmology do not vindicate biblical divine creation ex nihilo at all;" also published in J. Leslie, (ed.), {\em Physical Cosmology and Philosophy}, New York: Macmillan, 1990, pp.92-112, {\em Free Inquiry} vol.9, No.4, 1989,pp.48-57, {\em Epistemologia} (Italy), vol.12, 1989, pp.3-32; a sequel to the above paper, "Pseudo-Creation of the Big Bang," {\em Nature} vol.344, No.6269, April, 1990,pp.821-822. \subsection{Toby E. HUFF} {\bf Toby E. HUFF}, address: Department of Sociology, Southeastern Mass. University, N. Dartmouth MA, 02747 U.S.A., phone: 508 999-8405. Home address: 49 Clyde St. Newtonville, MA 02160, phone 617 332-2033. Education: Ph.D. Sociology. Publications: {\em Max Weber and the Methodology of Social Science} Transactions Books (1984). \subsection{Struan JACOBS} {\bf Struan JACOBS}, address: School of Humanities, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia 3217, phone 052 471-336 (home) 9A Laurel Bank PDE., Newtown, Victoria, Australia 3220, phone 052 211 829. Education: B.A.(Tas), M.A.(Melb), Doctoral thesis submitted to LSE. Interest in Popper: Philosophies of science, social science and politics. Publications: Articles in {\em Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, {\em British Journal of Sociology}, {\em Midwest Quarterly}. \subsection{G\'{e}rald LAFLEUR} {\bf G\'{e}rald LAFLEUR}, adresse: 4038 Rosemont, Montr\'{e}al, Qu\'{e}bec, H1X 1M3, t\'{e}l. 514-722-9231. Affiliation: Etudiant de Doctorat en Philosophie, U.Q.A.M.. Education: Ma\^{i}trise en philosophie, U.Q.A.M.. Int\'{e}r\^{e}t \`{a} la philosophie de Popper: M\'{e}moire de ma\^{i}trise sur la verisimilarit\'{e}. Pr\'{e}paration d'une th\`{e}se doctorat sur Popper et l'\'{e}conomique. Publications: "Qui a peur des hypoth\`{e}ses fausses?" {\em Phil. Soc. Sc.} (septembre 1988 ); "Le probl\`{e}me de la fausset\'{e} des hypoth\`{e}ses en \'{e}conomie et dans la science empirique," {\em Cahiers d'\'{e}pist\'{e}mology}, U.Q.A.M., no.8803; "V\'{e}risimilarit\'{e} et m\'{e}thodologie popp\'{e}rienne," {\em ibidem}, no.8801. Activiti\'{e}s: Membre du Groupe de Recherche en Epist\'{e}mologie Compare\'{e} (G.R.E.C.), directeur Robert Nadeau, U.Q.A.M.. \subsection{Joel Jay KASSIOLA} {\bf Joel Jay KASSIOLA} is professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College. Publications: The Death of Industrialized Civilization: The Limits to Economic Growth and the Repoliticization of Advanced Industrial Society; contents: Part 1: Advanced Industrial society in Crisis: Experiencing the Consequences of Economic Growth Addiction 1) The Contemporary Industrial Crisis and the Limits-to-Growth Controversy 2) The Death of Industrial Illusions Part II: Modern Economics as the Reductionism of Politics 3) The Modern Rise of Economics and the Demise of Politics 4) Industrial Economic Reductionism: Depoliticization through the Addiction to Unlimited Growth 5) Liberalism and the Economic Reductionism of Politics 6) The Concept of "Relative Wealth": A Social limit to Growth that Destroys the Addiction to Growth and Spurs Repoliticization Part III: The Values of Industrialism: Unlimited Competitive Materialism and the Normative Limits to Growth 7) Beyond the Biophysical Limits to Growth: Assessing Industrial Values 8) Materialism and Modern Political Philosophy Part IV: Transindustrial Values: Replacing the Addiction to Unlimited Free Economic Growth with Nonmaterialism, Noncompetition, Participatory Democracy and Community 9) Social Transformation into a Transindustrial Community 10) Conclusion: Towards a New Transindustrial Society. \subsection{Kimball KRAMER} {\bf Kimball KRAMER}, address: 40-1915 Newport Parkway, Jersey City, NJ 07310. phone: office 201-724-3801, home: 201-659-1214. Background: physicist. \subsection{Jan KRYSPIN} {\bf Jan KRYSPIN}, address: 99 Avenue Rd. \#303 Toronto, Ontario, Can., M5R 1S2, phone 416 961-1140 (home) 22 Aldenham Cres. Don Mills, Ont. M3A 1S2, phone 416 447-2394. Affiliation: University of Toronto, Departments of Medicine and Physiology. Education: M.D.(1950), Ph.D.(C.Sc., 1959); medicine, philosophy, physics, engineering, clinical physiology. Interest in Popper: Popper's personality. Activities: consulting, director of pain clinic. \subsection{William L. LIBBY, Jr.} {\bf William L. LIBBY, Jr.}, address: Department of Psychology. University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, phone 519-253-4232. Home address: 4240 Riverside Dr. E., Windsor, Ontario, N8Y 1B5, phone 519-944-5127. Affiliations: APA, World Future Soc.. Education: Ph.D. Chicago. \subsection{K. MAZUREK} {\bf K. MAZUREK}, address: Faculty of Education, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, T1K 3M4, phone: 403-329-2462; home address, 101 Ridgewood Crescent W., Lethbridge, Alberta, T1K 6C9, phone: 403-392-2260. Interests: logic of inquiry, research methods, historiolgraphy. Education: Ph.D., University of Alberta. Interest in Popper's philosophy: logic of inquiry. \subsection{Lee C. MCINTYRE} {\bf Lee C. MCINTYRE}, address: (home) 5233 N.E. 62nd Avenue, Portland, Oregon, 97218, U.S.A., phone 503 281-4118 (office) Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, phone 313 764-6285. Eduction: currently enroled in Ph.D. in Philosophy at University of Michigan, dissertation on the status of {\bf law}-like explanations in the social sciences, also interested in the question of whether there is a "fundamental" demarcation between natural and social science, M.A. Philosophy University of Michigan (1987), B.A. Phil Social Science Wesleyan University (1984). Affiliations: Member of Phil Sci Assoc. of APA. Interests in Popper: Falsification, Demarcation, general philosophy of science and philosophy of social science. \subsection{MIDDELMANN, Hans} {\bf MIDDELMANN, Hans} (Commencement Ceremony, University of Cape Town, 24 June 1988) Hans Middelmann was born in Berlin in 1912 and educated there and in Leipzig. His father, who had had a spell in London himself, sent him to work in London for a year. he attended the London School of Economics as an occasional student, hearing people such as Ghandi and Nehru at the Round Table Conference, G. B. Shaw and Hayek, absorbing ideas that reacted with the metal that was already in him. When he returned to Germany he found a place in a private bank, owned by a friend of his father. The owners were Jews, and over the four years the young 19 year old German Middelmann was to see the effect of Nazism on people that he worked with and for. It became apparent to him and to his elder brother that things were happening which they could not stomach, and that they must therefore leave Germany. It was a striking decision when one remembers what life and the future must have looked like to the young gentile Germans of that time, intoxicated by nationalism. But there were not many places one could go to: South Africa was one of the few whose requirements were minimal and whose doors were open, and by 1937 Hans had followed his brother to this country. He came on a visitor's visa, and it was an irony and a sign of things to come that when he arrived the law had been changed as the result of disturbances caused by agitators, led by a young Hendrik Verwoerd, against the admission of Jews to the country. That law caught Hans Middelmann too and he had a long battle to convert his visitor's visa to an immigrant visa. He began work for Inter-union Finance Ltd. of Cape Town, starting at humble level and working his way up to the managing directorship from 1959 to 1970. It was his base for all his activities. it thrived under his guidance. From that base he extended in four ways: first to the Junior Chamber of Commerce, after the war to the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, becoming President in 1959/60, and from there to the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, of which he became president in 1961/62. The second way was to the boards of many companies where he played important roles, most particularly of the Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society, whose board he chaired for 10 years, of Garlicks, of the Standard Bank, the Standard Bank Investment Corporation, and the Standard Merchant Bank; more recently of the Tongaat Group in Natal. These appointments were tributes to the respect he elicited. The conviction, vision and integrity that have characterised all his doings were displayed just as much in these business financial activities as elsewhere. he had imagination, was innovative, and pioneered new practices of which an example is his negotiation of the first major lease-back operation in South Africa. It is noteworthy that he was President of the Junior Chamber of Commerce whilst still classified, as he was during the war, as an enemy alien exempt from internment. A third way that he extended himself was in his service to this University. Hans Middelmann was elected to the Council of the University in 1973, to be a member of the Baxter Theatre Board in 1975, and he has been Chairman since 1980; as a trustee of the UCT Foundation in 1976 and he has been Chairman since that same year. Councils of universities are excellent, or adequate, or poor, by virtue of their having on them men and women of wisdom, integrity and vision, the greatly respected persons quoted with satisfaction or chagrin when difficult issues are debated. None who has served on the UCT Council will fail to recognise Hans Middelmann as fitting that description exactly, and to hold dear a person who, now with a twinkle in his eye, now with a glint of conviction, plays so important a part in its governance of this University. There is a last and important direction in which Hans~Middelmann extended himself. From the time in London when Hayek inspired him, hans Middelmann wished to make his contribution to liberal thought. In Cape Town he met at theEconomics Society, the Dean of Commerce Professor W. H. Hutt, who continued his education. It was he who advised Hans Middelmann - "Do not register for a BCom, look - here are 4 tickets to the University library, take them and go and read everything you can." And so, apart from the odd course, that is what Hans~Middelmann did, reading widely and deeply, much influenced by Karl Popper but developing his own ideas, and writing about them, of freedom, of economic liberalism, of constitutional development, of new structures to accommodate an open society. \subsection{Greg MOGLIA} {\bf Greg MOGLIA}, address: 34 Robin Dr., Hauprauge, N.Y. 11787. Affiliation: N.Y.U., Ph.D. applied Popper to science teaching. \subsection{Robert NOLA} {\bf Robert NOLA}, Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland. \subsection{Donald E. OLSEN, FAIA} {\bf Donald E. OLSEN, FAIA}, address: (office) 1349 Powell Street Emeryville, California 94680, phone 415 658-2222 (home) 771 San Diego Road, Berkeley, California 94707 phone 415 524 5764 (university) Department of Architecture , University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, phone 415 642-4942, 415 642-4413. Affiliations: American Institute of Architects; Fellow American Institute of Architects; British Society for the Philosophy of Science; Society for Philosophy and Technology; Newsletter for those interested in the philosophy of Karl Popper. Education: Bachelor of Architecture, University of Minnesota; Master of Architecture, Harvard University (on scholarship); A.W. Wheelwright Fellow, Harvard University; Postgraduate Study in Civic Design University of Liverpool; Post Graduate study in philosophy of science, The London School of Economics 1962-63 and 1968. Private Architectural practice 1954 to present, professor or architecture, University of California 1954 to present; Guest Professor - American and European Universities. Interest in Popper's philosophy: Epistemology, facts and decisions, holism, determinism v.s. indeterminism, world III etc., growth of knowledge, evolutionary epistemology. Publications: Magazine articles; mainly articles about me or my work. Activities: study of philosophy, travel and travel photography. News of that might be of interest to other readers: Insatiable interest, alas, by architecture students in phenomenology. Especially Martin Heidegger; and now also Michel Foucault. These things come in fashion waves. To dissuade students is about like fighting the tide of the pacific. But these fashions are short lived - five or six years and a new fad takes over. This has been gathering momentum the better part of ten years and is at a high point just now. I suspect it will dissipate soon. \subsection{Christopher Peter ORMELL} {\bf Christopher Peter ORMELL,} Senior Fellow, EDU, University of East Anglia, Norwich, England NR4 7TZ. Education: Maths and Philosophy degrees at Oxford. Interest in Popper: epistemology, theory of self-reference, philosophy of science. Publications: About 90 articles in Journals and books. My most recent paper is in the {\em Cambridge Journal of Education}, 18, 2, 1988, "Is there a future for Liberal Education?". Activities: Editor-in-Chief Mathematics Applicable Group (Mag), Educationalist. During the period 1982-85 I wrote four monographs on understanding during the period 1982-85. The four monographs form a sustained argument which begins with a re-examination of the applicability of mathematics. By pinning down the 'use' of mathematics it is possible to formulate a new and more powerful version of the empiricist view of meaning (Vol.2). This is then applied in Vol.3 to derive a wholly 'naturalistic' view of meaning in pure mathematics. It is argued that Cantor's 'Diagonal Argument' has been seriously misunderstood by successive commentators. It cannot tell us that there are {\em more} real numbers than rationals because any realnumber with accredited existence has a generating rule and this can be {\em embedded} in the 'greater lexicographic ordering' - a lexicographic ordering of all the symbols ever used by the human race. The reals are, indeed, 'uncountable' but not for reasons of numerousness. Vol. 4 is an ambitious attempt to drive a Popperian-Lakatosian view of science to the limit. It studies the fitness of mathematics to give us the best possible models of physical reality and finds it wanting. This leads to the specifications of a new quasi-mathematical science beyond mathematics which does meet the requirement for models in science. The result is therefore to open up a new kind of scientific (i.e. falsifiable) theorising. These monographs were published by the MAG, EUD, UEA Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.. \subsection{Ray PERCIVAL} {\bf Ray PERCIVAL} Organiser and Chairman of the Annual One-Day Conference on the Philosophy of Sir Karl Popper. His Ph.D.: I am working on Popper's notion of an immunising stratagem, and exploring the role of these devices in the evolution of networks of ideas in response to criticism. Specifically, i would like to determine the exact logical possibilities for the evasion of criticism and also the costs of evasion in terms of reduced ideological survival value. \subsection{Henry J. PERKINSON} {\bf Henry J. PERKINSON}, address: 737 East Bldg. New York University, NY, NY, 10003, phone 212 998-5045 (home) 301 Wood Lane, Edgewater Park, NJ, 08010, phone 609 387-7409. Affiliations: New York University, Professor of Educational History. Interest in Popper: applications to Educational Theory. Publications: {\em The Possibilities of Error}, {\em Learning From Our Mistakes}, {\em Since Socrates}, Knowledge , Fallibilism and Education (co-author). Queries to readers: Anyone working on applications of Popper's work to Educational Theory and Practice? \subsection{Darko POLSEK} {\bf Darko POLSEK}, Philosophical Faculty, Zadar, Yugoslavia. \subsection{Anthony QUINTON} {\bf Anthony QUINTON}, address: The British Library, 2 Sheraton Street, London W1V 4BH, England, telephone 01-323-7012 (home) 22 St. James's Square, London SW1Y 4JH, England. Professional background: teaching philosophy in Oxford 1949-1987, President, Trinity College, Oxford 1978-1987, currently chairman, British Library. Interest in Popper: professional from first reading of 'Open Society' in 1946. Publications: {\em Nature of Things} (1973), Utilitarian Ethics (1973), Politics of Imperfection (1978), Francis Bacon (1980) {\em Nature of Things} (1973) and {\em Thoughts and Thinkers} (1982), the latter two containing substantial consideration of Popper's philosophy. \subsection{Gerard RADNITZKY} {\bf Gerard RADNITZKY} ist Ordinarius f\"{u}r Wissenschaftstheorie an der Universit\"{a}t Trier seit 1976; 1973-76 war er ordentlicher Professor f\"{u}r Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte an der Ruhr-Universit\"{a}t Bochum und vorher Universit\"{a}tsdozent an der Universit\"{a}t G\"{o}teborg, Schweden. 1972 Visiting Professor an der State University of New York at Stony Brook; 1978 Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; seit 1975 Membre Titulaire der Acad\'{e}mie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences (1981-1987 Premier Assesseur) und seit 1981 ordentliches Mitglied der Sudetendeutschen Adademie der Wissenschaften und K\"{u}nste. (Festschrift zu seinem 60. Geburtstag: Andersson, G. (Hg.). {\em Rationality in Science and Politics.} Dordrecht: Reidel 1984). Ausgew\"{a}hlte Schriften: {\em Contemporary Schools of Metascience};{\em Preconceptions in Research}; {\em Epistemologiz e Politica della Ricerca}; {\em L'Epistemologia di Popper e la Ricerca Scientifica} sowie \"{u}ber hundert Aufs\"{a}tze zur Wissenschaftstheorie und zur politischen philosophie, darunter z.B.: "Science, Technology, and PoliticalResponsibility," {\em Minerva} (London) 21:234-264 (1983) und "R\'{e}flexions sur Popper," {\em Archives de Philosophie} (Paris) 48:79-108 (1985). Er ist Mitherausgeber zahlreicher B\"{u}cher, darunter: {\em Voraussetzungen und Grenzen der Wissenschaft}; {\em Fortschritt und Rationalit\"{a}t der Wissenschaft} (beide auch auf englisch, italienisch und spanisch); (mit W.W. Bartley, III) {\em Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge} (LaSalle, IL: Open Court 1987); (mit P. Bernholz) {\em Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics} (New York, NY: Paragon House 1987) und Herausgeber von {\em Centripetal Forces in the Sciences} (New York, NY: Paragon House 1987). \subsection{Jacques G. RUELLAND} {\bf Jacques G. RUELLAND}, teaches philosophy at the \'{E}cole nationale d'A\'{e}rotechniqe du Coll\`{e}ge Edouard-Montpetit (St. Hubert, QC) and history of science and of medicine in Department of History, Universit\'{e} de Montr\'{e}al. Address: 360 Venise, Brossard, QC, J4W 1W7, t\'{e}l. off. (514) 678-3560 poste 223, home (514) 671-7427; acad. discip.: philosophy and history; fields: philosophy of science and of history, political history, history of science and of medicine; education: B.A. philosophy (Universit\'{e} du Qu\'{e}bec \`{a} Montr\'{e}al), M.A. Philosophy (UQAM), M.A. History (Universit\'{e} de Montr\'{e}al); Ph.D. Histoire des sciences, Universit\'{e} de Montr\'{e}al - to be obtained in 1991; publications: "La controverse Habermas-Popper", {\em La petite revue de philosophie}, Longueil, vol. 2, no. 1, pp.105-135; "L'anti-historicisme de Karl Popper," m\'{e}moire de ma\^{i}trise en philo., UQAM 1984; {\em De l'\'{e}pist\'{e}mologie \`{a} la politique. La philosophie de l'histoire de Karl R. Popper}, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991; many other publications; interests in Popper's philosophy of history, Popper on social science, Popper's unity of method. \subsection{Kurt SALAMUN} {\bf Kurt SALAMUN}: Geboren 1940; Studium der Philosophie, Psychologie, Germanistik und Anglistik; seit 1963 Mitarbeiter am Institut f\"{u}r Philosophie der Universit\"{a}t Graz; 1965 Promotion; 1973 Habilitation f\"{u}r Philosophie mit besonderer Ber\"{u}cksichtigung der Philosophie der Politik bei Ernst Topitsch; seit 1975 au{\ss}erordentlicher Professor der Abteilung f\"{u}r Philosophische Soziologie am Institut f\"{u}r Philosophie der Universit\"{a}t Graz. Adresse: Heinrichstrasse 26/VI, A-8010 Graz, \"{O}sterreich. \subsection{Pierre SALMON} {\bf Pierre SALMON}, address: Universit\'{e} de Bourgogne, Facult\'{e} de Science \'{e}conomique, 4 Boulevard Gabriel, F-24000 Dijon, France, phone 80-39-55-00 (home) 3 Rue Bellevue, F-21121 Daix, France, phone 80-56-53-31. Education: Docteur en Sciences \'{e}conomiques (Univ. de Paris), Diplome de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. Interest in Popper: 1) de la m\'{e}thodologie \'{e}conomique 2) de la philosophie politique. Publications: "La m\'{e}thodologie hypoth\'{e}tique d\'{e}ductive et les raisonnements en termes de "comme in" en \'{e}conomique", {\em Revue d'Economie Politique}, 1976, No. 5; {\em M\'{e}thodologie Economique}, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (en collaboration avec A. Minget et A. Wolfelsperger), 1985; "Decentralization as an Inventive Scheme," {\em Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, 1987-9; "Alterable Electorates in the Context of Residential Mobility", {\em Public Choice}, October, 1988 (en collaboration avec A. Minget); "Trust and Trans-bureau Networks in Organizations", {\em European Journal of Political Economy} Vol 6, 1988, Extra Issue. \subsection{Claude SAVARY} {\bf Claude SAVARY}, address: 2069 Bd. des Forges, Trois-Rivi\`{e}res, Que., Canada G8Z 1T9, phone 374-7128. Affiliations: Universit\'{e} du Qu\'{e}bec a Trois Rivi\`{e}res. \subsection{Vivien SCHMIDT} {\bf Vivien SCHMIDT}, address: Department of Management, University of Massachusetts/Boston, Boston, MA 02125, phone 617 929-8060 (home) 205 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02116, phone 617 267-7738. Affiliation: University ofMassachusetts/Boston, Associate Professor. Education: Ph.D. Political Science, 1981, University of Chicago. Publications: "Four Models of Explanation" {\em Methodology and Science}, vol 21, no.3 (1988); "The Historical Approach to Philosophy of Science: Toulmin in Perspective" {\em Metaphilosophy} vol 19, no.3 (1988); "Four Approaches to Science and their Implications for Organized Theory and Research" {\em Knowledge} vol 9, no.1 (1987); "Four Approaches to Scientific Rationality" {\em Methodology and Science} vol 19, no.3 (1986); a number of articles on French politics and political economy. \subsection{Jeremy SHEARMUR} {\bf Jeremy SHEARMUR}, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia. Education: B.Sc (Econ), M.Sc., Ph.D. (London School of Economics), former assistant to Popper for eight years. Publications: Philosophy of science and social science; political philosophy, history of political thought, political economy. Activities: Organized first two Annual Popper conferences in U.K., numerous panels at political studies association, American Political Science Association, American Philosophical Association, American Association of Law Schools, American Historical Association, etc.. \subsection{John Robert SKOYLES} {\bf John Robert SKOYLES}, address: Department of Psychology, University College London, Gower St., London WCIE 6BT, phone, 01-387 7050 ext. 5358 (home) 6 Denning Rd., Hampstead, London NW3 ISU, phone, 01 435-3784. Education: B.Sc. (Econ) London School of Economics Department of Philosophy. Publications: Vowels of Civilization New Scientist 24/31 Dec., 1988. \subsection{Zak VAN STRAATEN} {\bf Zak VAN STRAATEN}: Department of Philosophy, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch 7700, South Africa, (021) 650-3316 (office). Strong and comprehensive interest in Popper philosophy. Publications include "Philosophical Method," {\em South African Journal of Philosophy}, June 1988, arguing that "the method of conjecture and refutation proposed by Popper for science, is, as a method, effective and sufficient for philosophy." \subsection{Andrew P. VAYDA} {\bf Andrew P. VAYDA,} Human Ecology, Cook College, P.O.Box 231, Rutgers College, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903, phone 201 932-9166 (home) 212 222-0647. Affiliations: Department of Human Ecology, Cook College, Rutgers University. Education: Ph.D. Anthropology, Columbia University. Interest in Popper: Popperian methodology and social science. Publications: Recent articles: "Holism and Individualism in Ecological Anthropology," "Actions and Consequences as Objects of Explanation in Human Ecology," "Explaining What People Eat: A Review Article." Activities: Teaching courses on explanation and methodology in social and ecological science; research in Indonesia and elsewhere on processes and mechanisms of social and ecological change. \end{document}